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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION  
 
Treating Allies with Respect: The Importance of Status  
in the Politics of Asymmetric Alliances 
 
by 
 
James Jungbok Lee 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019  
Professor Deborah W. Larson, Chair 
 
Over the past three decades, the North Korean nuclear weapons program has rapidly 
evolved into a major international conundrum. In this context, the United States and the Republic 
of Korea (ROK) should have been able to display a high level of alliance cohesion, primarily 
because of: 1) the presence of a shared security threat; and 2) the asymmetric structure of the 
alliance. Curiously, however, Seoul and Washington have frequently clashed over the North 
Korean nuclear problem throughout the post-Cold War period, and this deeply puzzling state of 
relations lies at the heart of the dissertation. The goals of this project are twofold. 
The first goal is to explain why the US and the ROK have failed to cooperate effectively 
over the management of the shared nuclear threat, and this I do so by focusing on the South 
Korean side of the story. The central argument that I advance is that for the South Koreans, 
having an opportunity to significantly influence the management of foreign policy issues critical 
iii 
 
to their national interest has been an important privilege that they believed they were entitled to 
per their claimed middle power status. This prerogative in turn had to be respected by the United 
States for their aspired status to be recognized and thereby legitimized. Otherwise, the South 
Koreans would experience status inconsistency and consequently become more prone to defying 
cooperation with the Americans. I conduct in-depth case studies of the First Korean Nuclear 
Crisis of 1993-94 and the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis of 2002-06 to demonstrate the validity 
of my claims.  
The second goal of the project is to show that the above line of argument can be 
generalized to explain instances of low levels of cohesion observable in other cases of 
asymmetrical alliances as well. For this purpose, I conduct an in-depth case study of the US-
France alliance relations during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969), up to France’s 
withdrawal from NATO in 1966. Overall, in both empirical and theoretical terms, this 
dissertation contributes to our understanding of the nature of conflicts that can develop within 
asymmetrical alliances more generally. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 Status and Respect in the Study of Asymmetric Alliances 
Over the past three decades, the North Korean nuclear weapons program has rapidly 
evolved into a major international conundrum. After having threatened the international 
community and the global nonproliferation regime with its potential to go nuclear during the 
First and Second Korean Nuclear Crises (erupted in 1993 and 2002, respectively), North Korea 
ended up testing its first nuclear weapon in October 2006—de facto becoming the world’s ninth 
nuclear power. Since then, the DPRK has conducted five additional nuclear tests, and on the 
Fourth of July of 2017, successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) for the 
first time.1 With the mainland United States now within range of Pyongyang’s weapons, the 
DPRK nuclear threat indubitably has become one of the most urgent agendas for the US 
administration. While current US President Donald J. Trump at times has claimed that the United 
States is prepared to act on its own in pressuring North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un regime,2 there is 
no doubt that a close coordination with the key players in East Asia—China, Russia, Japan, and 
South Korea—is essential for optimizing the prospects of a denuclearized peninsula, as it would 
enable application of maximum multilateral pressure on the DPRK.  
Although it is China—North Korea’s biggest ally, trade partner, and source of food and 
energy3—that has justifiably been receiving the most attention on this front due to its presumed 
                                         
1 CNN Library, "North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts," CNN, July 4 2017; John Nilsson-Wright, 
"North Korea's Nuclear Tests: How Should Trump Respond?," The BBC, September 3 2017. 
2 Mark Landler and Javier C. Hernandez, "Trump Warns China He Is Willing to Pressure North Korea on 
His Own," The New York Times, July 3 2017. 
3 Jayshree Bajoria and Beina Xu, "The China–North Korea Relationship," Council on Foreign Relations, 
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leverage over Pyongyang, it is also important that the United States not neglect the necessity of 
seeking cooperation of smaller powers like South Korea and Japan as well, especially at a time 
when Chinese help on the nuclear issue has been less than forthcoming.4 After all, to the extent 
that its North Korea strategy relies on regional cooperation, it makes eminent sense for the 
United States to turn first to its allies Japan and South Korea (before Russia and China) in order 
to secure a minimum coalition of three (while striving for a maximum of five) against the 
DPRK.5  
At a first glance, it is easy to take a close US-ROK or US-Japan coordination over the 
management of the DPRK nuclear issue for granted. After all, the purpose of a security alliance 
is to counter a shared threat, and what could possibly provide a stronger cohesive force to an 
alliance than a common enemy determined to go nuclear? And moreover, because economic, 
military, and political capabilities within each of these alliances are asymmetrically distributed to 
the United States’ favor, one can reasonably expect that the smaller parties, South Korea and 
Japan, would be motivated to maintain strategic unity with their stronger partner, lest they find 
themselves abandoned by the latter in the presence of a security threat. Curiously, however, in 
the case of the US-ROK alliance, the North Korean nuclear issue—far from generating such 
cooperative energy—instead has become a principal source of conflict between Seoul and 
Washington. Two notable examples from the current Donald Trump and Moon Jae-In period of 
                                                                                                                                   
July 5 2017. 
4 Tom Phillips, "Donald Trump Says China Does ‘Nothing’ to Thwart North Korea’s Nuclear Quest," The 
Guardian, July 30 2017. 
5 Victor D Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 
2012), p. 259. 
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the US-ROK alliance, which began in May 2017 with the election of Moon as the president of 
South Korea, attest to this point.  
The first example concerns the controversy over the deployment of the Terminal High 
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) US anti-missile system in the ROK. President Moon, as soon 
as he entered office, raised tension in the alliance by unilaterally deciding to halt the installment 
of the missile system, reasoning that the new administration must first conduct environmental 
impact assessment of the deployment site in Seongju and also subject the deployment issue itself 
to public debate (for the sake of upholding governmental transparency) before the process could 
resume. Considering that the primary purpose of the THAAD system is to serve as a bulwark 
against a potential North Korean missile attack, the fact that President Moon essentially 
jeopardized the security of both Koreans and Americans living in South Korea on less-than-
compelling grounds and without prior consultation with the United States was enough to raise 
suspicions regarding the incoming president’s commitment to uphold the ROK’s credibility as a 
strong US security partner against the common enemy.6 U.S Sen. Dick Durbin, for instance, 
voiced his frustrations, complaining, “I’m troubled by the fact that it [THAAD deployment] is 
now going to be resubmitted for political debate in the Republic of Korea as to whether or not 
they will accept our $923 million investment in missile defense of their country…I can’t follow 
their logic here.”7 And given that the DPRK at the time was not only making open threats to 
                                         
6 Mercy A. Kuo, "South Korea Stops T.H.A.A.D.: Strategic Misstep?," The Diplomat, June 22 2017; 
Scott Snyder, "South Korea's Decision to Halt T.H.A.A.D. Carries Hidden Risks," Forbes, June 11 2017; 
Byong-Su Park, "President Moon’s T.H.A.A.D. Flip-Flopping Continues with Call for Additional 
Launchers," Hankyoreh, August 3 2017.  
7 Nyshka Chandran, "North Korea Is More Erratic Than Ever, but South Korea Is in No Rush for U.S. 
Missile Defense," CNBC, July 26 2017. 
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“strike a merciless blow at the heart of the US,” but also was well on its way to build “reliable, 
nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile as early as next year [2018],”8 Moon’s decision 
must have been doubly troubling from the American point of view. In fact, President Trump was 
said to have expressed fury over President Moon’s order to halt the deployment.9 While the 
tension surrounding the THAAD missile system quickly subsided once Moon, in an about-face—
and presumably under both direct and indirect pressure from Washington—decided on July 29, 
2017 to resume its installment,10 this episode nonetheless demonstrates that the presence of the 
DPRK nuclear threat in itself does not automatically bring the US and the ROK together.   
The next example relates to the disagreement between Seoul and Washington over the 
imposition of sanctions on Pyongyang. As of October 2018, the United States was of the view 
that pressure on the DPRK had to be maintained, given that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un 
did not follow up with “concrete steps to relinquish his nuclear arms” as he had promised 
President Trump back in June at the historic US-DPRK summit in Singapore. On the other hand, 
the ROK was of the view that sanctions had to be eased in order to encourage the North Koreans 
to speed up denuclearization.11 Surprisingly, however, rather than trying to narrow the gap in 
their respective positions and thereby reach a compromise of some sort with their ally, the South 
Koreans only heightened tension in the alliance by pursuing their own set of preferred policies. 
                                         
8 Jeff Daniels, "North Korea Threatens 'Merciless Blow' to U.S. As Data Shows Moscow Aiding 
Regime," ibid., July 25. 
9 "Trump Expresses Fury over S. Korea's Decision to Delay T.H.A.A.D. Deployment: Senior Official," 
Yonhap News, June 19 2017. 
10 Park, "President Moon’s T.H.A.A.D. Flip-Flopping Continues with Call for Additional Launchers." 
11 Jonathan Cheng and Andrew Jeong, "Ease or Squeeze? U.S., Seoul Wrangle over North Korea Policy," 
The Wall Street Journal, October 18 2018. 
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For instance, the ROK, without informing the US, suddenly announced in October its plans to 
connect road and rail networks with the DPRK, and also went about “reopen[ing] a joint liaison 
office in the North” in September (even “providing fuel and electricity” for it)—both of which 
risked violating international sanctions imposed on North Korea.12 Understandably, the US 
officials were quite troubled by these actions, not only because they threatened to “undermin[e] 
Washington’s leverage in disarmament talks” by weakening the power of its sanctions, but also 
because they indicated that Seoul might not be fully committed to the alliance after all; as one 
US diplomat observed, “the South Koreans don’t seem to be bothered with keeping us in the 
loop.”13 Despite these concerns, however, the ROK continued to behave in an alliance-eroding 
manner. For example, during his nine-day trip to Europe in October, President Moon Jae-In tried 
to convince the likes of UK Prime Minister Theresa May, French President Emmanuel Macron, 
and Pope Francis to loosen sanctions on Pyongyang and to pursue greater engagement with the 
regime. Although Moon’s overture ended up being unsuccessful, such an effort nonetheless was 
something that could not be taken lightly by the Americans, for it implied that the South Korean 
president was willing to go so far as to isolate Trump internationally if that meant being able to 
deal with the DPRK problem the way he wanted.14 President Trump certainly did not hide his 
frustrations at these turn of events when he told reporters, “They [the South Koreans] do nothing 
without our approval.”15 
                                         
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Dasl Yoon and Laurence Norman, "Moon’s Push to Ease North Korea Sanctions Falls Flat," ibid., 
October 19. 
15 Cheng and Jeong, "Ease or Squeeze?." 
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In essence, these episodes demonstrate that the US and the ROK have experienced 
particularly low levels of alliance cohesion during the new Trump-Moon phase of their relations. 
The term alliance cohesion, as used here and throughout this dissertation project, can be 
understood as “the ability of states to agree on goals and strategies for attaining those goals.”16 
According to this criterion, if allies confront a policy decision and agree over how to proceed 
with ease, then an alliance can be considered cohesive—and vice versa.17 Per this criterion, the 
US-ROK alliance has not been cohesive at all over the past several years. As one former senior 
South Korean government official pointed out, “That signs of disagreement are being publicly 
exposed means there is a much deeper disagreement among US and South Korean officials in 
private meetings.”18 
Perhaps even more intriguing than the lack of cohesion per se is the fact that in the 
aforementioned episodes, South Korea—in boldly acting out of step with the United States—
played a significant role in causing the observed instances of intra-alliance conflict. Given that in 
theory the smaller and weaker party in an alliance has a strong stake in maintaining a high level 
of alliance cohesion with her more powerful partner—the provider of her security and economic 
                                         
16 Ole R Holsti, P Terrence Hopmann, and John D Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International 
Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York, NY: Wiley, 1973). For other definitions, see Fred Chernoff, 
"Stability and Alliance Cohesion: The Effects of Strategic Arms Reductions on Targeting and Extended 
Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no. 1 (1990): 92-101; Louise Richardson, When Allies 
Differ: Anglo-American Relations During the Suez and Falklands Crises (New York, NY: St. Martin's 
Press, 1996); Stephen M Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 (1997): 156-79; 
Earl C Ravenal, "Extended Deterrence and Alliance Cohesion," in Alliances in U.S. Foreign Policy: 
Issues in the Quest for Collective Defense, ed. Alan Ned Sabrosky (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988). 
Examples originally from Patricia A Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of 
War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 24. 
17 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, pp. 35-36. 
18 Cheng and Jeong, "Ease or Squeeze?." 
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benefits—it comes as a surprise as to why the Moon administration would have so deliberately 
attempted to pursue its own set of ideas and policies in defiance of its American counterpart.  
This point rings particularly true in light of the fact that the ROK does not seem to have 
earned much, if any, tangible economic or security benefits by having resorted to such behavior, 
other than perhaps having managed to fall out of favor with the United States. For example, on 
November 7, 2017, the Wall Street Journal unhesitatingly labeled Moon an “unreliable friend,” 
reasoning that “Mr. Moon favors appeasing Kim Jong-Un to lower tension on the Korean 
Peninsula, including direct talks even as the North continues its nuclear and missile tests. He 
wants to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Zone that provided Pyongyang with about $100 million 
in hard currency a year.”19 And moreover, reports have been surfacing in the early months of 
2019 that President Trump was “rais[ing] fears of US pullback” from the Korean peninsula by 
more aggressively demanding that the ROK “accept as much as 50 percent increase in what it 
pays for US military protection,”20 allowing us to surmise that the ROK did in fact end up 
alienating the United States to a certain extent—to the detriment of both its economic and 
security prospects. In short, based on a simple cost-benefit analysis alone, it is difficult to fathom 
the rationale underlying the ROK’s alliance-eroding behavior—especially given that all this 
while, the DPRK has not “taken any steps toward eliminating [its] nuclear arsenal or 
intercontinental ballistic missiles.”21 
                                         
19 The Editorial Board, "South Korea’s Bow to Beijing," The Wall Street Journal November 7 2017. 
20 Youkyung Lee and Nick Wadhams, "Trump's Spat with Ally South Korea Raises Fears of U.S. 
Pullback," Bloomberg, January 27 2019. 
21 Edith M. Lederer, "North Korean Nuclear and Missile Programs Still Intact, Says U.N. Experts," Time, 
February 5 2019. 
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While one might initially be tempted to dismiss such signs of trouble in the US-ROK 
alliance as a unique product of the Trump-Moon period, a closer examination indicates otherwise. 
That is, as far as the North Korean nuclear problem during the post-Cold War era is concerned, 
the US-ROK relations were often marred by similar instances of intra-alliance conflict that had 
much to do with South Korean defiance.    
For instance, during the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94, the ROK played quite a 
substantial role in creating a rift in the US-ROK coordination over the management of the North 
Korean nuclear threat. In the words of one scholar, “Whenever US-DPRK talks were on the 
verge of breaking down, Seoul tried to supply the lubricant to keep them going. Whenever they 
lurched ahead, Seoul applied the brakes.”22 Understandably, the ROK government under Kim 
Young-Sam (1993-1998) ended up leaving a rather poor impression on its Clinton counterpart, 
which would later recall it as having been an erratic and obstinate partner that unreasonably held 
back and complained about what the US viewed as a sensible set of approaches towards the 
North Korean nuclear proliferation problem.23 In short, the US-ROK relations during the First 
Nuclear Crisis closely paralleled that of the current Trump-Moon period, in the sense that not 
only did the presence of the North Korean nuclear threat fail to induce close cooperation between 
the US and South Korea, but also that the ROK, in deliberately acting out of step with the US, 
exacerbated the conflict and risked alienating its security partner in the process.  
Similar patterns are observable for the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (2002-2006) as 
                                         
22 Leon V Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), p. 124. 
23 C.S. Eliot Kang, "Restructuring the U.S.-South Korea Alliance to Deal with the Second Korean 
Nuclear Crisis," Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 2 (2003): 314. 
9 
 
well. As a Wall Street Journal article notes, the level of US-ROK alliance cohesion at the time 
was particularly low: “The US, focused on preventing nuclear proliferation and disarming North 
Korea, [was] looking for ways to ratchet up…economic pressure on Pyongyang. But the South 
Korean government [was] busy working to help keep its former enemy in the North afloat with 
aid and economic cooperation projects.”24 The extent to which the allies’ respective views and 
policies differed, and also the extent to which the ROK stood up to and challenged the US 
against can easily be gleaned from the following two notable instances. First, soon after the 
DPRK test-launched missiles in July 2006, the ROK Unification Minister boldly criticized the 
United States’ North Korea policy for having “fail[ed] the most.”25 Second, following the 
DPRK’s first nuclear test in October 2006, President Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2008) himself 
angrily blamed his ally, claiming, “You Americans keep on saying you want this [the nuclear 
issue] resolved diplomatically…but you are always putting up more hurdles.”26 Naturally, such 
antagonistic attitude and the overall tendency on the part of the South Korean officials to defy 
close cooperation with the US during the crisis years dismayed the Americans. For instance, 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, characterizing President Roh as “erratic” and 
“unpredictable”, wrote in her memoir that “I frankly did not know what to expect in South 
                                         
24 Gordon Fairclough, "South Korean Aid to North Increases Tensions with U.S.: Seoul, Fearing Collapse, 
Tries to Keep Neighbor Afloat; Nuclear Situation Heats Up," The Wall Street Journal, March 11 2005. 
25 Jong-Seok Lee, K'alnalwiŭi P'yŏnghwa: Nomuhyŏn Sitae T'ongiloekyoanpo Pimanglok [Peace on a 
Knife’s Edge: The inside Story of Roh Moo-Hyun's North Korea Policy] (Goyang, Korea: Kaema, 2014), 
pp. 507-09. 
26 Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York, NY: St. 
Martin's Press, 2009), p. 301. 
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Korea”;27 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates labeled Roh as “anti-American and probably a 
little crazy”;28 and President Bush even went a step further, turning to his aides during one of his 
meetings with President Roh and remarking, “He’s [Roh’s] pissing me off.”29 In sum, in line 
with the First Crisis and the ongoing Trump-Moon era, not only did the allies fail to maintain 
their cohesion in the presence of the North Korean threat, but also the ROK once again played a 
large part in eroding alliance cohesion by audaciously confronting and alienating its stronger 
partner in the process of dealing with the DPRK.  
On the whole, then, the US-ROK alliance cohesion over the North Korean nuclear issue 
in the post-Cold War period represents an especially intriguing case for understanding the causes 
of international security conflict and cooperation—in particular, within the context of an 
asymmetric security alliance—and an analysis of this deeply puzzling state of relations lies at the 
heart of this dissertation. The main goals of this project are twofold.  
The first goal, in general terms, is to explain why asymmetric allies are sometimes 
unable to display a high level of alliance cohesion despite mutual interests and shared threats. 
And specifically, in the context of the US-ROK alliance, I seek to explain the causes behind the 
United States and South Korea’s inability to cooperate effectively over the management of a 
nuclear threat emanating from their common enemy. This I do so by focusing on the South 
Korean side of the story, analyzing why the country has defied powerful strategic logic and 
                                         
27 Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York, NY: Crown 
Pub, 2011), pp. 528-29. 
28 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York, NY: Knopf, 2014), p. 416. 
29 Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York, NY: Basic 
Books, 2013), p. 388. 
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resorted instead to ostensibly unfruitful actions that have only been inimical to maintaining 
healthy alliance relations with the United States. The central argument that I advance is that the 
ROK’s behavior and the resulting erosion in the US-ROK alliance cohesion should be 
understood in terms of the country’s pursuit of status as a solid middle power in the post-Cold 
War period and its desire for the United States to recognize such aspirations. 
The second goal of this dissertation is to extend these findings from the US-ROK 
relations to other cases of asymmetrical alliances, and in so doing, enhance our understanding of 
the nature of conflicts that can develop within asymmetrical alliances more generally.  
The remainder of the introductory chapter is organized into five sections. In the 
following section, I explain in greater detail the reasons why the case of the US-ROK alliance 
presents a theoretical puzzle by reviewing the literature on alliance politics. In the second section, 
I lay out the logic of my argument, which is based on the principle of status inconsistency. In the 
third section, I introduce and discuss three major alternative hypotheses: divergent threat 
perception between the allies, the ROK’s domestic political constraints stemming from anti-
Americanism, and South Korea’s desire to bandwagon with the rising China. I then explain my 
case selection and methodology, concluding with a roadmap of the dissertation afterwards.  
Theoretical Puzzle and Literature Review 
As this dissertation focuses on the US-ROK alliance and its cooperation over the North 
Korean nuclear issue, the concept of alliance cohesion from the alliance literature will be used as 
a theoretical baseline. I adopt the following conceptualization of the term formulated by Ole 
Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan: “the ability of alliance partners to agree upon 
goals, strategy, and tactics (the attitudinal component) and to coordinate activities directed 
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towards those ends (the behavioral component).”30  
As labeled, this definition has both attitudinal and behavioral dimensions to it, with the 
former referring to “the similarity of members’ attitudes about external threats confronting the 
bloc, which constitutes the degree of attitudinal consensus of perceived external threats,” and the 
latter referring to “the degree to which alliance members cooperate and suppress their conflicts 
with other members of the alliance.”31 As Hyun-Wook Kim points out, these two dimensions are 
closely intertwined: “when the perceived interests of actors conflict each other, their attitudes 
will tend to be hostile, and their behavior will tend to involve conflict. Conversely …when the 
perceived interests of actors are held in common, their attitudes will tend to be friendly and their 
behavior will tend to be collaborative.”32  
From these points, it can be inferred that in order for alliance cohesion to be considered 
high, a given alliance would have to perform well on both attitudinal and behavioral components 
of the working definition. That is, alliance cohesion would be considered high if allies, when 
confronting a policy decision, are not only able to agree upon goals, strategy, and tactics 
(attitudinal dimension) but also able to coordinate activities directed towards those ends 
(behavioral dimension); on the other hand, alliance cohesion would be considered low if—in 
Patricia Weitsman’s words—“states cannot come to any agreement over their goals and strategy, 
                                         
30 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances, p. 16.  
31 Hyun-Wook Kim and Won K. Paik, "Alliance Cohesion in the Post-Cold War U.S.-South Korea 
Security Relations," The Journal of East Asian Affairs 23, no. 2 (2009): 5; Hyun-Wook  Kim, 
"Substantiating the Cohesion of the Post-Cold War U.S.–Japan Alliance," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 65, no. 3 (2011): 342; Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in 
International Alliances, pp. 93-94. 
32 Andrew MacKay Scott, The Functioning of the International Political System (New York, NY: 
Macmillan, 1967), p. 142. 
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or if they undertake policies that undermine their allies.” By this criterion, the US-ROK alliance 
has not been consistently cohesive throughout the post-Cold War era.  
Per the alliance literature, however, the level of alliance cohesion should have been high 
instead—scoring well on both attitudinal and behavioral dimensions—due mainly to the 
following factors: 1) the shared threat emanating from North Korea; and 2) the alliance’s 
asymmetric structure.  
First, based on the existing theories of alliance formation, it can be deduced that the 
presence of a shared external threat works to enhance the cohesion of an alliance. The alliance 
literature is predominantly built on the tenets of realism, and neo-realism in particular—the 
central premise of which is anarchy.33 According to Kenneth Waltz, states in an anarchic order 
must “provide for their own security.” As “threats or seeming threats to their security 
abound…preoccupation with identifying dangers and counteracting them becomes a way of 
life.”34 Alliance formation provides one means by which states can manage those threats, and 
whether states decide to do so via balancing or bandwagoning, the overarching goal remains one 
and the same: to maximize security in an anarchic world.35 Thus, it is no surprise that the level 
of external threat usually is cited as the most important cause of alliance formation, so much so 
that one prominent scholar states, “alliances are against, and only derivatively for, some one or 
                                         
33 Kenneth N Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); John J 
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Updated ed. (New York, NY: WW Norton & 
Company, 2014). See also Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, pp. 16-18. 
34 Kenneth N Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 
18, no. 4 (1988): 619. 
35 On balancing and bandwagoning, see Stephen M Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), pp. 17-49. 
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some thing.”36 In fact, Stephen Walt echoes this view when providing his widely-cited definition 
of an alliance—“a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more 
states”—by emphasizing that “although the precise arrangements embodied in different alliances 
vary enormously, the defining feature of any alliance is a commitment for mutual military 
support against some external actors(s) in some specified set of circumstances [emphasis 
added].”37 In short, threat is the raison d’être of alliances, and therefore, it can well be posited 
that the cohesion of an alliance would be enhanced if an existing threat were to persist or 
increase, or if an entirely new threat were to emerge.38  
By such reasoning, the US-ROK alliance should have been highly cohesive, since 
throughout the Cold War period and beyond, the two countries have shared both conventional 
and nuclear threat emanating from North Korea. In 1953, the United States and South Korea 
entered into a formal alliance in order to balance against the common threat to their national 
security: an initiation of another war on the peninsula by the DPRK, with the support of the 
Soviet Union and/or the People’s Republic of China.39 As made explicit in the Mutual Defense 
Treaty signed at the time, the US and the ROK, in the event of an armed attack on one or both 
members, would each “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
                                         
36 Patricia A Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances," Security Studies 7, no. 1 
(1997): 160. Quotation originally from George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 12   
37 Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," p. 157. 
38 Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies," p. 167. See also Walt, The Origins of Alliances. 
39  Byung-joon Ahn, "The Origins and Evolution of the Korean-American Alliance: A Korean 
Perspective," Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Paper Series  (1998): 7; Eliot Kang, 
"Restructuring the U.S.-South Korea Alliance to Deal with the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis," p. 311. 
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processes.”40 Although by the wake of the post-Cold War era the threat from Russia and China 
decreased significantly—especially following their normalization in relations with the ROK in 
1991 and 1992, respectively—the alliance nonetheless has faced the very threat that had led to its 
formation the first place—an aggressive North Korea. Only this time, the DPRK threat has taken 
a new and a more critical form, as the regime has gone nuclear.  
While Weitsman shows in her study that high alliance cohesion can be difficult to attain 
even in the presence of a high external threat if the level of internal threat between allies is also 
significant, the US-ROK alliance has not been subject to such dynamics since its inception.41 In 
other words, the US-ROK alliance, which started out as a defense pact—a form of alliance 
whereby the “parties promise one another active military support in the event one or more is 
attacked”42—has consistently remained so to the present day, without ever having transitioned 
into a “tethering” alliance of any sort—a form of alliance “undertaken in order to reduce the 
level of threat states face from their adversaries by allying with them.”43 An example of a 
tethering alliance is the alliance formed between Hitler and Stalin in 1939 via the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact, which tells us that the central purpose of such alliance is to promote “mutual restraint 
between adversaries” by “hold[ing] animosities in check”—essentially “conciliat[ing] an 
                                         
40 Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, The Evolution of the South Korea–United States Alliance (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), pp. 1-2. 
41 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, pp. 24-27. 
42 Brett Ashley Leeds, "Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the 
Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes," American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 3 (2003): 430. 
43 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, p. 22. 
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adversary through an alliance agreement.44 Clearly, the US-ROK alliance has never fallen into 
this category. In short, this fact, along with the presence of the DPRK’s conventional and nuclear 
threat, allows one to posit that a high level of US-ROK alliance cohesion should have been 
maintained into the post-Cold War era. Giving further credence to such conjecture is Brett Leeds 
and Burcu Savun’s finding that nearly 75 percent of alliances they examined fulfilled 
commitments when conditions arose that necessitated allied action.45 
Second, the asymmetric nature of the US-ROK alliance should have worked towards 
enhancing its cohesiveness, especially by encouraging loyalty of the smaller partner, South 
Korea. As James Morrow points out, asymmetric alliances are easier to form and to maintain 
than their symmetric counterparts, for the stronger partner (the patron) gains autonomy in 
exchange for providing security to the weaker partner (the client).46 The essence of this 
argument, according to Leeds and Savun, is that an asymmetric alliance is “based on implicit 
issue linkage,” with the “major power[ ] provid[ing] security to minor power[ ] in return for 
support on other issues,” such as “economic cooperation, territorial settlement agreements, 
and/or guarantees for minority rights.”47 And the presence of such tradeoff in turn tends to 
enhance cohesion of an asymmetric alliance—as Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane claim, 
                                         
44 Ibid., p. 21. 
45  Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, "Reevaluating Alliance 
Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 5 (2000): 697. 
46 For an extensive theoretical discussion on this tradeoff, see James D Morrow, "Alliances and 
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Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991): 904-33.  
47 Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, "Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?," 
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issue linkage more generally can “facilitate agreements that might not otherwise be possible”48—
since leaders on both sides would be “less likely to defect on any issue for fear of losing the 
benefits of cooperation on other issues…when cooperation on one issue is linked to cooperation 
on other issues.”49  
Moreover, considering that it is security that the weaker partner in an asymmetrical 
alliance is gaining via the bargain with the stronger partner, it can be inferred that of the two, the 
former would be the party that has a much greater stake in maintaining cohesion of the alliance. 
That is, as the more vulnerable of the partners in the absence of the partnership, the client state 
comes to fear the risk of abandonment—which, according to Victor Cha, is the “fear that the ally 
may leave the alliance, may not live up to explicit commitments, or may fail to provide support 
in contingencies where support is expected”50—and for this reason, it is unlikely that it would 
take any action that may erode harmonious relations with the patron state; after all, as John 
Mearsheimer points out, survival is the number one goal of states in an anarchical international 
system.51 Therefore, it can reasonably be expected that the client, in order to maintain the 
attractiveness of the alliance for the stronger partner, would try to establish a reputation for 
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loyalty.52 And given that a negative reputation for disloyalty, according to Jonathan Mercer, 
leaves a much stronger impression than a positive one for loyalty, the client would be further 
deterred from unnecessarily defying patron-set agenda.53 In short, while the client’s tactics to 
avoid abandonment necessarily entail a sacrifice of political voice and policy autonomy on its 
part, at the end of the day, they would work to enhance alliance cohesion.  
The US-ROK alliance was no exception to such dynamics. For example, in 1971, after 
the US followed through the Guam Doctrine and withdrew 20,000 of the 62,000 American troops 
stationed in South Korea,54 the ROK—out of a genuine fear of complete abandonment—
surreptitiously launched a project on developing indigenous atomic capability as a last resort. 
Unfortunately for the South Koreans, however, their clandestine program was soon discovered in 
1975 by the Americans, who followed up with a threat to terminate the defense alliance with 
Seoul if it did not shut the project down immediately.55 This episode is a salient example that 
demonstrates the extent to which the asymmetric nature of the US-ROK alliance endowed the 
US with the power to constrain the ROK’s autonomy, helping it rein in any deviation from its 
agenda and thereby increase cohesion of the alliance. As David Lake claims, to the extent that a 
subordinate state is “dependent upon the dominant state, it must obey the latter’s commands and 
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anticipate its wishes.”56 
One might argue, however, that the situation is different for the post-Cold War period, 
since the ROK’s rapid economic development over the Cold War era would have helped reduce 
its military dependence on the United States and thereby eroded the asymmetric nature of the 
alliance. As a number of prominent scholars point out, economic prosperity forms the basis for 
military effectiveness. For example, Paul Kennedy claims in his seminal work that “all major 
shifts in the world’s military-power balances have followed alterations in the productive 
balances.”57 Moreover, Robert Gilpin and A.F.K Organski, in making the connection between 
economy and military more explicit, claim that technological advancements, which are crucial 
for enhancing military capabilities, necessitate significant investment in research and 
development that can only be sustained via strong economic development.58 According to James 
Morrow, when one partner in an alliance improves its capabilities through economic 
development, “its ability to provide for its own security increases,” and as a result, “it will 
demand additional autonomy from its ally, either by obtaining new concessions or by removing 
old obligations,” either of which would work towards weakening alliance cohesion.59  
In the case of South Korea, the country has certainly leveraged on its miraculous 
economic growth over the past decades to significantly improve its military power. As the 12 th 
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largest economy in the world and a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), the ROK today is able to spend nearly $40 billion in national defense, an 
enormous jump from a mere $411 million back in 1971.60 As such, South Korea should have 
become highly confident over the years in its ability to provide for its own security, especially 
considering that the North Korean economy in the meantime has experienced a rapid decline and 
the country can now only spend $8.3 billion in defense (one-fifth of the ROK) as a result.61 
Indeed, in 1994, the US and the ROK agreed to return peacetime operational control (OPCON) 
to the latter, and talks of transferring wartime OPCON to Seoul began in 2002, with then-
president Roh Moo-Hyun supporting the policy by reasoning that “our military forces 
have…grown up strong enough to be able to control its operation.”62  
Nonetheless, despite these signs of the ROK’s increased confidence stemming from both 
economic and military development, the country on the whole has continued to depend heavily 
on the United States for security throughout the post-Cold War period. In simplest terms, this is 
mainly because North Korea has armed itself with nuclear weapons while South Korea has not—
the former officially went nuclear in October 2006 via its first nuclear test, whereas the latter has 
been nuclear-free since December 1991, when the US removed all nuclear weapons from the 
peninsula. 63  According to John Mearsheimer, “nuclear weapons, because of the horror 
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associated with their use, really are the ultimate deterrent. Formidable conventional forces 
simply do not have and can never have the deterrent value of nuclear weapons.”64 Therefore, per 
a recent Chosun Ilbo article, one can characterize the military status quo on the peninsula today 
as “a severe imbalance,” since “North Korea is now armed with nuclear weapons and ICBMs, 
and no matter how heavily armed South Korea may be with conventional weapons, the North has 
the advantage.”65 And add to this the fact that since the end of the Cold War, the US has enjoyed 
a “virtually unchallenged position as the system’s preeminent superpower,” with its “military, 
diplomatic and economic power, and influence” rivaled by none.66 It is thus only natural for 
South Korea to have continued to depend heavily on the US for security. 
Perhaps this is the reason why in spite of all the hype about the OPCON transfer, Seoul 
has continued to balk at actually executing the plan. In particular, although Washington and 
Seoul had initially set the date of transfer to April 17, 2012 under President Roh Moo-Hyun 
(2003-2008), President Lee Myung-Bak (2008-2013) had pushed the date back until December 1, 
2015, and President Park Geun-Hye (2013-2017) has deferred the transfer indefinitely.67 The 
implication of all this is very clear. The ROK indubitably has become much more powerful 
economically and militarily over the past decades, yet it still is quite far from being able to 
provide for its own security independently—it continues to depend greatly on the US extended 
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deterrence and nuclear umbrella.68 After all, as Morrow points out, in an asymmetric alliance, 
“changes in the weaker power’s capabilities will not greatly alter the nature of the trade [between 
autonomy and security]. Because it provides autonomy to the major power, its contribution to the 
alliance is unaffected by changes in its capabilities.”69 Therefore, it can be posited that similar to 
the Cold War era, South Korea of the post-Cold War period would also have been strongly 
motivated to maintain a high level of alliance cohesion with the United States as dictated by the 
asymmetric nature of the alliance, because only by doing so would it have been able to optimize 
its security.  
Overall, then, as the review of some of the alliance literature’s major tenets makes it 
clear, the low levels of alliance cohesion between the United States and South Korea with respect 
to the North Korean nuclear issue presents a puzzle. In particular, in stark contrast to the 
theoretical prediction that the shared threat emanating from the DPRK and the asymmetric 
structure of the alliance would have enabled the US and the ROK to readily agree on goals, 
strategy and tactics for dealing with the common enemy (attitudinal dimension) and also to 
effectively coordinate activities towards those ends (behavior dimension), the reality tells us 
otherwise. Therefore, in this dissertation, I aim to provide answers to the following two questions 
that stem from this enigma. First, why have the United States and South Korea been unable to 
maintain a high level of cohesion against the face of a common threat? Second, why has South 
Korea resorted to acting in defiance of the patron state at the risk of alienating the latter and 
thereby jeopardizing its security, without any apparent countervailing benefits? In the next 
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section, I present my central argument.  
The Argument  
In this dissertation, I argue that the low levels of US-ROK alliance cohesion over the 
North Korean nuclear problem should be understood within the context of South Korea’s pursuit 
of status as a solid middle power in the post-Cold War period. In particular, I demonstrate that for 
the South Koreans, having an opportunity to significantly influence the management of foreign 
policy issues critical to their national interest—such as the North Korean nuclear problem—has 
been an important privilege that they believed they were entitled to per their claimed middle 
power status. This prerogative in turn had to be respected by the United States for their aspired 
status to be recognized and thereby legitimized. Otherwise, the South Koreans would experience 
status inconsistency and consequently become more prone to defying cooperation with the 
Americans. In the fourth chapter of this project, I show that this line of argument can also explain 
the low levels of alliance cohesion observable in the US-France alliance relations during the 
presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969) as well.  
In this section, I start out by introducing the concept of status and its empirical and 
theoretical significance. I then elaborate on the logic underlying the principle of status 
inconsistency, which forms the basis for understanding South Korea’s behavioral patterns. And 
finally, I apply the principle to the case of the US-ROK alliance.  
What is Status 
According to Deborah Larson, T.V. Paul, and William Wohlforth, status can be defined 
as “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive 
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capabilities, culture, demographic position, sociopolitical organizations and diplomatic clout).”70 
Steven Ward similarly defines status as a “position that an actor occupies within a social 
hierarchy,” which can essentially be understood as “membership in an elite club” or as “a 
socially recognized and accepted ranking within a community.” In the context of international 
politics, these “clubs” refer to “stratified positions within a global social hierarchy,” such as “the 
‘West’, the OECD, and the G7.”71 As these definitions make it clear, a status-based analysis of 
international relations presupposes that the international system is a hierarchy (as opposed to an 
anarchy), defined as a “system through which actors are organized into vertical relations of 
super-and subordination.”72 In this dissertation, I treat status as an identity, in the sense that a 
state’s position in an international hierarchy is one of many dimensions that inform its “own 
conception of who or what it is.”73 
Status, in Jonathan Renshon’s words, can be understood as “many actors’ beliefs about 
what many other actors also believe.” This is because there tends to be a “common” or “shared” 
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belief among a “community [of states] about where each actor stands in some hierarchy.”74 To 
make his case, Renshon draws on Barry O’Neill’s analytical framework of “hierarchy of beliefs,” 
in which the 0th level refers to “objective situation,” the 1st level refers to “one actor’s beliefs 
about another actor,” and the 2nd level refers to “beliefs of one actor about the beliefs of another 
actor or group of actors.”75 While O’Neill doesn’t situate status specifically in his framework, 
Renshon addresses this gap by arguing that status is located at a level beyond the second order, 
reasoning that “status is not simply about one actor’s beliefs about one other actor,” but instead 
“many actors’ beliefs about what many other actors also believe.”76 In short, per Cecilia 
Ridgeway and Shelley Correll, “status beliefs are necessarily beliefs about what ‘most people’ do 
or would think about the status worthiness and competence of one categorical group compared to 
another.”77 
Status matters in world politics because, as Larson, Paul, and Wohlforth argue, it “brings 
with it deference to a state’s interests and concerns.” Specifically, they claim that if a state has a 
high status, others will “acknowledge, respect, and defer to” its special interests in both crises 
and everyday interactions, and thus, one can assert that “the higher a given state’s status, the 
more other states will adjust their policies to accommodate its interests, institutions and ideas.”78 
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For this reason, state behaviors tend to be significantly motivated by a desire to acquire higher 
status. For example, states often seek out “positions and protocol symbolizing respect and 
deference,” the likes of “membership in elite clubs such as the Group of 8 (G8), permanent 
membership in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), leadership positions in 
international organizations,” among others.79 Similarly, they also strive to acquire status symbols, 
such as space programs and high-technology weapons, in order to influence others’ perception of 
their standing.80 In essence, status considerations can significantly influence state behavior, and 
by extension, mold global governance and world order. As John Harsanyi states, "Apart from 
economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and 
motivating force of social behavior"; a voluminous amount of research in fact corroborate this 
claim, demonstrating that humans (and by extension, states) are “hardwired for sensitivity to 
status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.”81 It is 
thus unsurprising that Renshon, Dafoe and Huth would go so far as to claim, “if there is one 
feature of…status on which scholars agree, it is that leaders, policy elites, and national 
populations are often concerned, even obsessed, with their status.”82 
The distinctive advantage of applying an analytical framework based on status concerns 
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is that it is able to explain behaviors that deviate from the economic model of rational choice. For 
instance, given a choice between two worlds, the first in which a person would earn $100,000 
while another person would earn $90,000, versus the second in which he would earn $110,000 
while another would earn $200,000, the rational actor model predicts that the person in question 
would choose the latter, simply because $110,000 is greater than $100,000. However, survey 
evidence indicates that a substantial proportion of respondents opted for the former, indicating 
that there is a strong psychological attraction offered by the relative superiority that cannot be 
explained via economic explanations alone. 83  Another example relates to James Fearon’s 
seminal work, “The Rationalist Explanations for War.” In that article, Fearon claims that issue 
indivisibility rarely provides a coherent rationalist explanation of war, for "both the intrinsic 
complexity and richness of most matters over which states negotiate and the availability of 
linkages and side-payments suggest that intermediate bargains typically will exist."84 However, 
according to William Wohlforth, this is not necessarily true, since even issues that are “physically 
divisible can become socially indivisible, depending on how they relate to the identities of 
decision makers.” In particular, once an issue is framed in terms of status, disputants “may be 
unwilling to pursue intermediate bargaining solutions” insofar as “they value their standing itself,” 
even if striking a bargain makes more sense in rational terms.85  
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The takeaway from these two examples is clear: the preference for status, per Wohlforth, 
is a “basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.” That is, people are 
often motivated to pursue certain ends “not because of the welfare or security they bring but 
because of the social status they confer.” In fact, under certain conditions, the search for status 
may even lead states to “behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security 
and/or prosperity.”86 Therefore, it can be said that the key advantage of focusing on status lies in 
its ability to shed light on anomalous state behaviors that are difficult to understand from the 
rationalist perspective alone, and for this reason, it merits incorporation into the analysis of 
interstate relations. 
Having introduced the concept of status and its empirical and analytical significance, I 
move on next to elaborate on the principle of status inconsistency, which forms the basis for 
understanding the causes behind the ROK’s alliance eroding behavior with respect to the North 
Korean nuclear issue.   
Status Inconsistency 
The main theoretical principle that I claim undergirds the ROK’s behavioral pattern over 
the post-Cold War period is as follows: a state that experiences status inconsistency becomes 
motivated to take defiant and/or assertive actions redress the situation, even if its material and/or 
security interests could be jeopardized as a result. The underlying logic is explained below. 
According to Steven Ward, in order for a state to achieve a certain status, it must satisfy 
two conditions. First, the state has to “acquire the markers that distinguish those eligible for a 
particular stratified position from those ineligible [emphasis added].” Second, the state has to be 
                                         
86 Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," p. 35.  
29 
 
“recognized by relevant others as occupying a particular position.”87 
The first requirement is quite straightforward. It simply means that a state should have 
what it takes to justify its claimed position in the international hierarchy. That is, it should have a 
status marker, which can be defined as “a salient attribute that is necessary (albeit not sufficient) 
for substantiating one’s claims to a particular social status.”88 For example, possessing nuclear 
weapons—a marker of great power status—is necessary for a state to make claims to such status 
position, yet the possession of those weapons in itself does not make a state a great power, as 
indicated by the case of the DPRK. In general, a status marker can include concrete factors like 
GDP, military power, population, and natural resources and also intangible ones like cultural 
achievements, soft power, and moral authority as well.89 To be sure, what exactly constitutes a 
status marker “var[ies] with cultural context and historical era” and “depends on the prevailing 
international culture and practices”; as Renshon notes, because status is “based on higher-order 
beliefs, there is no objective, time-invariant formula for what qualities or attributes confer status.” 
For instance, in the 18th century, a great power had to be “a guarantor of an international treaty”; 
in the 19th century, a member of the European Concert; and today, it has to be a permanent 
member in the UNSC or a member of the G8, among others.90 Despite these variations, however, 
the important point is that at a given time, there tends to be “collective understandings about 
what kinds of characteristic or performances qualify actors for membership in various status 
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categories”91—that is, a general agreement as to what sorts of markers characterize a great power, 
a middle power, and so on. As Kenneth Waltz asserts, "historically, despite the difficulties, one 
finds general agreement about who the great powers of a period are, with occasional doubt about 
the marginal cases."92  
According to Michelle Murray, a state takes into account such broader social context—in 
conjunction with its domestic discourses and historical experiences—to form a self conception of 
where “it is located in the social structure of the international system and what interests and 
actions are appropriate to that subject[ive] position [emphasis added]”93 In other words, once a 
state has certain status markers in hand, it comes to form a more concrete self-understanding and 
begins to “imagine [itself] occupying particular positions relative to others [emphasis added].”94 
A pertinent example is China’s pursuit of great power status today.95 According to Jack Levy, in 
order to be a great power, a state must have unusual levels of military and economic capabilities 
and an ability to utilize those relatively independently of other major powers.96 Hedley Bull adds 
that a great power must intend to use such extraordinary capability for promoting peace and 
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security of the international system as a whole.97 By Levy and Bull’s criteria, then, having both 
the ability and willingness to behave as a powerful and responsible member of the international 
society constitutes a marker of great power status. In the case of China, the country does fulfill 
that criterion, since it is an economic and military giant that has actively participated in 
multilateral institutions and international cooperative efforts on both economic and security 
fronts (e.g., UN Peacekeeping Operation and the Six-Party Talks);98 it is thus rather unsurprising 
that the country would feel entitled to a great power status.99 
As the italicized terms subjective and imagine in the above paragraph tells us, however, 
simply having status markers does not automatically enable a state to secure its place in the 
international hierarchy. This is because status is inherently subjective, and as such, a state cannot 
attain status unilaterally; rather, status depends on others’ perceptions and therefore must be 
recognized by others to be concretized—the second of the two requirements for status 
achievement.100 As Steven Ward points out, given that “status exists in the realm of ideas and 
beliefs,” status markers can only create expectations for a state about “where it belongs in an 
imagined hierarchy.”101 The “actual position,” he continues, “exists in the collective beliefs of 
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relevant others about the validity of the claim.”102 What this means in practice is that in order for 
a state to secure its aspired status, it has to earn the recognition of others, because as Jennifer 
Mitzen points out, “whatever a state’s private aspirations, the social meaning of its type depends 
on whether other states represent that state in a similar way.”103  
Recognition in this context can thus be understood as a set of actions on the part of a 
state’s significant other(s) that indicate their agreement with the version of the state’s status-
based identity that it is trying to promote. More concretely, to recognize a state’s declared status 
can be said to involve showing respect for that state’s privileges that it believes it is entitled to 
per its claimed status position.104 So in essence, a recognition of a state’s aspired status is 
reducible to an act of respect for the prerogatives it associates with that status, which in turn boils 
down to a behavior that appropriately confirm—directly or by implication—that state’s 
entitlement to those privileges; an act of disrespect by contrast boils down to a disregard for 
them.105 That being said, successful acts of recognition—and by extension, a show of respect for 
a state’s claimed privileges and prerogatives—work to “secure the state’s identity and provide 
self-certainty because they transform a state’s self-understanding into its identity, thereby 
reflecting back to the state an image of what it already understands itself to be.”106 On the other 
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hand, in the absence of such recognition, there continues to remain a gap between a state’s status 
aspirations and reality; more specifically, per Thomas Lindemann, a “denial of recognition 
means that the asserted image [of an actor] is superior to that returned by others.”107 For instance, 
China can aspire to be a great power on the basis of its enormous military and economic power 
and extensive involvement in international cooperative efforts. But if its significant other(s) 
refuses to respect, for example, its prerogative to “legitimately exercise power and influence 
unilaterally” within its sphere of influence—a privilege that China believes it is entitled to per its 
claimed great power status108—China’s actual status would trail the declared status, and therefore, 
for the time being, it would not be able to secure its position as a great power.109  
In sum, then, for a state “to actually occupy a stratified position within a hierarchy,” not 
only does it have to acquire associated status markers, but also it has to earn the recognition of 
others for the claimed status by getting them to respect “the privileges that go along with the 
desired status.”110 In simplest terms, status inconsistency arises when there is a mismatch 
between the two conditions—that is, when a state “perceives that its attributed status is lower 
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than the level of status it believes it deserves.”111 I argue that when a state experiences status 
inconsistency, it becomes highly motivated to take assertive and/or defiant actions to redress the 
situation, even if its material and/or security interests could be jeopardized as a result.  
According to the constructivist view of international politics, “a secure identity is 
essential for state survival,” because a state “requires a stable identity in order to be a subject in 
the international system”;112 as Erik Ringmar notes, in international politics, “not only physical, 
but also social survival is at stake.”113 And “without a stable sense of self,” argues Murray, 
“states cannot define or realize their interests and hence cannot be secure.”114 That is, so long as 
a state’s status-based identity is put into question, the state cannot “function as a positively 
informed self and thus cannot pursue the interests that follow from its perceived identity.”115 
Therefore, in the event that a state’s aspired status goes unrecognized, the status-inconsistent 
state should become motivated to seek out recognition from its significant other(s). And against 
such backdrop, it would begin to search for “ways to alter the beliefs of other members of the 
international community”—especially its significant other(s) 116 —so that they would show 
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respect for certain prerogatives and privileges that it believes it is entitled to due to its aspired 
status position. Indeed, as Thomas Volgy and Stacy Mayhall point out, “a country may rank 
relatively high on economic and/or military capabilities (i.e., achieved status) but may be 
accorded little prestige (i.e., ascribed status) by the international community. Under such 
conditions…it is plausible that a nation’s decision makers would evidence a strong desire to 
change the status quo [emphasis added].117 
In particular, a status-inconsistent state, in trying to get its significant others to show 
respect for its claimed privileges, would strongly make its case that it is both resolved and 
capable of exercising those prerogatives—as Marina Duque puts it, a pursuit of status can be 
conceptualized as “an effective claim to social esteem in terms of privileges.”118 And in that 
process, a status-inconsistent state is likely to resort to assertive and/or defiant behaviors, even if 
its material and/or security interests could be jeopardized as a result. For example, in recent years, 
China, a great power aspirant, has been trying to overcome its status dissonance by constructing 
a series of artificial islands in the disputed waters of the South China Sea, against the opposition 
of the United States and its allies;119 from the Chinese perspective, this was a way of forcefully 
demonstrating both their ability and determination to exercise control over their claimed sphere 
of influence. In order to understand why a status-inconsistent state might be prone to engaging in 
such assertive actions, I will now turn to explore some of the micro-foundations of status-seeking 
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behavior. 
Experiments have shown that once a person’s status is threatened, he is “willing to pay 
far more to keep x amount of status than [he] would be if it had not been threatened in the first 
place.”120 As Pettit, Yong, and Spataro point out, “individuals value status more when recalling a 
potential loss than when recalling a potential gain” and “pay more and work harder to avoid a 
status loss than to achieve a status.”121 What this means, per Renshon, is that once status is 
threatened and leaders experience status inconsistency, “they will become increasingly willing to 
expend resources to save it.” That is, status concerns come to be “raised high enough that they 
overshadow the increased expenditure of economic resources.”122 Such a phenomenon is to a 
large extent attributable to the fact that an experience of status inconsistency tends to be 
accompanied by feelings of disrespect and/or humiliation. 123  In particular, an actor feels 
disrespected when others directly or indirectly “lower her rank or question claims on which she 
grounds her status position” by denying the “degree of esteem or consideration she feels entitled 
to.”124 Similarly, a state feels humiliated when it believes that “its position has been lowered in 
the eyes of others and that this lowered estimation will result in a future decline in respect and 
                                         
120 Renshon, Fighting for Status, p. 61. 
121 Nathan C Pettit, Kevyn Yong, and Sandra E Spataro, "Holding Your Place: Reactions to the Prospect 
of Status Gains and Losses," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 46, no. 2 (2010): 400. 
122 Renshon, Fighting for Status, p. 61. 
123 Joslyn Barnhart, "Status Competition and Territorial Aggression: Evidence from the Scramble for 
Africa," Security Studies 25, no. 3 (2016): 390. 
124 Wolf, "Respect and Disrespect in International Politics," p. 107; Barnhart, "Status Competition and 
Territorial Aggression," p. 390. 
37 
 
deference.”125  
What is important about an experience of disrespect and humiliation is that it tends to 
trigger an arousal of emotions, such as anger and frustration. As Jonathan Turner and Jan Stets 
claim, it is when self is not “verified by others responding to self in a manner that is consistent 
with self’s own view” that negative emotions such as anger, distress, shame, fear, and frustration 
are generated.126 Similarly, as sociologist Charles Cooley remarks, it is when “we impute to the 
other person an injurious thought regarding something which we cherish as part of our self" that 
anger (in particular) comes along.127 That being said, when a person experiences these negative 
emotions, they become motivated to take “more risk prone and more aggressive behavior” to 
overcome them, because, as Reinhard Wolf points out, those feelings work to “constrain 
information processing,” “negatively bias[ ] perceptions,” “reduce[ ] the demand for information,” 
and also to “shorten[ ] decision times.”128  
The implication of all this for a status-inconsistent state is quite clear. In the process of 
convincing its significant others to show respect for its claimed privileges, a status-dissatisfied 
nation would often resort to assertive and/or defiant actions (which might jeopardize its material 
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and/or security interests), largely because of the influence of the emotional arousal that tend to 
accompany an experience of disrespect and/or humiliation.129 Indeed, as Manus and Elizabeth 
Midlarsky claim, “national decision makers who are exposed to conditions of extreme 
frustration…may react in ways which facilitate the onset of international aggression.”130  
Before concluding this subsection, I now point out two important ways in which my 
argument departs from and contributes to the previous literature on status inconsistency. First, it 
should be noted that there is a large body of scholarship dating back to the work of Johan 
Galtung that sets out to explain state behavior in terms of its experience of status inconsistency 
and/or its variants (i.e., status dissatisfaction and status deficit).131 Michael Wallace, for example, 
finds that “status inconsistency plays a significant role in the genesis of international conflict.”132 
Maurice East, on the other hand, finds that there is a “negative relationship between overall 
levels of status inconsistency in international system and international conflict.”133 Still others 
like Volgy and Mayhall find mixed support for the connection between status inconsistency and 
international violence, with the linkage holding true for the period 1950-64 and not so for the 
period 1964-80.134 Regardless of the differences in the findings, these works are common in that 
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they operationalize a state’s attributed status in terms of “the number of diplomats received” and 
expected status—or “what countries would feel they ‘deserved’”—in terms of “military and 
industrial capacity”135; status inconsistency arises when there is a mismatch between the two. 
Thus, the concept of status inconsistency that these works incorporate are, at its core, in line with 
the one used in this dissertation: namely, a condition in which a state experiences a disjuncture 
between the status it believes that it deserves (status expectation) and the actual status attributed 
by the international community (status attribution). However, what is missing from this body of 
scholarship is the specific mechanism by which an experience of status inconsistency instigates a 
state to resort to certain behaviors (i.e., engaging in violent actions), making it seem as if a 
discrepancy in the objective conditions alone is sufficient to motivate state action. My argument 
addresses this gap by proposing the concepts of (dis)respect and (mis)recognition as the crucial 
intermediary steps linking status dissatisfaction and the resulting state behavior.  
The second contribution of my argument to the status literature relates to the question of 
whether status-seeking is rational or irrational. Many works in this vein have—explicitly or by 
implication—taken the latter position, viewing status-seeking “largely as a manifestation of 
pathology or irrationality.”136 For instance, Forsberg, Heller, and Wolf notes that status concerns 
“may give rise to behavior that is typically depicted as emotional or ‘irrational’.”137 Similarly, 
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Michelle Murray, who studied Germany’s naval expansion during the Weltpolitik, labels such 
project—to the extent that it was motivated and sustained by status ambitions—“irrational”.138 
On the other hand, scholars like Jonathan Renshon explicitly make the case that status-seeking is 
perfectly rational, since status, “like honor, reputation, credibility, or other ideational constructs, 
is something that political actors care about and are willing to pay costs to gain,” for there is “an 
expectation that it is instrumentally valuable.”139 In this project, I take the best of both worlds, 
agreeing with the likes of Renshon that status is a valuable enough resource that makes it rational 
for states to go after, while also agreeing with the likes of Murray and Forsberg that status 
concerns can often prompt a state to resort to behaviors that do not make sense in rational 
terms—especially when it becomes overwhelmed with emotions like anger and frustration that 
follow an experience of disrespect and/or humiliation where status concerns are involved. In 
essence, the second contribution of my argument to the status literature is that it posits that while 
status-seeking in itself can be construed as rational by default, the intrusion of psychological 
factors can prompt a state to behave in an irrational manner as well.  
In sum, in this subsection, I introduced and elaborated on the concept of status 
inconsistency, and explained in detail the reasons why a status-inconsistent state is likely to take 
assertive and/or defiant behaviors to redress the situation. I also made a note of the ways in 
which my dissertation departs from and contributes to the prior literature on status inconsistency. 
I move on next to apply the principle to the case of the US-ROK alliance. 
Principle Contextualized 
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The principle of status inconsistency, once again, is as follows: a state that experiences 
status inconsistency becomes motivated to take assertive and/or defiant actions redress the 
situation, even if its material and/or security interests could be jeopardized as a result. In this 
subsection, I apply this analytical framework to the case of the US-ROK relations, with the 
following three questions in mind. First, why were concerns for status an important aspect of the 
South Koreans’ diplomatic calculus during the post Cold War era? Second, what sorts of 
privileges and prerogatives did they want their significant others (the United States in particular) 
to respect, and what was the rationale underlying such choice? Third, what is the relationship 
between South Korea’s experience of status inconsistency (the independent variable) and the 
cohesion of the US-ROK alliance (the dependent variable)?  
In order to understand why the ROK has been status conscious over the past three 
decades, we first have to understand that following the end of the Cold War, “both power and 
authority in world politics started to coalesce around the triumphant West.”140 The leading 
advanced democracies of North America, Europe and Japan began to form a “great-power 
society,” characterized by “stable nuclear deterrence, reliable democratic peace, and firm liberal 
economic beliefs,” whereas a large part of the rest of the world continued to be mired in “old-
power politics and violence.”141 As a result, many of the key Western values such as economic 
liberalism and political democracy were soon elevated as the ideals to be pursued in the new 
world order, and democracy in particular “came to enjoy a new status as a now authoritative 
principle of international life” and as “the international standard for regimes wishing to integrate 
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into the global order.”142 Consequently, the small number of those “elite” states that already 
subscribed to these norms and principles became categorized as a “higher-status group” that 
represented a “superior mode of both domestic and international organization of political life.”143 
As Francis Fukuyama observed at this point in time, “the century that began full of self-
confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be 
returning full circle to where it started…an unabashed victory of economic and political 
liberalism.”144 
According to Social Identity Theory (SIT), people “derive part of their identity from 
membership in various social groups—nation, ethnicity…or occupation.” Because membership 
reflects back on the self, people want their groups to have an identity that is both positive and 
distinctive.145 Therefore, when people can no longer derive positive identity from their group 
membership, they try to redress the situation by pursuing one of the three “identity management 
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strategies”: social mobility, competition, and creativity. 146  Of particular relevance to our 
discussion here is social mobility. Per this strategy, people from a “lower-status group” attempt to 
pass into a “higher status group” by conforming to the norms adhered to by the latter.147 In the 
context of international politics, a state pursuing social mobility would emulate the “institutions, 
values, or ideology of the dominant states” in order to be “admitted to more prestigious 
institutions or clubs.”148 Because the end of the Cold War brought about not only a very clear 
demarcation between the lower and higher status groups of nations along the lines of political 
and economic values but also a new configuration of international power structure favorable to 
the US upon which these new norms could be securely established,149 many nations became 
incentivized to seek entry into the higher-status club by way of social mobility.  
The ROK was one of those nations striving for an enhanced status position. And by the 
wake of the post-Cold War period, the South Koreans were able to make a significant headway 
towards that end via a major step forward in their democratization.150 Specifically, in the winter 
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of 1992, the South Koreans—following the years of political liberalization that began in the mid-
1980s—completed their democratic transition from the authoritarian past with the election of 
Kim Young-Sam as the country’s first democratically elected civilian president in three 
decades. 151  In essence, a “genuine civilian democratic government” that was prepared to 
promote “such universal values as democracy, liberty, welfare and human rights” at both home 
and abroad was at last established in South Korea.152   
Against the backdrop of such historic accomplishment, the South Koreans have become 
highly confident that their country was finally ready to take its “rightful place in the ranks of the 
democratic and industrialized nations [on the world stage].”153 That is, they have come to 
strongly believe that their successful pursuit of social mobility via democratization entitled the 
ROK to an enhanced status by way of new categorization. Given that South Korea was also at 
this point “on the verge of becoming a developed economy” after having undergone decades of 
exceptional economic growth spurred by rapid industrialization since the 60’s—a globally 
recognized economic miracle that won its title as one of the four Asian Tigers154—and also 
managed to win the coveted memberships in the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for 
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1991 and 1996, respectively, the South 
Koreans’ conviction in their increased status has been further reinforced. In particular, the South 
Koreans have come to self-identify as a middle power.  
Middle powers, according to Eduard Jordaan, can be defined as “states that are neither 
great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a 
propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system.”155 Or put another way, 
middle powers “can be treated as secondary states whose possession of material capabilities can, 
to some degree, influence the international system through their active engagement in global 
governance.”156 As these definitions make it clear, middle powers are not simply defined by 
their material capability—as Gareth Evans, the former Australian foreign minister, rightfully 
points out, “objective criteria like GDP, population size, physical size and military capability can 
be no more than starting points.” 157  Instead, middle powers are associated with certain 
behavioral patterns as well. In particular, according to Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal, those patterns 
are characterized by three major preferences: “1) projecting good international citizenship as the 
normative basis of foreign policy; 2) seeking multilateral agreement to resolve global problems; 
and 3) assuming crisis management initiatives to alleviate instability in global affairs.”158 In 
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other words, a middle power is essentially a “good citizen of international society who respect[s] 
the rules of the game and abide[s] by international norms as stipulated by the UN and other 
international organizations” and who devote their diplomatic capability to “induc[e] consensus 
and collaboration between states in special issue areas.”159 In short, a middle power is a “state 
that ranks between a major power and a minor power” that has the ability, aspiration, and 
willingness to play a “meaningful leadership role within international politics,” with the goal of 
“contributing to making the world a better place, including by addressing issues that do not relate 
directly to the national interest.”160 
Nevertheless, as the discussion in the previous subsection on status inconsistency tells us, 
it is one thing to acquire the markers of certain status by satisfying the material and behavioral 
criteria. Doing so is certainly important, if not necessary, but to actually achieve one’s aspired 
status, an entity has to get its significant others to recognize that status, and in particular, to show 
respect for its exercise of certain privileges associated with such declared position. Therefore, for 
the South Koreans, who have come to form a new conception of their nation’s status in the 
international system—in particular, as a middle power—following their democratic transition 
and astonishing economic development, it has been imperative for them to earn the recognition 
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of its significant others, especially the United States, for their claimed status to be legitimized in 
the post-Cold War era. Remember, for the South Koreans, says Gi-Wook Shin, the United States 
is “not simply another country but one that has significantly shaped their past and will shape 
their future as well”; and “formation of social identity,” continues Shin, “presupposes the 
existence of one or more significant others, and the United States is one such other shaping the 
national identity of South Koreans [emphasis added].”161 
What specific privileges associated with middle power status, then, did the South 
Koreans expect others to show respect for? My answer, in the context of the US-ROK relations, 
is that the South Koreans were looking at the Americans to respect their prerogative to exert a 
significant amount of influence over the management of foreign policy issues critical to their 
national interests, such as the North Korean nuclear problem. This is because in general, middle 
powers tend to be particularly wary of being constrained by the vagaries of great power politics. 
Indeed, as Carsten Holbraad argues, middle powers often “find it hard to come to grips with a 
process [of international politics] which, so to speak, is decided at higher levels.”162 And such 
tendency in turn, claims Randall Schweller, gives rise to domestic groups within middle powers 
that are on a constant lookout to “exploit the fear of unwanted great power influence, seeing the 
power aspects of most issues and raising such matters to the level of high politics where power 
status becomes a concern.”163 As a result, middle powers oftentimes become prone to actively 
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seeking out policy autonomy. For example, during the post-Cold War period, Iran and Syria have 
frequently “acted in concert on regional policy matters” against the United States in order to 
“shape the Middle East power balance”—in effect “counterbalanc[ing] the regional influence of 
a global great power.”164 Another example is Egypt under Nasser during the early 60’s, which, 
according to Michael Barnett and Jack Levy, deliberately limited its “reliance on Soviet financial 
assistance” due to its fears that “the Soviets might attempt to use their leverage to control Egypt’s 
domestic and foreign policy”; moreover, even as it was coming to increasingly rely on Soviet 
military assistance in the late 60’s, the Egyptians were determined to “never” let the Soviets to 
build bases in Egypt “because of the symbolic loss of autonomy that this would entail.”165 
Based on these considerations, one can make the case that a desire to both protect and 
further a state’s claim to policy autonomy would be particularly salient for the smaller partner in 
an asymmetric alliance, presuming that the state is aspiring to a middle—or even a great—power 
status. As discussed in the previous section, the structure of an asymmetric alliance is such that 
the weaker partner sacrifices autonomy in exchange for gaining security from the stronger 
partner. In particular, the patron earns political benefits such as “access to the weak ally’s 
territory in the form of bases (often combined with preferential legal treatment for troops) and, 
more importantly, political influence over the junior partner’s policies.”166 In this context, the 
client suffers serious political costs, which, according to Dong-Sun Lee and Sung-Eun Kim, can 
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“produce security-related vulnerabilities” as well; in particular, “the great power ally may 
pressure the minor partner to enter an unwanted conflict and/or curb the latter’s pursuit of 
security interests.”167 Therefore, if the smaller partner in an asymmetric alliance were a middle 
power aspirant that wants to advance its preferences on both regional and global stages, it would 
most likely find such political costs unbearable and consequently start pursuing greater political 
autonomy by reasoning—in George Liska’s words—that “the struggle with the adversary must 
not be allowed to obscure the duty of self-assertion within the alliance.”168  
Indeed, over the past three decades, the South Koreans have quite frequently expressed 
their desire to exercise greater policy autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. For example, after 
having largely increased its military expenditures in the early 90’s, South Korea “requested the 
return of peacetime operational control (OPCON) of ROK forces,” to which the United States 
acquiesced in 1994 during the Kim Young-Sam administration. Since then, say Uk Heo and 
Terence Roehrig, the ROK forces have come to “handle[ ] their own military operations,” 
especially for “small-scale actions” such as the “two naval conflicts off Yeonpyeong-do in 1999 
and 2002.”169 Another example comes from the Roh Moo-Hyun presidency, when the ROK 
proposed to make revisions to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in order to “reclaim the 
ROK government’s jurisdiction over US soldiers in some criminal cases,” for many Koreans 
were unable to tolerate the fact that “some actions taken within the ROK territory were subject to 
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foreign rather than national laws.”170 And finally, during the Park Geun-Hye administration, 
President Park opted to visit Beijing in September 2015 to attend the Victory Day military 
parade—which was “aimed at showcasing the latest Chinese weaponry designed to counter US 
power in the Pacific”—despite much handwringing in the US about a “Korea that was slowly but 
surely gravitating into the Chinese orbit and away from the United States and Japan.”171 While 
these are but a few examples, they do indicate that for the South Koreans, a right to exercise 
greater autonomy in their relations with the United States is something that they have coveted 
(albeit to varying extents) throughout the post-Cold War period.  
The discussion thus far has revealed two important points. First, South Korea has strived 
to be recognized for its middle power status against the backdrop of having acquired the essential 
markers of that status: impressive economic growth, political maturity, and active regional/global 
diplomacy, among others. Second, as a middle power aspirant, the ROK has been eager to protect 
and expand its privilege to exercise policy autonomy vis-à-vis the United States. Based on these 
points, we can now apply the principle of status inconsistency172 to the case of the US-ROK 
alliance with respect to the North Korean nuclear issue.  
I argue that that for the South Koreans, having an opportunity to exert a significant 
influence over the management of the DPRK problem has been a privilege that they believed 
they were entitled to per their claimed middle power status—and which in turn had to be 
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respected by the United States in order for their aspired status position to be recognized and 
thereby legitimized; in the absence of the United States’ respect for their prerogative (as the 
South Koreans themselves perceive), the South Koreans would experience status inconsistency 
and as a result, become motivated to resort to assertive and defiant alliance-eroding behaviors in 
order to signal to the United States their ability and resolve to exercise their claimed privilege. 
This argument can also be stated in more general terms as well: if the smaller partner in an 
asymmetric alliance—assuming that it aspires for a higher status vis-à-vis the status quo—
believes that its stronger partner is not showing respect for its claimed privilege associated with 
that status, the former—in order to overcome status inconsistency—is likely to take assertive and 
defiant alliance-eroding actions to signal to the latter its resolve and ability to exercise the 
prerogative. In any case, I hypothesize,  
H1: The ROK’s experience of status inconsistency—stemming from its perception that 
the US is not showing respect for its privilege of exercising significant influence over 
the management of the DPRK nuclear issue—was primarily responsible for causing the 
low levels of US-ROK alliance cohesion observed over the post-Cold War period.  
 
I will now conclude this subsection by outlining some of the important observable implications 
of this hypothesis. If the ROK’s experience of status inconsistency were indeed significantly 
responsible for causing the lack of US-ROK alliance cohesion observed, I would first expect to 
see evidence of the South Korean decision-makers describing their ability to play an influential 
role in dealing with the DPRK nuclear issue as a critical element of fulfilling their nation’s 
higher status aspirations. If the South Korean do believe that it is playing a central role in dealing 
with the DPRK, I would not expect to see much change in the level of US-ROK alliance 
cohesion. If, on the other hand, the South Koreans believe that they are not getting to play a 
central role—especially because the US is not taking their ideas and contributions seriously in 
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the process—I would expect to see the South Koreans voicing frustrations at the United States 
for its lack of respect for their sensitivities; in particular, I would see the South Koreans 
indicating, directly or by implication, that they are being denied a privilege or prerogative that 
they are entitled to. Once this happens, I would expect the US-ROK alliance cohesion to be 
negatively impacted, since the ROK would strive to highlight both its resolve and ability to make 
concrete and independent contributions to the management of the nuclear issue by defying 
coordination with the United States. And because these actions are expected to be strongly 
influenced by an emotional arousal (at the expense of cold power political calculations), they 
would most likely not yield much tangible security and economic benefits for the ROK—if 
anything, they would harm those interests.   
Summary 
In this argument section, I introduced the concept of status and its empirical and 
theoretical significance, elaborated on the logic underlying the principle of status inconsistency, 
and applied that principle to the case of the US-ROK alliance—presenting my argument, 
hypothesis, and observable implications. I now move on to discuss some alternative explanations.  
Alternative Explanations 
If status concerns have played no or negligible role in shaping the ROK’s policies 
towards the US-ROK alliance over the nuclear issue, I expect that other factors would better 
explain the low levels of alliance cohesion witnessed. In particular, I consider three alternative 
explanations in this section: 1) divergence in threat perception between the US and the ROK; 2) 
the ROK’s domestic political constraints stemming from anti-Americanism; and 3) South 
Korea’s desire to bandwagon with rising China.  
Divergent Threat Perceptions  
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The United States and South Korea could have failed to maintain a high level of alliance 
cohesion because they viewed the threat emanating from the DPRK differently. Given that 
international relations theories hold that “alliances must rest on a congruence of strategic 
interests and a willingness to share risks and costs” in response to a common external threat,173 it 
follows—per Stephen Walt—that “alliances will dissolve whenever there is a significant shift in 
the level of threat its members face.”174 Indeed, as a Korea Economic Institute (KEI) report 
points out, “if the United States and South Korea [cannot] reach agreement on how they viewed 
the North Korean threat, the US-ROK alliance would be in grave trouble.”175  
How might, then, a divergence in threat perceptions between the allies be causally 
related to the ROK’s resorting to alliance-eroding behavior? Glenn Snyder’s “alliance dilemma” 
framework can serve as our guide here. According to Snyder, “the risks of abandonment and 
entrapment tend to vary inversely: reducing one tends to increase the other.”176 And as Victor 
Cha elaborates, “abandonment fears will be higher for a state with high external threat 
perceptions,” whereas “entrapment fears will be higher for a state with…no salient security 
threats.”177 Applying this framework to the case of the US-ROK alliance, one can posit two 
scenarios. The first is the case in which the ROK pursues a dovish DPRK policy (low threat 
perception of North Korea) whereas the United States pursues a hawkish one (high threat 
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perception of North Korea). The second is the case in which the ROK pursues a hawkish policy 
(high threat perception), whereas the US pursues a dovish one (low threat perception).  
In the first scenario, the South Koreans would be more fearful of being dragged into an 
unwanted conflict that is caused by the United States’ hawkish North Korea policies and less 
fearful of their ally’s failure to live up to its commitment to protect them against the DPRK threat. 
It is widely believed that the current Trump-Moon period fits this description. As a May 2017 
Foreign Affairs article points out, “South Koreans are more concerned that Trump, rather than 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un, will make a rash military move, because of his outrageous 
tweets, threats of force, and unpredictability.”178 In the second scenario, the South Koreans 
would be more fearful of being abandoned by the United States and less fearful of being 
entrapped in an unwanted conflict. It is widely believed that the US-ROK relations during the 
First Korean Nuclear Crisis (1993-94) fit this bill, when the US attempted to strike a deal of 
some sort with the North Koreans. As Nancy Tucker states, “Seoul could not bring itself fully to 
trust American diplomats to represent its interests and feared that compromises would be made 
that would jeopardize southern security.”179 
In light of these points, it can be conjectured that if the South Koreans were to believe 
that aligning their policies with their ally could increase the possibility of either entrapment or 
abandonment, they would come to resolutely defy cooperation with the United States in order to 
prevent either of the two scenarios from materializing. After all, as Stephen Walt points out, if 
the client in an asymmetric alliance has a greater stake and interest in the outcome of an issue 
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than the patron, such “asymmetry of motivation” can instigate the smaller partner to more 
aggressively protect its interests, even when it is highly dependent on the patron’s support.180 
Therefore, I hypothesize,  
H2a: The ROK’s desire to avoid entrapment in a conflict caused by the United States’ 
hawkish North Korea policies was primarily responsible for causing the low levels of 
US-ROK alliance cohesion observed over the post-Cold War period.  
 
H2b: The ROK’s desire to avoid abandonment by the United States in the face of the 
North Korean threat was primarily responsible for causing the low levels of US-ROK 
alliance cohesion observed over the post-Cold War period.  
 
If these hypotheses were true, I would expect to see the South Korean leaders not only 
expressing fear that the ROK’s security interests would be compromised by aligning its North 
Korea policies with that of the United States, but also explaining in detail how the said risk 
would materialize, what specific scenarios most worried them, and how defying cooperation with 
the United States would help forestall those outcomes.181 That is, the South Korean’s fears, 
concerns, and complaints about cooperating with the US should be substantive, going beyond 
mere rhetoric.  
Domestic Politics and Anti-Americanism 
Another factor that could explain the United States and South Korea’s failure to maintain 
a high level of alliance cohesion would be the presence of anti-American sentiment in the ROK. 
According to Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, anti-Americanism in the ROK has risen following its 
transition to democracy in the 90’s, as it has become easier for both the public and the media 
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alike to voice such sentiment.182 Substantively, the causes underlying anti-Americanism are 
many, such as “generational divide and demographic change”, “Korean nationalism”, “views of 
China as a viable strategic partner alternative”, “supposed historic US complicity in the 
suppression of Korean democracy,” among others.183 Specifics aside, however, the important 
point here is that an increase in expressions of anti-American sentiment essentially boils down to 
an erosion of the South Koreans’ belief in the continued importance of the US-ROK alliance and 
their commitment to its continuation.”184  
To be sure, anti-Americanism has not been consistently present throughout the post-Cold 
War period. However, when it was on the rise, the leaders of South Korea became incentivized to 
cater to such popular public opinion in order to score political points.185 A telling example here 
is the case of President Roh Moo-Hyun, who was elected in December 2002 on a wave of anti-
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Americanism.186 As a presidential candidate, Roh had made the most out of the public sentiment 
by empathizing with it, such as by delivering a “campaign speech under the banner of ‘Yankee 
Go Home!’”187 In short, this case of Roh demonstrates that—per D. Scott Bennett—“rational 
leaders will include considerations about domestic power or outcomes in their decisions” 
regarding alliance policies in light of the opinions expressed by “important domestic political 
audiences (elites and/or masses).” 188  This is because “public opinion is important in a 
democratic government,” for in order to stay in office, “leaders must listen to public opinion and 
reflect these views in domestic and foreign policies.”189 All this indicates that when push comes 
to shove, the South Korean leaders could certainly push back against the US policy positions if 
that means securing domestic political advantage. Therefore, I hypothesize,  
H3: The rise of anti-American sentiment in the ROK and the South Korean leaders’ 
desire to cater to such public opinion were primarily responsible for causing the low 
levels of US-ROK alliance cohesion observed over the post-Cold War period. 
 
If this hypothesis were true, I would expect to see the South Korean leaders framing their 
alliance policies in terms of domestic political calculus, such as securing victory in an upcoming 
election and/or improving approval ratings, among others. In particular, the ROK would display 
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defiance against the United States in dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat when anti-
American sentiment is on the rise, and when the South Korean leaders believe that they can, 
against such backdrop, improve their domestic political standing by defying cooperation with 
their ally.   
 Bandwagoning with the Rising China  
The final factor that could explain the United States and South Korea’s failure to 
maintain a high level of alliance cohesion would be the ROK’s desire to bandwagon190 with the 
rising China. After having normalized their relations in 1992, trade between South Korea and 
China has increased significantly. According to Dohee Kim and Uk Heo, “South Korea’s trade 
with China in 1992 was $6.37 billion, but the figure rose to $235 billion in 2014.” Moreover, 
“with an annual growth of approximately 35 percent, China became South Korea’s largest trade 
partner in 2003, replacing the US...and has maintained the status since that time.” Furthermore, 
China and South Korea signed a free trade agreement (FTA) in 2015, which is expected to 
“augment the bilateral trade between the two countries even more.”191 In essence, it can be said 
that over the post-Cold War period, South Korea has increasingly “look[ed] to China for 
economic opportunity,” while continuing to “look to the United States for security.”192  
For realists, such situation would not have had much impact on the level of US-ROK 
alliance cohesion. This is because according to the realist view, “economic interactions (which 
constitute ‘low politics’) rarely decide the course of security affairs (or ‘high politics’) in a 
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crucial way”; 193  that is, as Kenneth Waltz asserts, “politics, as usual, prevails over 
economics.”194 Therefore, by this logic, no matter how much the South Koreans might have 
benefited from trade and investment with China, so long as the United States continues to 
provide for their security, they would have no incentive to defy cooperation with the Americans.  
Liberals, however, would disagree with such assessment. This is because according to 
the liberal view, security issues do not necessary dominate interstate relations,195 meaning that 
economic factors can play as great, if not greater, a role in shaping world politics than the realists 
tend to give credit for. In particular, one important line of liberal argument says that “economic 
intercourse increases contact and promotes communication between private actors in different 
countries, as well as between governments,” and such increase in ties are, in turn, “expected to 
foster cooperative political relations.”196 According to Edward Mansfield and Brian Pollins, it 
was based on such logic that various historic policies ranging from the “formation of the 
European Economic Community, Richard Nixon’s opening to China, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, 
[to] Henry Kissinger’s conception of détente with the Soviet Union,” were justified.197 Surely, 
supposing that “heightened [economic] interdependence” does indeed foster “cooperative 
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political relations,”198 then one can certainly make the case that an increase in economic ties 
between China and the ROK would motivate the South Koreans to place a greater value on the 
Chinese as a trade partner than on the Americans as a security partner—as economic concerns 
come to trump security ones in their calculus.  
A telling example from the current Trump-Moon period indicates that the liberal logic 
may be at work in the case of the US-ROK alliance. In October 2017, the ROK Foreign Minister 
Kang Kyung-Wha stated in a National Assembly hearing South Korea’s “Three No’s” policy 
toward China. In particular, Kang declared that South Korea had no intention to: “1) install 
additional THAAD batteries; 2) participate in a regional missile defense system; and 3) form a 
trilateral alliance with the United States and Japan.” In response to this overture, Beijing 
announced that it would “take steps to repair bilateral relations” and finally agreed to lift the 
series of punitive economic sanctions it had been imposing on the ROK in order to reverse the 
latter’s decision in July 2016 to deploy THAAD missiles in South Korea.199 The US was 
understandably very agitated by this policy decision, criticizing President Moon for not only 
having “work[ed] against US policy in the wider [Asia-Pacific] region,” but also having “caved 
to Chinese pressure on missile defense, rewarding Beijing for its bullying behavior.”200 However, 
from the ROK’s point of view, the Three No’s policy might have been a necessity economically, 
given that the country was losing billions of dollars in revenue as China boycotted “Korean pop 
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culture, cosmetics, and tourism,” among others.201 That being said, an important take-away from 
this episode is that China’s economic punishment did get its job done, which indicates that 
contrary to the realist notions, the growing economic interdependence between the ROK and 
China might actually have worked towards drawing the former closer to the latter and away from 
the United States. Therefore, I hypothesize, 
H4: The ROK’s desire to bandwagon with the rising China at the expense of the United 
States was primarily responsible for causing the low levels of US-ROK alliance 
cohesion observed over the post-Cold War period. 
 
If this hypothesis were true, I would expect to see the ROK’s decision-makers—when deciding 
whether and how to cooperate with the United States over the North Korean nuclear issue— 
seriously considering the ramifications of their policy decisions for China’s national interests. In 
particular, if the South Koreans believe that they cannot maintain a high level of US-ROK 
alliance cohesion without hurting China’s preferences, they would defy cooperation with the 
United States. On the other hand, if the South Koreans believe that they can display unity with 
the Americans without hurting China’s national interests, their willingness to cooperate with the 
United States would not be affected. Overall, I would expect the South Korean decision-makers 
to pay very close attention to the China factor as they manage relations with the United States 
over the course of dealing with the North Korean problem.  
Cases and Methodology 
Case Selection 
Three case studies will be conducted for this dissertation: 1) US-ROK alliance during 
the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94; 2) US-ROK alliance during the Second Korean 
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Nuclear Crisis of 2002-06; and 3) US-France alliance during the presidency of Charles de Gaulle 
(1958-1969), up to France’s exit from NATO in 1966. 
The Korean cases were chosen for a number of reasons. First, most importantly, they 
deal with the very issue that has inspired this dissertation in the first place: the extent to which 
the US and the ROK can display unity over the management of the DPRK nuclear problem. 
Second, in both of the cases, the alliance is presented with the very threat that had led to its 
formation in the first place, meaning that one can expect a priori that power political 
considerations would have trumped other factors in bringing the two allies together against the 
face of a common security threat. As such, the cases provide a hard test of my argument that 
status considerations have played a critical role in eroding the US-ROK alliance cohesion over 
the management of the North Korean nuclear issue. Third, ample primary and secondary sources 
are available on the many facets of these cases, which is not true for the more recent periods of 
the US-ROK alliance. And finally, the cases have “large within-case variance on the study 
variable, permitting multiple within-case congruence procedures.”202  That is, the level of 
alliance cohesion meaningfully fluctuates within each of these cases to allow for an assessment 
the causal impact of status inconsistency on the level of the US-ROK alliance cohesion. 
The non-Korean case was most fundamentally chosen in order demonstrate that the 
findings from the Korean cases can be extended to explain cases of conflict that occur within 
asymmetric alliances more broadly. I chose the US-France alliance in particular because the 
inability of de Gaulle’s France to cooperate closely with the United States—which culminated in 
its decision to leave NATO altogether in 1966—presents a puzzle that very closely parallels that 
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posed by the ROK’s defiant behavior in the context of the DPRK nuclear issue: namely, why 
weren’t the French able to display a high level of alliance cohesion with the Americans despite 
the presence of the common security threat emanating from the Soviet Union? That is, similar to 
the US-ROK case, the puzzle can be framed in a way that provides a hard test of the status-based 
argument. In addition to these reasons, substantial documentary and secondary sources are 
available for the US-French case, and moreover, it has a large in-case variance of the study 
variable (i.e., the level of alliance cohesion) that allows for multiple within-case congruence 
procedures. In essence, then, an analysis of the US-France alliance can serve as an important first 
step towards broadening the findings from the US-ROK alliance to those cases of conflict that 
occur within asymmetric alliances more generally.   
Methodology 
The goal of this dissertation is to examine whether and how South Korea’s experience of 
status inconsistency causally impacted its willingness to cooperate with the United States on the 
North Korean nuclear issue during the two crises, and also whether and how France’s experience 
of status inconsistency impacted the level of US-France alliance cohesion, up to France’s 
complete withdrawal from NATO in 1966. That is, I am not only interested in showing that status 
inconsistency is or is not correlated with low alliance cohesion, but also in spelling out the causal 
dynamics underpinning such an association if there is any, as laid out in my central argument. 
For this reason, I will be incorporating process-tracing on top of congruence method to explain 
the nature of US-ROK alliance cohesion during the two nuclear crises and of the US-France 
relations during the de Gaulle period. That is, similar to Sebastian Rosato in his Europe United, I 
will examine "the historical record for evidence that events unfolded as my logic suggests and 
that important actors behaved and spoke as it stipulates...and examine the sequence of events as 
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well as actors' claims about why they acted as they did."203 And in particular, my use of process-
tracing will be geared towards theory development, in the sense that I will be conducting a 
“detailed examination” of historical episodes to develop and test “explanations that may be 
generalizable to other events.”204 This method is especially promising for the purposes of this 
dissertation, given that all three cases I will be examining are “deviant cases” from the standpoint 
of realist theories of international relations. According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, 
an in-depth exploration of deviant cases allows for “specification of a new concept, variable, or 
theory regarding a causal mechanism that affects more than one type of case and possibility even 
all instances of a phenomenon,” thereby leading to “the development of a better and more 
explanatory theory.”205  
Chapter Outline 
  The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines the US-
ROK alliance cohesion during the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94. I find that ROK 
caused frequent policy collisions—aligning its policies with the US at one point and not doing 
so at another—throughout the crisis; in particular, alliance cohesion was high when the ROK 
believed that the US was showing respect for its claimed prerogative of playing the leadership 
role in crisis management, and low otherwise. These fluctuations ended up not only eroding 
alliance cohesion but also inhibiting a successful resolution of the crisis. Chapter 3 examines 
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the US-ROK relations during the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis of 2002-06. The main finding 
here is that the ROK, with a sense of entitlement to its solid middle power status, had set out to 
cooperate closely with the United States in dealing with the nuclear problem, based on the spirit 
of horizontal, equitable alliance relations. However, as the South Koreans saw it, the United 
States failed overall to reciprocate—by not respecting its claimed privilege of exercising an 
adequate degree of policy autonomy in crisis management—which led the ROK to boldly 
pursue its own set of policies at the expense of eroding alliance cohesion. Finally, Chapter 4 
examines the US-France alliance relations during the de Gaulle period (1958-69). Here I find 
that General de Gaulle, with a sense of entitlement to France’s great power status, believed that 
his country was entitled to the privilege of playing a principal role on the world stage by 
exercising full independence and policy autonomy. However, the United States refused to show 
respect for the claimed privilege, and in response, the French leader resorted to a series of 
assertive and defiant alliance-eroding actions in order to signal that France had both the resolve 
and ability to exercise policy autonomy in an influential manner. It was against such backdrop 
that France withdrew from NATO in 1966. The dissertation concludes with a discussion of our 
study’s theoretical and empirical contributions along with its policy implications.  
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CHAPTER 2 
US-ROK Alliance and the First Korean Nuclear Crisis, 1993-94 
 The basic story of the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94 is clear enough.1 North 
Korea officially precipitated the crisis on March 12, 1993 by declaring its intent to withdraw 
from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). 2  High-level bilateral talks between 
Washington and Pyongyang ensued, only to become deadlocked by the spring of 1994. North 
Korea then crossed the Rubicon by unloading fuel from its 5-megawatt nuclear reactor, a major 
step forward in acquiring nuclear arms production capability.3 Unable to tolerate a North Korea 
moving full steam ahead in the nuclear area, the US decision-makers seriously considered a 
preemptive strike against North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facilities, bringing the peninsula in 
June 1994 to the brink of another Korean War.4 The timely intervention of Jimmy Carter that 
month via his trip to Pyongyang saved Korea from such potential catastrophe, and in October, 
the US and the DPRK were able to work out a temporary arrangement called the Agreed 
Framework, settling the issue for the time being.5  
                                         
1 For perhaps the most comprehensive account of the First Korean Nuclear Crisis to date, see Joel S Wit, 
Daniel Poneman, and Robert L Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 
2 Marc Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 262; Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 
410. Intelligence Report, “The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence Summary,” March 12, 1993, The United 
States and the Two Koreas, Digital National Security Archive (hereafter, Two Koreas, DNSA).  
3 C.S. Eliot Kang, "Restructuring the U.S.-South Korea Alliance to Deal with the Second Korean Nuclear 
Crisis," Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 2 (2003): 314. 
4 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 406. 
5 Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After, p. 265. 
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While any cursory overview of the crisis would portray it as a drama mainly between the 
United States and North Korea, what is less recognized and analyzed is the role of South Korea 
in this whole process. A closer examination of the case, however, indicates that such neglect is 
not warranted, for the ROK was largely responsible for creating a rift in the US-ROK 
coordination over the North Korean nuclear issue. Leon Sigal captures the dynamics well: 
“Whenever US-DPRK talks were on the verge of breaking down, Seoul tried to supply the 
lubricant to keep them going. Whenever they lurched ahead, Seoul applied the brakes.” 6 
Mitchell Reiss agrees, adding that “the dual nature of South Korean behavior—unyielding [to the 
US-DPRK talks] when the US dialogue with North Korea went well and compliant when the 
situation deteriorated—[was] a familiar and frustrating fact of life to American diplomats.”7 Per 
such portrayal, it is understandable why many officials from the Clinton administration would 
later recall the ROK government as having been erratic and obstinate, holding back and 
complaining about what the US viewed as a sensible engagement policy in dealing with the 
DPRK’s nuclear proliferation threat.8  
This presents a puzzle. From the standpoint of the neorealist alliance theories, one would 
expect that the level of coordination between the US and the ROK—or alliance cohesion—
would have been high during this period, for two reasons. First, that the allies shared the 
common threat emanating from the DPRK should have enabled them to readily come together 
                                         
6 Leon V Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), p. 124. 
7 Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, 
DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 251.  
8 Eliot Kang, "Restructuring the U.S.-South Korea Alliance to Deal with the Second Korean Nuclear 
Crisis," p. 314. 
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and jointly pursue the goal of preventing North Korea from going nuclear. Second, the 
asymmetry in the distribution of capabilities within the alliance to the United States’ advantage 
should have deterred South Korea from unnecessarily causing a rift in the alliance’s strategic 
unity—out of a fear of abandonment. Nonetheless, despite these constraints, the ROK willfully 
resorted to those diplomatic moves that were detrimental to a successful culmination of the US-
DPRK talks, the very purpose of which was to forestall the North from acquiring the bomb. In 
short, the ROK’s behavior cannot be adequately reconciled from the perspective of the rationalist 
or material factors alone, a point that is troubling theoretically because the US-ROK alliance 
provides the “most likely case” of high alliance cohesion per the tenets of alliance politics. Such 
a gap in prediction and reality calls for a need to consider factors that lie beyond those material 
and security concerns that undergird the predominantly realist and rationalist perspectives taken 
by the alliance literature. An example of one such non-material variable that has been receiving 
increasingly greater attention in the IR field is status concerns, defined and elaborated in the 
theoretical chapter.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate that by examining the ROK’s behavioral pattern with an 
analytical focus on status concerns, a causal logic that underlies what initially appears to be an 
erratic, irrational decision-making process can be established. In particular, I show that the 
ROK’s diplomatic maneuvers during the crisis were significantly influenced by its experience of 
status inconsistency. I do this by utilizing newly declassified documents and other primary 
sources in both English and Korean and by employing the methodology of robust process tracing.  
The basic point that emerges from my analysis is that the variations in the South Koreans’ 
behavior during the First Korean Nuclear Crisis were a function of their experience of status 
inconsistency. As I argued in the first chapter, for the South Koreans of the post-Cold War period, 
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having an opportunity to exercise a significant degree of policy autonomy over the management 
of foreign policy issues critical to their national interest has been a prerogative that they believed 
they were entitled to per their claimed middle power status. This privilege in turn had to be 
respected by the United States in order for their aspired middle power status to be recognized and 
thereby legitimized. What this meant was that if the South Koreans believed that the United 
States was not showing respect for their prerogative, they would experience status inconsistency 
and as a result, become motivated to take assertive and defiant alliance-eroding actions in order 
to signal to the United States their ability and resolve to exercise such privilege.  
In line with this argument, what I find for the First Nuclear Crisis is that when the South 
Koreans believed that they were getting to exercise their claimed privilege of exerting significant 
degree of influence over the management of the nuclear issue, they were able focus squarely on 
the central goal of ensuring a nuclear-free North Korea—they were not only able to display a 
high level of alliance cohesion with the United States but also able to conscientiously take 
measures, including the support of the US-DPRK negotiations, necessary for that end. On the 
other hand, when the South Koreans believed that the US prevented their exercise of the 
prerogative by not showing respect for it, they were instigated to take assertive and defiant 
alliance-eroding actions that were primarily aimed at signaling their ability and resolve to play an 
influence role in crisis management—including reining in the US-DPRK talks—rather than at 
tackling the main nuclear issue in hand. Overall, these behavioral fluctuations ended up 
weakening alliance cohesion and, by extension, inhibiting a successful resolution of the nuclear 
crisis.9  
                                         
9  A number of Korean academic articles do attempt to provide an explanation for the ROK’s 
uncooperative behavior during the nuclear crisis. Some have focused on presidential leadership style and 
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The remainder of this chapter is organized into four parts. In the opening section, I 
demonstrate that the ROK’s self-identification as a middle power and its desire to exercise a 
significant degree of policy autonomy over the North Korean nuclear issue have been consistent 
themes in South Korean foreign policy throughout the post-Cold War era—and not simply 
unique to the period under examination. Thereafter, I conduct an in-depth case study of the First 
Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94 in light of the ROK’s status concerns. In particular, I trace the 
ways in which the Kim Yoanung-Sam administration’s experience of status inconsistency 
influenced its decision-making process, and also the ways in which its resulting policies 
impacted the level of the US-ROK alliance cohesion over the course of the crisis, from its 
outbreak on March 12, 1993 to the signing of the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994. 
                                                                                                                                   
psychology, such as Yong-Soo Park, "The Competitive Foreign Policy Management Style of the President 
Kim Young-Sam in the Process of First North Korean Nuclear Crisis," The Korean Journal of 
International Relationship 55, no. 4 (2015): 139-68; Yong-Soo Park, "A Critique on the Inflexible 
Responses of Kim Young Sam Administration to North Korean Nuclear Crisis," Journal of Korean 
Politics 20, no. 3 (2011): 55-79; Dong-Jun Cho, "Hanmigwan’gyeŭi Yŏksajŏk Koch’al ; 
Oegyojŏngch’aekkyŏlchŏngja Simnibunsŏgŭi Yuyongsŏng Kŏmt’o: 1990yŏndae Pukhaegwigirŭl 
Tullŏssan Hanmigwan’gyerŭl Chungsimŭro [a Study on the Utility of Foreign Policy Decision Makers' 
Psychological Analysis: Focusing on U.S.-R.O.K. Relations on North Korea Nuclear Crisis in the 
1990s]," Journal of Korean Political And Diplomatic History 26, no. 1 (2004): 197-222. Others have 
focused on bureaucratic politics, such as Jong-Yun Bae, "Bureaucratic Politics and Korean Foreign Policy 
on North Korea in 1990s," Korean Political Science Review 37, no. 5 (2003): 147-65; Sung-Deuk Hahm 
and Okjin Kim, "Presidential Leadership and Bureaucratic Politics in Foreign Policy-Making Process of 
Korea: Cases of North Korean Nuclear Crises I and I.I.," Journal of International Politics 10, no. 2 
(2005): 37-71; Ki-Jung Kim, "Kimyŏngsamjŏngbu 5yŏnŭi Taebukchŏngch’aekp’yŏngga: Chŏngch’aegŭi 
Hollan’gwa Kwallyojŏngch’ihyŏnsang [Evaluating Kim Young-Sam Administration's North Korea Policy: 
Policy Confusion and Bureaucratic Politics]," Unified Economy [t’ongilgyŏngje] 37 (1998): 7-17. Still 
others have focused on the absence of the ROK’s coherent North Korea strategy, such as Hak-Soon Baek, 
Not’aeu Chŏngbuwa Kimyŏngsamjŏngbuŭi Taebukchŏngch’aek Pigyo [Comparing Rho Tae-Woo and 
Kim Young-Sam Administrations' North Korea Policies] (Seoul, Korea: Sejong Institute, 2012); Kun-
Young Park, "A New North Korea Policy," The Korean Journal of International Studies 38, no. 2 (1998): 
87-107; Kee-Jong Lee, "The Determining Factors and Prospect of North Korean Policy toward South 
Korea," ibid.37: 181-207. Overall, however, while these accounts do help one understand the reasons why 
the ROK might have behaved a certain way at specific points during the crisis, they fall short of providing 
a unified, systematic framework for understanding the causal dynamics underlying the overall behavioral 
fluctuations of the ROK. 
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Following the case study, I address three alternative explanations for the ROK’s alliance-eroding 
behavior: 1) divergence in threat perception; 2) domestic politics and anti-Americanism; and 3) 
desire to bandwagon with the rising China. Finally, I end the chapter with a brief conclusion that 
summarizes the findings and discusses their significance. 
The ROK as a Middle Power and the North Korean Nuclear Issue 
The origins of the ROK’s self-identification as a middle power can be traced back to 
1991, when President Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1993) first used the term to signal his country’s 
aspirations to play an active role on the global stage.10 President Kim Young-Sam (1993-1998) 
kept the momentum going with his segyehwa (globalization) policy, the primary goal of which 
was to move “away from and beyond inter-Korean competition to the center of the action not 
only in the Asia-Pacific region but also in the world community.”11 And under President Kim 
Dae-Jung (1998-2003), whose foreign minister explicitly noted that “Korea in the twenty-first 
century must stand as an Asian power and a middle power,” South Korea began to make more 
concrete accomplishments as a regional and global player, a notable example of which is the 
Sunshine Policy, whereby the country demonstrated to the world both its ability and willingness 
to take the regional leadership role in bringing about peace on the Korean peninsula.12 President 
Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2008) continued to similarly press for South Korea’s middle-power status, 
                                         
10 Soon-ok  Shin, "South Korea's Elusive Middlepowermanship: Regional or Global Player?," Pacific 
Review 29, no. 2 (2016): 195. 
11 Samuel S. Kim, "Korea's Segyehwa Drive: Promise Versus Performance," in Korea's Globalization, ed. 
Samuel S. Kim (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 244. 
12 Andrew  O'Neil, "South Korea as a Middle Power: Global Ambitions and Looming Challenges," in 
Middle Power Korea: Contribution to the Global Agenda, ed. Scott A. Snyder (New York, NY: Council 
on Foreign Relations Press, 2015), p. 82; Shin, "South Korea's Elusive Middlepowermanship," p. 195; 
Moch Faisal  Karim, "Middle Power, Status-Seeking and Role Conceptions: The Cases of Indonesia and 
South Korea," Australian Journal of International Affairs 72, no. 4 (2018): 356. 
83 
 
calling for a need to not only play an active role in the East Asian theater as a balancer that works 
to promote peace and prosperity in the region,13 but also to become a responsible member of the 
international society as well—such as by dispatching troops to Iraq in 2004 to support the US 
military operations there.14 Moreover, under the Presidents Lee Myung-Bak (2008-2013) and 
Park Geun-Hye (2013-2017), the ROK’s middle power status became “more prominent and 
substantive.”15 For example, under President Lee—whose Global Korea initiative envisaged “a 
Korea that leaves behind a habit of diplomacy narrowly geared to the Korean Peninsula, and 
adopts a more open and enterprising posture that sees the world as the appropriate platform for 
its foreign policy and national interest”16—the ROK hosted G20 Summit in 2010, the Fourth 
High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011, and the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, all 
of which helped highlight the country’s growing global influence.  17 And under President Park, 
the ROK participated in creating the Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and Australia 
(MIKTA) middle power network in order to play the roles of a “bridge between developed and 
developing countries” and of “a catalyst or facilitator in launching and implementing global 
governance reform.”18 In essence, since the end of the Cold War, the South Korean presidents, 
                                         
13 O'Neil, "South Korea as a Middle Power," p. 82; Shin, "South Korea's Elusive Middlepowermanship," 
pp. 195-96. 
14 Samuel Len, "South Korea Approves 3,000 Troops for Iraq," The New York Times, February 14 2004. 
15 O'Neil, "South Korea as a Middle Power," p. 82. 
16 Ibid., p. 83. 
17 Karim, "Middle Power, Status-Seeking and Role Conceptions," p. 357. 
18 Sook Jong Lee, "South Korea Aiming to Be an Innovative Middle Power " in Transforming Global 
Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea's Role in the 21st Century ed. Sook Jong Lee 
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 6. 
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regardless of their political orientations, have consistently identified their nation as a middle 
power and behaved accordingly by leveraging on their nation’s rapidly growing economic and 
political capabilities.  
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, middle powers tend to be particularly wary of 
being constrained by the vagaries of great power politics, and for this reason, they oftentimes 
become prone to actively seeking out policy autonomy. Indeed, as I noted in that chapter, the 
South Koreans have frequently expressed their desire to exercise greater policy autonomy vis-à-
vis the United States over the post-Cold War era. Here, I add to this observation by showing that 
for the ROK, such desire has been particularly pronounced where the DPRK nuclear problem 
was concerned. That is, South Korea has been notably eager to exert a substantial degree of 
influence in dealing with its major national security threat.  
For instance, during the First Korean Nuclear Crisis (1993-94)—as will be explored in 
greater detail later—there were a number of points during which Washington was taking the lead 
in dealing with Pyongyang, while the Seoul was being relegated to the sidelines.19 In those 
instances, the South Koreans did not hesitate to express their frustration—in fact, they were 
                                         
19 The following works make reference to such South Korean concern. Chae-Jin Lee, A Troubled Peace: 
U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas (Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 2006), p. 4; Sigal, Disarming Strangers, p. 
87; Michael J Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York, NY: St. 
Martin's Press, 1995), p. 139; Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior 
(Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1999), p. 108; Victor D Cha, "Balance, Parallelism, and 
Asymmetry: United States-Korea Relations," Journal of East Asian Studies 1, no. 1 (2001): 186; Victor D 
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openly “angry” at, 20  “humiliated” by, 21  and “resented” the reality of their 
disenfranchisement22—since the US, and not the ROK, was taking charge of a situation so 
crucial to their national security.23 By contrast, there was a complete about-face on the part of 
the South Koreans several years down the road when President Bill Clinton told President Kim 
Dae-Jung, “In view of your stature and experience, I would like you to lead on the issue of the 
Korean Peninsula. You take the driver’s seat and I’ll take the seat beside to help you.” Lim 
Dong-Won (one of President Kim’s top aides), in a speech that he gave over a decade later, said 
that he had been “deeply touched” by those words, and expressed great appreciation to President 
Clinton for having “kept his word until his last day in office.”24 As these two episodes tell us, 
having a substantial degree of ownership over the DPRK issue has been an important prerogative 
that the ROK wanted the US to show respect for, and indeed, over the years, South Korea has 
proposed and carried out a number of initiatives concerning the nuclear problem—starting, of 
course, with the Sunshine Policy—that presupposed South Korea’s prominent and active role 
therein. For instance, during the Second Inter-Korean Summit held in October 2007, President 
Roh Moo-Hyun made sure that the ROK would not be sidelined in the nuclear issue by urging 
his counterpart Kim Jong-Il to undergo the denuclearization process on the basis of the “Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” a document that South Korea (and 
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North Korea) had signed back in 1992.25 Another example comes from the Park Geun-Hye 
administration, when President Park signaled her intent to take the initiative towards making a 
breakthrough in the DPRK denuclearization process by promulgating her Trustpolitik, the 
success of which was most fundamentally dependent upon South Korea’s taking the leadership 
role to build inter-Korean trust and goodwill.26 
Overall, then, South Korea, as a middle power aspirant, has been eager to protect and 
expand its privilege to exercise a significant degree of policy autonomy vis-à-vis the United 
States over the DPRK nuclear issue. How, then, did such sense of entitlement, in practice, impact 
the level of the US-ROK alliance cohesion over the course of the allies’ joint management of the 
nuclear problem? In the case study that follows, I answer this question through a detailed 
examination of the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94. 
US-ROK Alliance and the First Korean Nuclear Crisis: A Case Study 
The ROK Strives for Leadership: Not so Easy  
 The president of the ROK, Kim Young-Sam, and his principal advisors took office 
committed to improving relations with the DPRK through dialogue and engagement. Because the 
preceding Roh Tae-Woo administration had made a significant headway towards improving 
North-South relations via conciliatory diplomacy, the new administration decided to continue on 
with the legacy.27 In particular, during the Roh administration, two very important inter-Korean 
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accords were concluded. The first, “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and 
Exchanges and Cooperation,” signed on December 13, 1991, laid out guidelines that, if 
implemented, would enable a near-complete cessation and reversal of the conflict on the 
peninsula. For example, the two sides agreed on important measures such as “mutual recognition 
of each other’s systems and an end to interference, vilification, and subversion of each other,” 
and mutual efforts to “transform the present state of armistice into a solid state of peace.”28 The 
second agreement, “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” signed 
on the 31st, stipulated that neither side “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, 
deploy or use nuclear weapons…[nor] possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment 
facilities.”29 While these accords were never actually implemented,30 the fact that they were 
concluded at all was in itself an impressive achievement that vindicated the utility of dialogue as 
a facilitator of inter-Korean relations. It was against such backdrop that the Kim Young-Sam 
administration adopted a conciliatory North Korea policy at the outset.31  
Substance aside, the new administration very strongly believed that its North Korea 
policy should be grounded upon the principles of self-reliance and leadership. That is, instead of 
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delegating their internal affairs to foreign powers and letting them determine the fate of the 
Korean people, it was time for the Koreans—both North and South—to come together and to 
take on full responsibility for their own problems. Recall from the theoretical chapter that by the 
wake of the post-Cold War period, South Koreans—against the backdrop of their astonishing 
accomplishments on both economic and political fronts—became highly confident that their 
country was finally ready to take its “rightful place in the ranks of the democratic and 
industrialized nations [on the world stage].”32 That is, they came to strongly believe that their 
successful pursuit of social mobility via democratization and decades of exceptional economic 
growth that placed it “on the verge of becoming a developed economy” entitled the ROK to an 
enhanced status by way of new categorization—as a solid middle power. What this meant for the 
South Koreans was that they had to get their significant other United States to recognize such 
status in order for it to be legitimized, and more specifically, show respect for the privileges 
associated with that position—in particular, for the prerogative to exert substantial influence over 
the negotiations with the DPRK.  
Accordingly, the South Korean leaders made it clear to the American officials—
including the secretary of state, Warren Christopher and the US ambassador to the ROK, Donald 
Gregg—that the ROK’s dialogue with the DPRK should be the primary channel for dealing with 
North Korea. While they did accept and appreciate external support in the form of a close US-
ROK coordination and a strong trilateral consultative process among the US, ROK, and Japan, 
the role and contribution of those foreign states were only to complement—and not substitute—
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that of the ROK.33 In essence, the South Koreans made it clear from the outset that they 
expected the Americans to show respect for the ROK’s privilege of making significant 
contributions to the resolution of the nuclear issue. That is, in contrast to the Cold War era, South 
Korea should no longer be taken for granted as a subservient client state that unquestioningly 
followed US policies. 
 The essence of the Kim Young-Sam administration’s initial North Korea policy—that of 
conciliation and active participation—was nicely captured by the president’s inaugural speech of 
February 25, 1993. Directly addressing the DPRK leader, Kim Il-Sung, Kim Young-Sam invited 
his counterpart to meet “at any time and any place” to discuss “reconciliation and unification.”34 
By emphasizing that “no ally can be more valuable than national kinship,”35 Kim Young-Sam 
stressed that the North-South cooperation should take the center stage in resolving the problems 
facing the peninsula.36 As a concrete measure signaling the ROK’s conciliatory intention, the 
Kim Young-Sam administration decided on March 11 to unconditionally send back Lee In-Mo, a 
North Korean war correspondent and guerilla captured during the Korean War.37 In his memoirs, 
Kim Young-Sam recalls this gesture as a very bold one that reflected the administration’s 
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ambition to reverse the zero-sum, antagonistic thinking that characterized decades of North-
South relations, to one of dialogue, trust, and cooperation—paving the way for achieving 
reunification before the new millennium.38   
  Unfortunately, however, these efforts received a major blow when the North Koreans 
suddenly declared their withdrawal from the NPT the very next day, March 12. While justifiably 
surprised and betrayed given their sincere intentions,39 the South Koreans nonetheless decided to 
stay the course in order to ensure that the North-South dialogue remained the primary channel 
for managing the North Korea issues. As promised, the ROK government sent back Lee In-Mo 
across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on March 19, demonstrating its seriousness, consistency, 
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predictability and rationality.40 Also, that same day, Seoul hastily declared the conclusion of the 
US-ROK annual joint military exercise Team Spirit and the withdrawal of the involved US 
forces and equipment in order to express a “willingness to resume the South-North dialogue.”41 
Moreover, the ROK foreign minister, Han Sung-Joo visited Washington later that month to make 
sure that the US did not resort to any precipitous action—such as a preemptive strike on the 
DPRK—that could jeopardize South Korea’s conciliatory plan of action. And President Kim 
Young-Sam to that end even sent a letter to the president of the United States, Bill Clinton, 
asking him “not to close the window of dialogue with North Korea.”42 The United States clearly 
understood and acknowledged the ROK’s preferences, not only agreeing on the need for a 
“diplomatic strategy to get North Korea to reverse its withdrawal from the NPT,”43 but also 
promising to “support the North-South dialogue as the primary means to resolve Korea’s 
problems.”44 
 However, it soon became very clear that the ROK’s ambition to achieve denuclearization 
and reunification predominantly through the North-South dialogue was but a pipe dream. This 
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was because the North Koreans had no interest at all in talking with their Southern counterparts. 
In fact, the DPRK placed its highest diplomatic priority on achieving US-DPRK bilateral talks 
while marginalizing the ROK. Called tongmibongnam in Korean, this strategy had two 
underlying rationale. First, symbolically, the DRPK would earn the legitimacy of negotiating 
with the world’s sole superpower.45 And second, practically, if a formal US-DPRK peace treaty 
were to ensue from the dialogue, the United States would no longer be a Cold War patron of the 
ROK but instead become an unbiased “broker of stability on the peninsula” that would be able to 
guarantee the North against the absorption by the South.46 Thus, the ROK had to allow for a 
greater degree of the US involvement than it initially might have wanted to.  
 The DPRK made its adherence to tongmibongnam explicit on April 22, during the 1993 
United National Disarmament Commission (UNDC) Session. Pointing out that the nuclear 
conflict was an issue primarily between the US and the DPRK, the North Koreans claimed that 
the crisis can and should “only be resolved through the US-DPRK negotiations,” and that the 
ROK was in no position to get involved.47 The DPRK justified the premise of its argument by 
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blaming the United States for its decision to withdraw from the NPT. Providing two reasons for 
this—Team Spirit and the IAEA’s demand for special inspections—Pyongyang claimed that the 
US was primarily responsible for both.48 In particular, it criticized the US for resuming Team 
Spirit and using the “nuclear war rehearsal” to threaten North Korea’s security. The DPRK also 
alleged the US for providing fabricated intelligence to the IAEA in order to induce its Board of 
Governors to issue demand for special inspections of the two suspected nuclear waste storage 
sites in Yongbyon.49 The North Koreans viewed these inspections as an “undisguised strong-arm 
act designed to disarm the DPRK and strangle [its] socialist system.”50 Against such backdrop, 
the DPRK warned the international community that its stance on the NPT would remain 
unchanged “until the United States [stopped] its nuclear threats,” in effect placing the burden on 
the United States to accommodate the DPRK interests and to come to the negotiating table.51   
 While the United States was initially against rewarding the DPRK for its “bad behavior,” 
it ultimately had to give in, due to a lack of better alternatives.52 First, there was the military 
option, including a “surgical strike” against the Yongbyon reactor, but as both the US and the 
ROK recognized, such a course would most likely lead to a general war, wreaking death and 
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destruction on the ROK and also entailing a significant military and civilian sacrifice on the part 
of the US as well. And even then, there was almost no guarantee that the North’s stocks of 
plutonium would be effectively eliminated.53 Second, the sanctions option was not ideal either, 
for the North Koreans made it clear that they weren’t simply going to give in to the international 
pressure. For example, in response to the IAEA Board of Governors’ referral of the DPRK’s non-
compliance with the IAEA Safeguards Agreement to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) on April 1, the DPRK responded by stating that it was “not afraid of [war]” and that it 
was willing to fight sanctions with “effective self-defensive countermeasures.”54 If the DPRK 
were to actually follow through those words, the peninsula in all likelihood was going to be 
dragged into a full-blown crisis, an outcome both allies wanted to avoid at all costs. Therefore, in 
a reversal of its initial hesitation, the United States publicly announced in late April that it was 
willing to take part in high-level talks with North Korea, and confirmed its position at the May 
11 UNSC meeting by stating that “we would be willing to meet with North Korea to help resolve, 
as part of the international community’s efforts, the situation resulting from actions North Korea 
has taken in the nuclear arena.”55  
The South Koreans obviously were not enthused with these turn of events. In fact, the 
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ROK national security advisor, Chung Chong-Wook, recalls that President Kim Young-Sam at 
first had a very difficult time swallowing the idea of a direct talk between the US and North 
Korea.56 Pride and symbolism aside, however, the South Koreans were perfectly aware that from 
the security standpoint, the US-DPRK negotiations were indispensible for putting out the 
immediate fire—which was only to get worse with the NPT withdrawal deadline (June 12) fast 
approaching and the prospects of international sanctions increasing following the referral of the 
nuclear issue to the UNSC. As both of these developments ran counter to the ROK’s desire for a 
diplomatic solution, rationality dictated that it support the US-DPRK bilateral talks.57 In fact, 
according to the deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Seoul, Raymond Burghardt, the 
talks were “the South Koreans’ idea…They actually came to us and suggested it.”58  
However, such support did not mean that the ROK relinquished its initial ambition to 
resolve the nuclear and other North Korea issues primarily through the North-South dialogue. In 
fact, it meant just the opposite; the South Koreans viewed the Washington-Pyongyang talks as an 
opportunity to bring back the center stage to the two Koreas.59 That is, the South Koreans 
believed that they were ceding the main platform to the US and the DPRK only temporarily with 
the expectation that the US would work on their behalf “as an agent” to facilitate Seoul’s own 
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dialogue with Pyongyang.60  
From the ROK’s perspective, such a conviction was justified because the United States 
was very forthcoming in its willingness to accommodate. For instance, according to the head of 
the State Department’s Korea desk, Charles Kartman, the US acknowledged that “the South-
North dialogue remains the primary means for resolving the problems of the Korean peninsula,” 
that the US efforts with North Korea are “designed to reinforce…[the ROK’s] dialogue with the 
DPRK,” and finally, that “any [US] dialogue with the North must only supplement and not 
supplant North-South dialogue.”61 And on May 12, undersecretary of state, Peter Tarnoff, 
reinforced these points by informing the ROK assistant foreign minister, Sin Ki-Pok, that the 
United States will be persuading Pyongyang to reengage the ROK in a bilateral talk in order that 
the two Koreas come together and satisfactorily implement the Joint Declaration on the 
Denuclearization of 1991.62 In short, while the United States might have begun taking a greater 
role in this whole process than the ROK initially wanted, the South Koreans otherwise were 
content to go along, for the US-DPRK talks not only addressed their immediate security 
concerns but also promised to bring the North-South channel to the forefront.  
Having established its mutual understanding with Seoul, Washington moved on next to 
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Pyongyang and began their talks on the nuclear issue at the US Mission to the UN, in New York, 
on June 2. The US team was headed by assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, 
Robert Gallucci, and the North Korean team was led by the first vice minister of foreign affairs, 
Kang Sok-Ju. As both the ROK and the US agreed, the goal of the negotiation was to seek “a 
nuclear-free Korean Peninsula” by ensuring the DPRK’s commitment to the following: 1) 
remaining in the NPT; 2) carrying out obligations to the IAEA; and 3) implementing fully the 
North-South Denuclearization Declaration.63  
The ROK’s Status Anxiety: US-ROK Alliance Put to Test  
 The First Round of the talks concluded with the US-North Korea Joint Statement on 
June 11, one day before the June 12 NPT withdrawal deadline. Gallucci and Kang agreed to the 
principles of: “assurances against the threat and use of force,” “peace and security in a nuclear-
free Korean Peninsula,” and “support for the peaceful reunification of Korea.” To this end, the 
DPRK agreed to “suspend” its withdrawal from the NPT “as long as it considers necessary”64 
and to support the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula.65 The two sides also agreed to a formal channel for future rounds of US-DPRK 
dialogue, through the North Korean UN Mission in New York,66 which would provide a “direct, 
authorized, and far more workable conduit for exchanges” than before.67 In sum, while the First 
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Round evidently fell short of resolving the central issues, 68 it nonetheless yielded highly 
promising results.  
One would think, given the ROK’s preference for a diplomatic solution to the peninsular 
crisis and its support of the US-DPRK dialogue as a temporary expedient to that end, that the 
South Koreans would have been satisfied with the outcome of the First Round. First, the 
impending crisis on the peninsula was defused, with the DPRK’s deferral of its official 
withdrawal from the NPT and its agreement to remain at the negotiating table.69 Second, the 
ROK was brought a step closer to achieving its own dialogue with North Korea, as the DPRK 
agreed to support the Denuclearization Agreement between the two Koreas. Third, the South 
Koreans’ advocacy of a conciliatory approach was vindicated, for Pyongyang’s negotiators 
presented themselves as being open to argument and logic, ready to make agreements on many 
issues.70 In short, as Gallucci noted, “of all the interested parties, South Korea should have been 
the most pleased.”71   
However, from the South Korean perspective, these positive developments were quickly 
overshadowed by a sense of helplessness at being sidelined from an issue that directly impinged 
on their national interests. 72  As Gallucci recalls, “pervasive…anxieties about a deal that 
bypassed inter-Korean dialogue … affected everyone from President Kim Young-Sam to the man 
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on the street.”73 One ROK official even “caustically remarked” that the South Korean public 
reacted to the “front-page pictures of a smiling Gallucci and Kang emerging from meetings in 
New York” as if it “had caught the United States ‘committing adultery’.”74 Moreover, according 
to Chung Chong-Wook, Kim Young-Sam was pained by the fact that only the US and the DPRK, 
and not the ROK, were being mentioned in the news.75 For the Americans, having entered the 
talks with high alliance cohesion and having done everything they could to brief the South 
Koreans during the negotiations,76 such negative reactions were incomprehensible. At one point, 
Gallucci was even forced to ask, “do they want to solve this?”77  
However, the South Koreans had legitimate reasons to fear that the First Round might be 
a signal of their eventual marginalization from the nuclear crisis—an anathema to their status 
aspirations. Three factors in particular stacked the cards against the ROK. First, that the US and 
the DPRK labeled their accord “joint statement”—the first ever between the two—implied a 
form of political recognition of North Korea by the US.78 Second, while the South Koreans were 
expecting the US to be focusing only on the nuclear issue—per Tarnoff and Shin’s understanding 
back in May—the Joint Statement clearly delved into a wider set of issues by not only 
mentioning reunification, but also stipulating that the US and the DPRK, officially for the first 
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time, disavow any hostile intention toward each other.79 In fact, these two developments were 
“progressive” enough to raise alarm in Seoul that its ally was “about to normalize relations with 
North Korea without consulting Seoul,” deviating from its initial promise to focus on helping the 
ROK enter the North-South dialogue.80 And finally, to make matters worse, the ROK’s own 
repeated diplomatic offensive since May to reinitiate its bilateral with the DPRK hit a dead end 
by late June.81 In short, the three factors together strongly indicated that the US influence over 
the nuclear issue was growing rapidly at the expense of the ROK’s, instilling status anxiety in the 
South Koreans that if such trend were to continue, the ROK might be permanently excluded from 
the crisis management.82  
In order to prevent such “worst-case” scenario from materializing and thereby overcome 
their status inconsistency, the South Koreans felt compelled to intervene before the US-DPRK 
relations progressed even further. The last thing they wanted to see—especially as a middle 
power aspirant—was allowing their fate to be governed once again by outside powers. Yet if the 
South Koreans were to continue standing on the sidelines and simply watch the US-DPRK move 
forward, they would only be expediting the ROK’s regression into its Cold War self. Although 
the North-South dialogue was indubitably a surefire way of putting themselves in a position to 
wield tangible influence over the crisis, with the reality dictating otherwise, the South Koreans 
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instead had to settle for gaining leverage as a third party. To this end, they sought to earn the 
Americans’ respect for their claimed prerogative of getting to play an integral role in the 
resolution of the nuclear issue.  
To signal their resolve to exercise such privilege to the United States, the South Koreans 
resorted to what might initially be seen as a counterintuitive course of action: openly criticizing 
the United States’ approach to the nuclear crisis. For example, on June 25, in an interview with 
the BBC, Kim Young-Sam claimed that the United States was being fooled by the North Koreans, 
who were only trying to buy time to finish their nuclear project. He thereby counseled toughness, 
asserting that the US should no longer make further concessions.83 Kim gave a similar interview 
on July 2 with the New York Times, expressing hope that the superpower would no longer 
“continue to be led on by North Korea.”84 The rationale behind these moves, which came at the 
cost of compromising alliance cohesion, were twofold. First, by showing that the ROK was 
ready to dissent and even counsel its patron, the South Koreans wanted to make the case that 
they should not be taken for granted as silent, passive watchers.85 Second, by pointing out that 
the United States alone was not adequately handling the nuclear issue, they also intended to 
make the case that the ROK’s input was essential to the whole process; after all, the South 
Koreans believed that “only they had the necessary experience to deal with Pyongyang.”86  
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While justifiably surprised and annoyed by such negativity, the Americans decided to 
cater to its ally’s preferences for the sake of preserving alliance cohesion. In his cable to Warren 
Christopher, Raymond Burghardt pointed out that the “principal political problem is Korean fear 
of becoming isolated…in US-North Korean negotiations.” He suggested that the United States 
allay such concerns by emphasizing to the South Koreans that the US approach was “based on 
US-ROK consultation and collaboration” and that its ultimate purpose was “to move beyond this 
crisis to encourage the direct North-South dialogue.” “Such reassurance,” argued Burghardt, 
“will go a long way toward converting the current [South] Korean uneasiness into solid 
support.”87  
This advice was soon put into practice during President Clinton’s trip to South Korea in 
July for the US-ROK Summit. Clinton stressed that the allies shared the “common goal” of 
preventing a nuclear North Korea and highlighted the importance of the partnership with the 
ROK by pointing out that the US would “continue working closely with the ROK and to consult 
on strategy all along the way.”88 He also promised to respect the ROK’s preferences by not 
“[upgrading] its [the US] relationship with North Korea without progress between North and 
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South.”89 As a symbol of their solidarity, Clinton and Kim Yong-Sam created a “24-Hour 
Hotline” via which the two could communicate directly whenever necessary, 90  thereby 
confirming for the South Koreans that their president was being fully respected and listened to 
by the leader of the “world’s only superpower.”91 Having thus been reassured at the highest level 
that they were a valuable partner to the United States whose role and ideas were integral to a 
successful resolution of the nuclear issue, the South Koreans reacted highly positively to the 
Summit, calling it a major diplomatic achievement for the ROK that not only enhanced President 
Kim’s stature but also elevated the status of the US-ROK security dialogue.92 Clearly, the South 
Koreans’ earlier status anxiety was effectively alleviated, which by extension helped restore 
alliance cohesion just in time for the Second Round the US-DPRK talks in Geneva. The Second 
Round concluded on July 19, with the US and the DPRK agreeing to begin the Third Round only 
if North Korea entered “serious discussions” with the IAEA and the ROK on nuclear matters.93 
However, for the next several months, almost no progress was made on either of these fronts, so 
much so that in late September, Warren Christopher remarked, “I am concerned that North Korea 
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could walk away from the discussions.”94 In order to break this impasse, the United States 
reached out to the DPRK in October, and the latter suggested the idea of a “package deal” as a 
possible solution.95 The point of such deal was to provide more incentive to the DPRK to 
cooperate by having both sides lay all their demands and offers on the table at once, instead of 
negotiating one step at a time.96 On November 15, after “fifteen midlevel meetings in New York 
and a host of letters back and forth to Pyongyang,” the American government decided to put its 
own package deal on the table.97 Per the deal, the Third Round was to begin and the Team 
Spirit ’94 cancelled in exchange for the DPRK’s 1) allowing the IAEA full access to all the 
declared facilities to maintain “continuity of safeguards” and 2) agreeing to hold simultaneous 
denuclearization talks with the ROK.98  
To the South Koreans, however, the idea of a package deal was not so palatable, for two 
reasons. First, they believed that the allies were giving away too much to the DPRK: why reward 
a “misbehaving child” instead of punishing her?99 Second, they suspected that even if the DPRK 
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were to consent to a deal comprehensively, it would implement the agreed-upon terms only 
“selectively,” as it saw fit.100 Despite having raised these concerns to their ally, however, the 
South Koreans to their dismay found out on November 17—through a leaked story on the 
Washington Post—that the United States went ahead and approved the proposal of the package 
deal to Pyongyang. That is, the US essentially made a major policy switch without having either 
taken the ROK’s reservations into account or given it any tangible role in the decision process.101 
To the status-conscious South Koreans, this was an anathema, as it once again reminded them 
that the ROK was “not the dominant force in policy toward Pyongyang,”102 but was rather a 
mere “bystander” unable to make any differences in the alliance’s strategies.103 While the South 
Koreans ultimately agreed to support the deal at the working level in preparation for the 
November US-ROK Summit, 104  the South Korean president was instead looking for an 
opportunity to overthrow it, “determined to show who was in charge and to do it in the most 
demonstrative way possible.”105 
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The November 23 Oval Office meeting with Clinton provided an ideal venue for Kim 
Young-Sam’s showdown. In what was supposed to be a brief, carefully staged session to put a 
“pro forma stamp of approval” on the package deal,106 the ROK President went off on a 50-
minute tirade against the “comprehensive approach.”107 A resentful Kim Young-Sam objected to 
the package deal, claiming that it had been decided by the US and only then briefed to the South 
Koreans,108 and thus angrily accused his ally of insufficient consultation and involvement of the 
ROK.109 Determined to show that Seoul was “in the front of the train, not in back,”110 Kim 
insisted that an “exchange of special envoys” between the North and the South be implemented 
as a precondition for both the initiation of the Third Round of US-DPRK talks and the 
cancellation of Team Spirit; that is, a resumption of the North-South contacts would no longer be 
merely a component of the package deal, but instead a necessary condition for any further 
progress in the nuclear dialogue.111 Moreover, Kim also insisted that it was the ROK, not the 
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Americans, that would have the final say on the cancellation of the Team Spirit ’94 and that 
would be making the announcement when the time came.112 Blindsided and yet again caught 
off-guard by the ROK leader’s ill-timed intervention, the US was essentially pushed into a corner 
and forced to accommodate its partner’s status concerns, lest any deterioration in the alliance 
cohesion work to the detriment of a negotiated resolution to the nuclear crisis. Thus, the allies 
agreed to modify the “comprehensive” approach as demanded, renaming the finalized version a 
“thorough and broad” approach to reflect the changes.113 After having executed a diplomatic 
about-face in perhaps the most dramatic manner possible, Kim Young-Sam proudly exited the 
Oval Office, telling his close aide, “We got what we wanted.”114  
The November Summit was a diplomatic victory for Kim Young-Sam, and the President 
returned home boasting that “the South Korean government will have the final say on issues 
affecting the peninsula.”115 The South Korean media heralded the Summit as a “clear success 
that burnishe[d] the ROK’s international image” and that confirmed its president’s “leadership on 
the DPRK nuclear issue.”116 As Kim Young-Sam proudly recalls, the Summit was a major 
milestone that clearly demonstrated that the ROK was an equal partner to the US not merely in 
rhetoric but also in practice as well.117 However, the ROK’s pursuit of status did not come 
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without its costs. On top of eroding the US-ROK alliance cohesion, it also began to inhibit a 
successful resolution of the crisis in hand, so much so that one Pentagon official even remarked, 
“that [Kim Young-Sam’s showdown] really locked us in. That accounts for the thrashing around 
in the coming months.”118 
Preoccupied with Status: the Breakdown of Super Tuesday  
The North Koreans, who were always very keen on talking directly to the US without 
the “South Korean filter,” were certainly not receptive to the “thorough and broad” approach.119 
As such, they were determined to dilute the ROK’s newly-gained influence over the pace of the 
US-DPRK talks, and to that end, began demanding that changes be made to the precondition for 
the Team Spirit suspension.120 In particular, the North Koreans refused to undergo an actual 
exchange of envoys at the time of the announcement, insisting that they would instead enter a 
dialogue with the ROK, and only then start arranging the envoy exchange.121  
Concerned that the nuclear talks would hit a dead-end otherwise, the United States 
agreed to go along with the DPRK’s demand, making sure—with the memories of the recent 
Summit clearly in mind—to consult the ROK before committing.122 While disappointed that the 
                                                                                                                                   
ROK relations, for unlike in the past—when the ROK was usually subject to the United States’ unilateral 
policy decisions—the ROK was finally able to clearly seize the initiative over the management of an 
important peninsular issue. Kim, Kimyŏngsam Taet'onglyŏng Hoekolok [President Kim Young-Sam's 
Memoirs], 1, pp. 214-15. 
118 Sigal, Disarming Strangers, p. 88. 
119 Cable, “Foreign Secretary’s Readout,” Jan. 3, 1994, Document 00418, The Two Koreas, DNSA. 
120 While the envoy exchange was a precondition for both the initiation of the Third Round and the 
cancellation of Team Spirit, the DPRK curiously only took issue with the latter at this point in time.  
121 Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, p. 115.  
122 Ibid., p. 116. 
109 
 
ROK’s leverage might be compromised as a result, Kim Young-Sam nonetheless agreed to get on 
board, appreciating the fact that Clinton had taken the trouble to give him a call.123 Based on 
these understandings, the US and the DPRK on December 29 were able to reach a preliminary 
agreement on simultaneously carrying out the following four steps on “the same as yet 
unspecified day—dubbed ‘Super Tuesday’”: 1) the IAEA begins inspections at seven specified 
sites 2) the North and the South start their talks on arranging envoy exchange 3) Seoul in return 
announces the cancellation of Team Spirit 4) US and the DPRK announces the date for the Third 
Round.124  
The December agreement, however, left the timing of the envoy exchange—whether it 
should take place before or after the initiation of the Third Round—unresolved. Because this was 
an issue of major contention between the two Koreas, the US and the DPRK negotiators were 
well aware that pressing either side too hard for a quick bargain would likely jeopardize the 
nuclear talks, and thus decided to defer the matter for the time being. Unfortunately, however, 
simply postponing the problem did nothing to mitigate it, and if anything, only gave more time 
for the ROK and the DPRK to further harden their respective positions over the following two 
months. In particular, the South Koreans remained as unyielding as ever in their insistence that 
the exchange take place before the initiation of the Third Round,125 if only to “demonstrate that 
Seoul was not playing second fiddle to Washington.”126 In fact, according to Gallucci, the South 
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Koreans were “so fixated on the timing of the exchange” that they “had no idea what to do in the 
meeting if the North actually agreed to it.”127 In contrast, for the very reason that it would give 
the ROK veto power over the US-DPRK talks, the North Koreans strongly opposed making the 
envoy exchange a “precondition for the Third Round of talks.”128  
Against such backdrop, the Super Tuesday initiative lurched forward on March 1,129 and 
by March 3, all of the four simultaneous “Super Tuesday steps” took place as planned.130 The 
US and the DPRK agreed to schedule the Third Round for March 21, the DPRK allowed the 
IAEA inspectors back in Yongbyon to ensure continuity of safeguards,131 working-level North-
South contacts were launched at Panmunjom in preparation for the exchange of envoys,132 and 
the ROK announced the suspension of Team Spirit.133  Moreover, during the Panmunjom 
meetings, the ROK and the DPRK were able to agree on most of the modalities for the envoy 
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exchange—aside from the timing—so much so that by March 10 the two sides’ agendas became 
“practically identical.”134 In sum, by early March, the parties came ever so close to a negotiated 
settlement, and a breakthrough seemed to be just over the horizon.  
One might think that such positive momentum would have motivated the ROK to loosen 
up its stance on the timing issue, given that Seoul wanted to hold the Third Round as much as 
Washington did,135 and that Kim Young-Sam in particular was as determined as anyone to 
“achieve a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue.”136 The choice for the ROK was clear-cut at 
this point. If it were to yield on the timing, the nuclear talks were guaranteed to proceed to the 
next phase, especially given that Pyongyang—aside from its intransigence on the timing—was 
quite eager to carry out the exchange; Kang Sok-Ju even told Gallucci that the DPRK 
government would do “all it could to reach agreement on the envoy exchange by [March 21].”137 
On the other hand, if the ROK were to persist, all of the hard-won progress thus far were likely 
to break down, as Pyongyang also made it clear that if the US and the ROK were to insist that 
the exchange happen before the Third Round, it would “neither honor the Super Tuesday 
agreement nor finish the IAEA inspection.”138  
Unfortunately, however, Seoul could not so easily let go of its attachment to its claimed 
privilege of exercising a significant degree of influence over the management of the nuclear issue. 
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That is, so long as the nuclear dialogue was being driven by the US and the DPRK, the South 
Koreans were bound to experience status inconsistency, which instigated them to take assertive 
and defiant actions to signal to the Americans that they were not going to take a back seat to 
them. The South Koreans were thus unable to forgo the “golden opportunity” to exercise veto 
power over the US-DPRK talks, and nothing was able to convince them otherwise. For instance, 
when Pyongyang suggested on March 12 that the two Koreas issue a communiqué stating that 
the envoys be exchanged “at an early date,”139 and when the United States proposed that the 
exchange and the Third Round take place simultaneously,140 Seoul rejected both proposals on 
the grounds that they fell short of its position and would make the ROK look like “an appendage 
to the US-North Korean talks.”141 Even when the situation was changing for the worse, with 
Pyongyang—out of frustration with the South—preventing the IAEA inspectors from taking 
sophisticated measurements at the plutonium reprocessing plant in Yongbyon142 and the IAEA in 
response calling its inspectors home on March 15,143 Seoul refused to accommodate. For 
example, when the US once again proposed simultaneity in order save Super Tuesday from 
collapsing, the ROK did not give in, merely making a “generous” counteroffer to carry out the 
exchange “one day” before the Third Round.144 Seoul continued to hold its ground for the next 
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several days, ultimately putting the “final nail in Super Tuesday’s coffin”145 at the March 19 
Panmunjom meeting by upping the ante and threatening to seek sanctions if the North continued 
to resist.146 No longer able to tolerate the ROK’s intransigence, the DPRK responded with a 
threat of its own, stating that “Seoul is not very far from here. If a war breaks out, Seoul will turn 
into a sea of fire.”147 
From this point on, everything uncontrollably went downhill. On March 21, the IAEA 
Board of Governors declared North Korea in “further noncompliance” with its safeguards 
agreement and sent the matter to the UNSC, and the United States canceled the Third Round of 
talks and revoked the cancellation of Team Spirit ’94.148 Then on April 19, North Korea notified 
the IAEA that it was planning to unload the irradiated fuel rods from the 5-megawatt reactor at 
Yongbyon, 149  which would not only “jeopardize the IAEA’s ability to conduct fuel 
measurements necessary to verify the operating history of the reactor”150 but also enable the 
DPRK to convert the unloaded rods into “enough plutonium for four or five nuclear weapons.”151 
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On May 8, North Korea initiated the process without international observation or approval, 
removing more than 60 percent of the fuel rods by June 2.152 The IAEA Board of Governors 
then adopted a resolution deploring the DPRK’s non-compliance with its safeguards agreement 
on June 10, and three days later, the North Koreans withdrew from the IAEA.153 With the 
prospects of a nuclear North Korea looming larger by the day, tension was rapidly escalating on 
the peninsula, so much so that according to the secretary of defense, William Perry, “we knew 
that we were poised on the brink of a war that might involve weapons of mass destruction.”154 In 
fact, on June 16, President Clinton held a meeting with his top advisors to consider America’s 
military options against the DPRK—including a preemptive strike against the Yongbyon 
facilities, called the “Osirak option.” It was only at this moment when word came from former 
president Jimmy Carter in Pyongyang that an agreement with the DPRK might be possible.155 
Status Fluctuations: a Turbulent Path toward the Agreed Framework  
Carter’s timely intervention was perhaps the only means available at the time to stop the 
                                                                                                                                   
exchange of special envoys before the US-DPRK nuclear talks could resume, a major concession that it 
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rapid escalation towards another Korean War. After all, had Carter not interrupted the Cabinet 
Room meeting, President Clinton would probably have proceeded with selecting and authorizing 
one of the military options given to him—any one of which, as it was understood, entailed a high 
risk of war. In particular, besides the Osirak option, Clinton was presented with other military 
alternatives that only involved an increase in US military forces in South Korea. While these 
other options did not involve the US initiation of an actual military attack against North Korea, 
they nonetheless were certain to be considered provocative by the DPRK, potentially instigating 
the latter’s military response. At the time of Carter’s intervention, Clinton was only considering 
among the deployment options, setting the Osirak option aside for the time being, and as a last 
resort. However it remains highly doubtful that the Clinton administration would actually have 
implemented a preemptive strike even if the more “peaceful” options were exhausted. 156 
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Regardless, the Korean peninsula at the time was still marked by a significant degree of tension 
and hostility, so much so that one American diplomat described the situation in Seoul—on a 
scale of 1 to 10 with 10 close to panic—as “a six and rapidly moving in the wrong direction.”157  
Despite these circumstances, however, the South Koreans’ initial reaction to Carter’s 
mission was curiously unreceptive, if not bluntly hostile. In fact, Kim Young-Sam criticized the 
upcoming Carter-Kim Il Sung meeting as being “ill-timed,” only helping the DPRK pursue 
“stalling tactics” on the nuclear issue, 158  and even telephoned Clinton to express his 
disapproval.159 This was because even at a moment in which their national security was 
seriously jeopardized, the South Koreans continued to experience status inconsistency, coming to 
assess Carter’s intervention not in terms of its security benefits but instead in terms of its 
incompatibility with their status pursuits. In particular, Kim Young-Sam was disheartened that he 
was once again putting “the fate of the peninsula…under negotiation at a very high level without 
his participation,”160 thereby relegating Seoul to a “bit part in its own national drama.”161  
The South Koreans’ frustrations lingered on for a few days, until Carter returned to 
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Seoul on June 18 with the breaking news that Kim Il-Sung agreed to make an offer to the South 
Korean leader to hold an inter-Korean summit “without preconditions, without extensive 
preparations.”162 In other words, their initial anxiety to the contrary, Carter’s trip—in a “sudden 
and entirely unexpected reversal of fortune”163—presented the South Koreans with perhaps the 
most surefire way of overcoming status inconsistency since the outbreak of the nuclear crisis. As 
a result, Kim Young-Sam, in a stark contrast to his critical attitude up to that point, suddenly 
became “ecstatic” at the “irresistible opportunity to regain the initiative” over the crisis164 and to 
realize his long-standing dream of becoming the “first leader of South Korea to meet with his 
North Korean counterpart.”165 Praising the former president for his efforts at mediation between 
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Seoul and Pyongyang, Kim Young-Sam immediately accepted the offer.166  
Now that they were about to play the long-desired integral role in the management of the 
nuclear crisis, the South Koreans were finally able to address their status inconsistency and 
thereby come to focus squarely on the main issue in hand: ensuring a non-nuclear DPRK. As 
such, in a stunning about-face, the South Koreans—clearly “determined to make progress in the 
North-South track and lend impetus to resolution of the nuclear issue” 167—became more 
cooperative with the US and more accommodating to the North Koreans than ever before; as 
Gallucci rightfully points out, “for the first time in months, South Korea was actively on 
board.”168 In particular, the ROK officials were willing to give the DPRK its way on most 
matters concerning the Summit arrangement. For example, they were “prepared to hold the first 
meeting in Pyongyang, if that was the North’s desire,”169 and did not even seek any commitment 
from Pyongyang for a return visit to the South by Kim Il-Sung.170 As a result, the two Koreas 
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were able to quickly and smoothly come to an agreement by June 28 to hold the first-ever inter-
Korean Summit on July 25-27 in Pyongyang.171 Moreover, with their growing confidence in 
their aggrandized role in the nuclear issue, the South Koreans were no longer splitting hairs over 
the US-DPRK dialogue, readily agreeing to the initiation of the long-awaited Third Round on 
July 8.172 At last, with all three countries moving toward a diplomatic solution in unison, a 
breakthrough truly seemed to be on the offing. 
Unfortunately, however, such hope was completely dashed when Kim Il-Sung suddenly 
died on July 9. While it was expected that both the Third Round and the inter-Korean Summit 
would resume shortly after the mourning period, only the former ended up being materialized. 
This was because, to the South Koreans’ dismay, the North Koreans reverted back to their tactic 
of tongmibongnam, shifting their focus entirely to the bilateral with the US while putting the 
inter-Korean dialogue to the backburner.173 Such a turnabout was the kiss of death for the South 
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Koreans, for if not held in check, it was bound to force them yet again to the sidelines while the 
US-DPRK dialogue proceeded. Consequently, status anxiety kicked back in, marking an abrupt 
end to the cooperative ROK that Carter helped bring about. Invoking a sense of déjà vu, the 
South Koreans resumed their earlier efforts at asserting their role in the nuclear dialogue, which 
came at the cost of eroding alliance cohesion and inhibiting a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear 
crisis by extension. 
A telling sign that the ROK was once again ready to cause trouble for the US-DPRK 
talks surfaced on July 27. That day, Seoul held a press conference to unveil a North Korean 
defector, Kang Myong-Do, who dropped a bombshell by claiming that the DPRK had already 
built five nuclear warheads.174 It was soon revealed, however, that Kang had no real evidence 
and that there was “clearly a pressure on the defector [by the Blue House] to come up with 
negative comments about North Korea.”175 The United States was indignant; the ROK disclosed 
a potentially groundbreaking testimony without any prior consultations, and a completely 
unsubstantiated one at that. From the American perspective, it seemed as if the South Koreans 
staged the press conference as a pretext for calling the US talks with the North into question.176 
Warren Christopher in particular alleged that the Blue House was deliberately attempting to 
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derail American efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff.177 Curiously enough, the allegation 
turned out to be true. In a 2003 interview, Kim Young-Sam bluntly admitted that he had ordered 
the press conference in order to hold back the nuclear talks, as they were starting to proceed at 
the exclusion of the ROK. Kim explained that he intended to make the case that without a 
significant participation of the South Koreans, the Americans alone would not be able to 
successfully denuclearize North Korea.178 
Against such backdrop of renewed South Korean recalcitrance, the Third Round of the 
US-DPRK talks resumed on August 5 in Geneva. By August 12, the two sides were able to agree 
on the rough outlines of a settlement of the central issues, signing a conditional accord called the 
Agreed Statement.179 With the US and the DPRK issuing yet another agreement, the South 
Koreans—scrambling not to be left out of the diplomatic track—predictably intervened with a 
reason to rein in the nuclear dialogue. In particular, they took issue with the following term of the 
agreement: the US makes an arrangement to provide 2,000-megawatt light-water reactors (LWRs) 
as a replacement for the DPRK’s existing 5-megawatt graphite-moderated reactors and related 
facilities, while providing energy alternatives in the interim; upon receipt of US assurances, the 
DPRK seals operation of its existing 5-megawatt graphite-moderated reactor and freezes 
construction of the new 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt versions. 180  The South Koreans 
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slammed the United States for giving away too much,181 claiming that simply getting the North 
to freeze its nuclear program wasn’t enough; they demanded an implementation of full-scope 
safeguards, including special inspections, in order to verify the operating history of the 
program.182 Only when nuclear transparency was thereby achieved, they argued, should the 
provision of the LWRs for the North Koreans begin. Furthermore, the South Koreans insisted 
that they should be the ones financing the construction of the LWRs, which in turn had to be 
Korean-made.183 In short, Seoul once again found a way to more centrally reinsert itself into the 
US-DPRK dialogue, at the cost of eroding alliance cohesion with the US and also complicating 
the nuclear negotiations more generally.  
As expected, Seoul’s intervention triggered a harsh reaction from Pyongyang. Regarding 
the ROK’s LWR provision, the North Koreans insisted that “it will not be acceptable,” warning 
that the “continued insistence [on the South Korean involvement] may lead to a breakdown of 
the Geneva talks and to a decision to reload the 5-megawatt reactor.”184 And regarding the 
                                                                                                                                   
DPRK’s energy needs, compared to their graphite-moderated counterparts. For details, see ibid., p. 6. For 
a full text of the Agreed Statement, see Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci, Going Critical, pp. 420-21. 
181 Intelligence Report, “The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence,” Aug. 18, 1994, Document 00516, The 
Two Koreas, DNSA. 
182 Briefing Memorandum, “Your Lunch with Korean Foreign Minister Han,” Sept. 7, 1994, Document 
00523, The Two Koreas, DNSA. 
183 Kim, Kimyŏngsam Taet'onglyŏng Hoekolok [President Kim Young-Sam's Memoirs], 1, pp. 343-44; 
Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 275.; and Intelligence Report, “The Secretary’s Morning Intelligence,” Aug. 
16, 1994, Document 00515, The Two Koreas, DNSA. 
184 Cable, “Instructions for US-DPRK Berlin Talks,” Sept. 13, 1994, Document 01017, The Two Koreas, 
DNSA. The ROK side also refused to budge. Kim Young-Sam in particular doubled down by claiming 
that the only LWRs that could be provided are the South Korean ones, and that if the DPRK continued to 
refuse, then any agreement it reached with the United States would be null and void. Kim, Kimyŏngsam 
Taet'onglyŏng Hoekolok [President Kim Young-Sam's Memoirs], 1, pp. 343-44. 
123 
 
special inspections, Pyongyang declared in both private and public that it would “never submit to 
what it described as a violation of its national sovereignty.”185 With the collapse of Super 
Tuesday still fresh in their memories, the Americans realized that they could no longer fully cater 
to the whims of the South Koreans.186 As such, they decided to take the ROK’s demands into 
account only to the extent that doing so did not interfere with the ongoing nuclear talks with the 
DPRK. By becoming less accommodating to the ROK’s sensitivities, Washington was able to 
push its dialogue with Pyongyang forward, and by October 6, the two sides were able to 
successfully reach an agreement regarding the contentious term from the August 12 Agreed 
Statement; the DPRK would comply with the special inspections only after 75 percent of the 
components of the promised LWRs were delivered, which was expected to take as much as five 
years.187 This arrangement ultimately became a part of the finalized accord. 
The South Koreans were furious. While they were the ones who were expected to 
underwrite a large part of the LWR project, none of their stipulations were adequately addressed: 
not only was the timing of the special inspections pushed back by five years, but also there was 
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no mention at all that the LWRs had to be “made in Korea.”188 As a result, Kim Young-Sam 
arranged an interview with the New York Times on October 7 in order to attack Washington’s 
diplomatic maneuver and to pull it back from reaching a “premature agreement” with the 
North.189 In particular, Kim claimed that the basic stance of the US in the discussions was naïve 
and overly flexible, warning that “the US should not be led on by the manipulations of North 
Korea.” “If the US wants to settle with a half-baked compromise and the media wants to describe 
it as a good agreement, they can,” he declared, “but I think it would bring more danger and 
peril.”190 Upon hearing about this interview in Geneva, Gallucci got enraged, his face even 
visibly turning red; the negotiations were about to be torpedoed at the final moment as a result of 
the ROK president’s blindsiding move.191 With a workable deal with the North clearly within 
reach, Washington was not going to back down this time.192   
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192 Washington in fact was very tough on Seoul at this point. Shortly after hearing about Kim Young-
Sam’s New York Times interview, Anthony Lake warned Chung Chong-Wook that “if Seoul insisted on 
sitting back and waiting for concessions from the North, it risked being blamed for any failure in the talks.” 
Lake added that it was time for the ROK to publicly announce its support for the agreement. Gallucci was 
as harsh, telling the ROK foreign minister, Han Sung-Joo, that Kim’s remarks were “an unacceptable 
public expression of mistrust of President Clinton and an attack on his negotiator.” Gallucci even refused 
to tell Han his plans for the afternoon meeting with Kang Sok-Ju. While admitting that there were a 
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Confronted with the Americans’ adamant demand that the ROK maintain unity at a 
moment in which they were about to succeed in curbing Pyongyang’s nuclear program, Kim 
Young-Sam was essentially forced to give in; he declared that he was “prepared to be a statesman” 
and would support the Geneva accord.193 However, as status-conscious as the president was, 
Kim needed a face-saving way to make the last-minute policy change, and thus demanded that 
the following two conditions be satisfied before he committed. First, President Clinton had to 
give him a call personally requesting his support for the accord. Second, the final accord should 
stipulate inter-Korean dialogue, as a reminder to Pyongyang that it must not forgo its obligation 
to deal bilaterally with Seoul. The first condition was easy to satisfy.194 However, the second 
was more difficult, for the DPRK was intransigent in its refusal to commit to the North-South 
talks.195 Unable to concretely settle the issue even after an intense diplomatic tug-of-war at the 
11th hour, the parties had no other choice but to settle for an awkward, ambiguous, and poorly 
formulated clause as a part of the final agreement: “The DPRK will engage in North-South 
dialogue, as this Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes such 
dialogue.”196 While the finalized accord clearly fell short of the ideals pursued by any one of the 
                                                                                                                                   
number of other occasions in which Gallucci and Han had tense exchanges, Gallucci recalls that 
“none…tested the close working relationship [we] shared more than this one.” Ibid., pp. 315-16.  
193 Ibid., p. 319; Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, p. 278. 
194 Wan-Sang Han, Hanpantonŭn Ap'ŭta : Chŏktaechŏk Kongsaengŭi Pikŭk [Han Wan-Sang's Memoirs] 
(Paju, Korea: Hanul, 2013), p. 248. 
195 Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, p. 278. 
196 Whether “as” meant “at the time” or “because” was unclear. Yet such ambiguity gave the leeway for 
both the North and the South to make an interpretation as they each saw fit. If “as” meant “at the time,” 
the statement could be understood as saying that the North-South dialogue would resume only after the 
Agreed Framework helped satisfy all the preconditions for it, an interpretation favorable to the DPRK. On 
the other hand, if “as” meant “because,” the statement could be understood as saying that because the 
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parties involved, it was nonetheless adequate enough to get all of the US and the two Koreas on 
board. At last, Gallucci and Kang Sok-Ju were able to sign the deal—the Agreed Framework—in 
Geneva on October 21, finally putting an end to the long and arduous 18-month march towards a 
diplomatic resolution to the nuclear crisis. At least for the time being…  
Alternative Explanations 
 In this penultimate section, I discuss the extent to which three alternative explanations—
1) divergence in threat perception; 2) domestic politics and anti-Americanism; and 3) desire to 
bandwagon with the rising China—could account for the ROK’s alliance-eroding behavior 
examined throughout the extensive case study above.  
Divergence in Threat Perceptions 
 The divergence in threat perceptions of the DPRK and the resulting abandonment and/or 
entrapment fears on the part of the South Koreans do not persuasively account for the latter’s 
alliance-eroding behavior. To be sure, a number of scholars have pointed out that the ROK, 
which had a high threat perception of the DPRK, feared that the United States—which had a 
comparatively lower threat perception—might be sacrificing Seoul’s security interests for a 
quick and easy bargain with Pyongyang to ensure nonproliferation.197 For instance, as Nancy 
Tucker states, “Seoul could not bring itself fully to trust American diplomats to represent its 
                                                                                                                                   
Agreed Framework in itself already provides the conditions necessary for the North-South dialogue, it 
should be able to begin anytime soon, an interpretation favorable to the ROK. Dong-Hyun Kim, "Chŏn 
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197  Byung-joon Ahn, "The Origins and Evolution of the Korean-American Alliance: A Korean 
Perspective," Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Paper Series  (1998): 13; Cha, "Balance, 
Parallelism, and Asymmetry," p. 185. 
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interests and feared that compromises would be made that would jeopardize southern 
security.”198  
While there certainly is some plausibility to this line of argument, however, at the end of 
the day, it falls short on two major fronts. First, as Victor Cha points out, although it is true that 
South Korea did claim from time to time that its security interests might be compromised if only 
Washington and not Seoul took the lead in engaging Pyongyang, these complaints were 
rhetorical at best and in actuality, the ROK’s dissatisfaction had little to do with such fears. In 
particular, the South Koreans never really explained how the said risk would materialize, or 
which specific scenarios most worried them, 199  thereby raising the possibility that their 
expression of abandonment fears was simply a means to achieve other non-security-related 
ends—such as seeking status recognition. Second, even if the fear of abandonment were more 
salient than Cha makes it to be, it is still difficult to understand from a security standpoint as to 
why the ROK would have tried to obstruct the US-DPRK talks and gambled on a nuclear North 
Korea in exchange for minimizing risks that were only speculative at best—especially when the 
US conscientiously briefed the South Koreans throughout the crisis.200 If anything, the ROK 
should have made even a greater effort to align its policies with that of the United States, for by 
acting in defiance of the patron state, it would only have facilitated abandonment by having 
solidified its image as a disloyal and uncooperative partner. In short, if the fear of abandonment 
                                         
198 Tucker, "The Origins and Evolution of the Korean-American Alliance," p. 23. 
199 Cha, "Mistaken Attribution," p. 47. 
200  For evidence, please refer to the case study section. Incidentally, the fact that the US-ROK 
communication was very thorough throughout the crisis makes it unlikely that the alliance would have 
suffered from other potential sources of discord such as mistrust and misperception.  
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were to serve as a convincing explanation for the ROK’s alliance eroding behavior, then there 
should have been a strong body of evidence that shows that the ROK not only had an explicit 
idea as to how exactly the ceding of the main negotiating platform to the US and the DPRK 
would have jeopardized its security interests, but also that the ROK had legitimate reasons to 
believe that only by resorting to alliance-eroding behaviors—as opposed to, for example, making 
an effort to deal with those concerns by diplomatically negotiating with Washington—would it 
have been able to optimally address its abandonment fears. I have not encountered such line of 
evidence over the course of my research.  
Domestic Politics and Anti-Americanism 
That the rise of anti-American sentiment in the ROK and the South Korean leader’s 
desire to cater to such public opinion caused the low levels of US-ROK alliance cohesion 
observed is only half-correct at best. Most importantly, anti-Americanism was not present during 
the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94. According to Gi-Wook Shin and Hilary Izatt, 
“negative views of America among Koreans became both common and explicit” during the 80’s 
and late 90’s/early 2000’s, while they remained quiescent over the period in between.201 Thus, 
anti-Americanism in itself cannot serve as an explanation for the ROK’s defiance against the 
United States.  
However, the other half of the hypothesis—namely, public opinion—does find support 
from the case study. For example, President Kim Young-Sam began to openly criticize the 
United States’ DPRK policies following the First Round in June 1993 largely due to his 
observation that the South Korean public was reacting negatively to the “front-page pictures of a 
                                         
201 Gi-Wook Shin and Hilary Jan Izatt, "Anti-American and Anti-Alliance Sentiments in South Korea," 
Asian Survey 51, no. 6 (2011): 1113-14. 
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smiling Gallucci and Kang emerging from meetings in New York.” Moreover, Kim pushed to 
create the 24 Hour Hotline during the July 1993 US-ROK summit largely in order to earn the 
recognition of the ROK public that he was being fully respected by the leader of the “world’s 
only superpower.” While these are but two examples, they still clearly show us that public 
opinion mattered a great deal for the ROK president when he formulated policies towards the 
US-ROK alliance and the North Korean nuclear issue. In fact, as Don Oberdorfer and Robert 
Carlin note:  
“What drove Kim Young-Sam’s northern policies [and alliance policies] above all were 
the tides of domestic public opinion. Unlike his military predecessors, Kim was a 
professional politician with a keen interest in the shifting views of the public. Known for 
relying more on his fee for the political aspects of issues than any overall strategy, he 
cited newspaper headlines or television broadcasts more often in internal discussions 
than official papers…According to a White House official, Kim constantly referred to 
polling data [and] public opinion…in discussing his reactions to events…”202 
 
How, then, does this explanation for the ROK’s behavior square with the central argument of this 
chapter—namely, that the ROK’s experience of status inconsistency was the primary cause of its 
alliance-eroding actions? My answer is that the former complements the latter. In other words, 
while the ROK’s self-identification as a middle power in the post-Cold War era and its resulting 
sense of entitlement to the claimed privilege of exercising policy autonomy were in themselves 
significant motivators of its behavior, what added further fuel to the fire was President Kim’s 
sense of obligation—as the first civilian leader of a newly democratized nation—to pay an extra 
careful attention to public opinion and to reflect it in his DPRK and alliance policies. 
Bandwagoning with the Rising China  
Finally, the hypothesis that the ROK’s desire to bandwagon with the rising China caused 
                                         
202 Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, p. 225. 
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the low levels of US-ROK alliance cohesion observed does not hold true. For starters, it was only 
a year before the outbreak of the crisis that the Chinese and the South Koreans normalized their 
diplomatic relations (in August 1992),203 and trade volume between the two at the time was 
naturally quite low, marking a mere $6.37 billion in 1992 (compared to $235 billion in 2014).204 
Considering that the US-ROK trade volume the same year amounted to roughly $32 billion,205 it 
can be said that there were neither economic nor security incentives for the ROK to move away 
from the US and closer to China during the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94. 
And even if the South Koreans were actually motivated for some other reasons to 
strengthen their ties with the Chinese at the expense of those with the Americans, there was no 
need for them to defy cooperation with the United States if that was their primary goal. This is 
because throughout the First Korean Nuclear Crisis, China stood mostly on the sidelines, 
intervening in the crisis in a very minimalist fashion. That is, contrary to the expectations raised 
by international relations theorists like John Mearsheimer,206 there were absolutely no signs that 
the Chinese were trying to pursue an anti-American policy of some sort aimed at restraining 
what could be interpreted as the United States’ intrusion into its backyard.207 If anything, the 
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Chinese were rather supportive (albeit indirectly) of the US policies toward the DPRK. For 
instance, according to Hochul Lee, when the Clinton administration went to the UNSC to impose 
economic sanctions on North Korea following its declaration to leave the NPT in March 1993, 
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen announced that China would not veto the sanctions.208 
Moreover, Lee notes that in June 1994, when the US was contemplating a preemptive attack on 
the DPRK, Foreign Minister Qian “called in the North Korean ambassador to warn that North 
Korea could not expect indefinite Chinese support in its confrontation with the US.”209 As 
Alastair Johnston cogently sums up, “by most accounts, China [was] relatively constructive in 
urging restraint in the DPRK’s development of WMD capabilities and in supporting the 
institutions designed to ensure this restraint,” such as the Agreed Framework of 1994 “that froze 
the DPRK’s plutonium production program.”210 In essence, during the First Korean Nuclear 
Crisis, China generally aligned its policies with those of the United States. Therefore, it can be 
said that even if South Korea did genuinely desire to accommodate China’s preferences at the 
expense of those of the United States, resorting to alliance-eroding policies for that purpose 
alone would not have been fruitful at all—since the US and China’s interests in the context of the 
nuclear issue were not misaligned to begin with.  
Conclusion 
A close reading of the historical record shows that the South Koreans’ diplomatic 
maneuvers during the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94 were heavily influenced by their 
                                         
208Hochul Lee, "China in the North Korean Nuclear Crises: 'Interest' and 'Identity' in Foreign Behavior," 
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experience of status inconsistency. Specifically, the South Koreans became compliant with the 
US-DPRK negotiations when they believed that they were getting to play a substantial role in 
crisis management, and intransigent when they believed that the United States was not showing 
respect for their exercise of such prerogative. And these behavioral fluctuations ended up not 
only causing a rift in the US-ROK alliance cohesion but also to a large extent inhibiting a 
successful resolution of the nuclear crisis. The fact that neither the collapse of the Super Tuesday 
initiative in March 1994 nor the rapid progress toward the Agreed Framework later that year was 
able to motivate the South Koreans to align their policies with that of the US just goes to show 
how preoccupied they were with status concerns at this time. 
These findings shed a new light on our understanding of the First Korean Nuclear Crisis. 
Previous scholarship has too often approached the topic with an analytical focus on the US-
DPRK dyad, pointing to factors like the DPRK’s nuclear brinkmanship,211 the United States’ 
reluctance to engage in a sincere diplomatic give-and-take with North Korea,212 or the failure of 
coercive diplomacy by either sides213 as an explanation for the escalation of tension and the 
emergence of various obstacles over the course of the nuclear negotiations. By departing from 
such conventional perspective and shifting the focus instead to the South Koreans, this study has 
brought to light the ROK’s significant influence over the unfolding of the crisis, a salient yet 
previously overlooked dimension of the case that helps deepen our insight into the complex 
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dynamics underlying the North Korean nuclear conundrum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
134 
 
References 
Ahn, Byung-joon. "The Origins and Evolution of the Korean-American Alliance: A Korean 
Perspective." Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Paper Series  (1998): 3-23. 
Ahn, Jung-Sik. Han'gugŭi Chajujŏk Taebukchŏngch'aekŭn Kanŭnghan'ga [Is South Korea's 
Independent North Korea Policy Possible?]. Paju, Korea: Hanul, 2007. 
Bae, Jong-Yun. "Bureaucratic Politics and Korean Foreign Policy on North Korea in 1990s." 
Korean Political Science Review 37, no. 5 (2003): 147-65. 
Baek, Hak-Soon. Not’aeu Chŏngbuwa Kimyŏngsamjŏngbuŭi Taebukchŏngch’aek Pigyo 
[Comparing Rho Tae-Woo and Kim Young-Sam Administrations' North Korea Policies]. 
Seoul, Korea: Sejong Institute, 2012. 
Bleiker, Roland. "A Rogue Is a Rogue Is a Rogue: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Korean Nuclear 
Crisis." International Affairs 79, no. 4 (2003): 719-37. 
Carter, Ashton B, and William J Perry. Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 
Cha, Victor D. "Balance, Parallelism, and Asymmetry: United States-Korea Relations." Journal 
of East Asian Studies 1, no. 1 (2001): 179-209. 
———. "Democracy and Unification: The Dilemma of the R.O.K. Engagement." In The Two 
Koreas and the United States: Issues of Peace, Security, and Economic Cooperation, 
edited by Wonmo Dong. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000. 
———. "Mistaken Attribution: The United States and Inter-Korean Relations." Asia Pacific 
Review 9, no. 2 (2002): 45-60. 
Cho, Dong-Jun. "Hanmigwan’gyeŭi Yŏksajŏk Koch’al ; Oegyojŏngch’aekkyŏlchŏngja 
Simnibunsŏgŭi Yuyongsŏng Kŏmt’o: 1990yŏndae Pukhaegwigirŭl Tullŏssan 
Hanmigwan’gyerŭl Chungsimŭro [a Study on the Utility of Foreign Policy Decision 
Makers' Psychological Analysis: Focusing on U.S.-R.O.K. Relations on North Korea 
Nuclear Crisis in the 1990s]." Journal of Korean Political And Diplomatic History 26, no. 
1 (2004): 197-222. 
Chung, Chong-Wook. "Chung Chong-Wook [Oral History Interview (Yonsei)]." In 
Hankuktaet'onglyŏng T'ongch'ikusulsalyochip 4-Kimyŏngsam Taet'onglyŏng [Oral 
History Collections on the R.O.K. Presidents Volume 4 - Kim Young-Sam], edited by 
Yonsei University Institute of State Governance Studies. Seoul, Korea: Sunin, 2014. 
———. "Chung Chong-Wook [Oral History Interview]." In Kowikwanlyotŭl, 'Pukhaekwiki'lŭl 
Malhata [Top Korean Officials Discuss the North Korean Nuclear Crises], edited by Shin 
Wook-Hee and Cho Dong-Joon. Seoul, Korea: National Institute of Korean History, 2009. 
135 
 
Creekmore, Marion. A Moment of Crisis: Jimmy Carter, the Power of a Peacemaker, and North 
Korea's Nuclear Ambitions. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2009. 
Cronin, Richard P, and Violet Jie Moore. North Korea: U.S. Policy and Negotiations to Halt Its 
Nuclear Weapons Program: An Annotated Chronology and Analysis. Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: November 18 1994). 
Dembinski, Matthias. "North Korea, Iaea Special Inspections, and the Future of the 
Nonproliferation Regime." The Nonproliferation Review 2, no. 2 (1995): 31-39. 
Downs, Chuck. Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy. Washington, DC: American 
Enterprise Institute, 1999. 
Drennan, William M. "Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing Whom?’." In The 
United States and Coercive Diplomacy, edited by Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin. 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003. 
Eliot Kang, C.S. "Restructuring the U.S.-South Korea Alliance to Deal with the Second Korean 
Nuclear Crisis." Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 2 (2003): 309-24. 
Hahm, Sung-Deuk, and Okjin Kim. "Presidential Leadership and Bureaucratic Politics in 
Foreign Policy-Making Process of Korea: Cases of North Korean Nuclear Crises I and 
I.I.". Journal of International Politics 10, no. 2 (2005): 37-71. 
Han, Wan-Sang. "Han Wan-Sang [Oral History Interview]." In Kowikwanlyotŭl, 'Pukhaekwiki'lŭl 
Malhata [Top Korean Officials Discuss the North Korean Nuclear Crises], edited by Shin 
Wook-Hee and Cho Dong-Joon. Seoul, Korea: National Institute of Korean History, 2009. 
———. Hanpantonŭn Ap'ŭta : Chŏktaechŏk Kongsaengŭi Pikŭk [Han Wan-Sang's Memoirs]. 
Paju, Korea: Hanul, 2013. 
Harrison, Selig S. Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003. 
Heo, Uk. "The U.S.–R.O.K. Alliance: Security Implications of the South Korea–U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement." Pacific Focus 23, no. 3 (2008): 365-81. 
Hwang, Il-Do. "Y.S., Ankipu Tongwŏnhae Chenepa Hapŭi Makŭlyŏ Haessta [Kim Young-Sam 
Tried to Block the Agreed Framework through the Agency for National Security 
Planning]." Shin Donga, November 25 2003. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain. "Is China a Status Quo Power?". International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 
5-56. 
Karim, Moch Faisal "Middle Power, Status-Seeking and Role Conceptions: The Cases of 
Indonesia and South Korea." Australian Journal of International Affairs 72, no. 4 (2018): 
136 
 
1-21. 
Kim, Dohee, and Uk  Heo. "Factors Affecting R.O.K.–U.S. Relations, 1990–2011: An 
Empirical Analysis." Journal of Asian African Studies 53, no. 1 (2018): 115-31. 
Kim, Dong-Hyun. "Chŏn Mi Kukmupu T'ongyŏk Kimtonghyŏnŭi Chŏngmilpunsŏk: 6chahoetam 
Hapŭimun, Chenepa Hapŭi, Chomikongtongk'omyunik'ee Sumŭn 'Ŏnŏŭi Chiloepat' [Ex 
U.S. State Department Interpreter Kim Dong Hyun's Analysis: Linguistic Subtleties in the 
Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, the Agreed Framework, and the U.S.-D.P.R.K. 
Joint Communique]." Shin Donga, November 2005. 
Kim, Hakjoon. "A Brief History of the U.S.-R.O.K. Alliance and Anti-Americanism in South 
Korea." Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Paper Series 31 (2010): 7-45. 
Kim, Hyun-Wook. "Domestic Events, Ideological Changes and the Post-Cold War U.S.–South 
Korea Alliance." Australian Journal of International Affairs 63, no. 4 (2009): 482-504. 
Kim, Ki-Jung. "Kimyŏngsamjŏngbu 5yŏnŭi Taebukchŏngch’aekp’yŏngga: Chŏngch’aegŭi 
Hollan’gwa Kwallyojŏngch’ihyŏnsang [Evaluating Kim Young-Sam Administration's 
North Korea Policy: Policy Confusion and Bureaucratic Politics]." Unified Economy 
[t’ongilgyŏngje] 37 (1998): 7-17. 
Kim, Sam-Hoon. "Kim Sam-Hoon [Oral History Interview]." In Kowikwanlyotŭl, 
'Pukhaekwiki'lŭl Malhata [Top Korean Officials Discuss the North Korean Nuclear 
Crises], edited by Shin Wook-Hee and Cho Dong-Joon. Seoul, Korea: National Institute 
of Korean History, 2009. 
Kim, Samuel S. "Korea's Segyehwa Drive: Promise Versus Performance." In Korea's 
Globalization, edited by Samuel S. Kim. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2000. 
Kim, Young-Sam Kimyŏngsam Taet'onglyŏng Hoekolok [President Kim Young-Sam's Memoirs]. 
2 vols. Vol. 1, Seoul, Korea: Chosun Ilbo Sa, 2001. 
Lee, Chae-Jin. A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press, 
2006. 
Lee, Hochul. "China in the North Korean Nuclear Crises: 'Interest' and 'Identity' in Foreign 
Behavior." [In English]. Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 80 (2013): 312-31. 
Lee, Kee-Jong. "The Determining Factors and Prospect of North Korean Policy toward South 
Korea." The Korean Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (1998): 181-207. 
Lee, Sook Jong. "South Korea Aiming to Be an Innovative Middle Power ". In Transforming 
Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea's Role in the 21st 
Century edited by Sook Jong Lee. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
137 
 
Lee, Won-Jong. "Lee Won-Jong [Oral History Interview (Yonsei)]." In Hankuktaet'onglyŏng 
T'ongch'ikusulsalyochip 4-Kimyŏngsam Taet'onglyŏng [Oral History Collections on the 
R.O.K. Presidents Volume 4 - Kim Young-Sam], edited by Yonsei University Institute of 
State Governance Studies. Seoul, Korea: Sunin, 2014. 
Len, Samuel. "South Korea Approves 3,000 Troops for Iraq." The New York Times, February 14 
2004. 
Lim, Dong-won. Speech at the Seminar Commemorating the Publication of the English Edition 
of Peacemaker. May 18 2012. Speech. Stanford University, Stanford, CA. 
Mazarr, Michael J. North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation. New York, NY: 
St. Martin's Press, 1995. 
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Updated ed. New York, NY: WW 
Norton & Company, 2014. 
Moon, Chung-In "Comparing the 2000 and 2007 Inter-Korean Summits." Global Asia 2, no. 3 
(2007): 76-88. 
O'Neil, Andrew "South Korea as a Middle Power: Global Ambitions and Looming Challenges." 
In Middle Power Korea: Contribution to the Global Agenda, edited by Scott A. Snyder. 
New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2015. 
Oberdorfer, Don, and Robert Carlin. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 2013. 
Park, Kun-Young. "A New North Korea Policy." The Korean Journal of International Studies 38, 
no. 2 (1998): 87-107. 
Park, Kwan-Yong. "Park Kwan-Yong [Oral History Interview (Yonsei)]." In 
Hankuktaet'onglyŏng T'ongch'ikusulsalyochip 4-Kimyŏngsam Taet'onglyŏng [Oral 
History Collections on the R.O.K. Presidents Volume 4 - Kim Young-Sam], edited by 
Yonsei University Institute of State Governance Studies. Seoul, Korea: Sunin, 2014. 
Park, Yong-Soo. "The Competitive Foreign Policy Management Style of the President Kim 
Young-Sam in the Process of First North Korean Nuclear Crisis." The Korean Journal of 
International Relationship 55, no. 4 (2015): 139-68. 
———. "A Critique on the Inflexible Responses of Kim Young Sam Administration to North 
Korean Nuclear Crisis." Journal of Korean Politics 20, no. 3 (2011): 55-79. 
"The History of the 1994 Agreed Framework." History News Network, History News Network, 
2006, accessed August 19, 2016, http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/31633. 
Power, John. "After North Korean Shelling, Another Look at South Korea's 'Trustpolitik'." The 
138 
 
Diplomat, August 20 2015. 
Pritchard, Charles L. "The Korean Peninsula and the Role of Multilateral Talks." North-East 
Asian Security 2, no. 1 (2005): 25-34. 
Quinones, C. Kenneth. 2p'yŏng Ppangchipesŏ Kyŏlchŏngtoen Hanpanto Unmyŏng [North 
Korea's Nuclear Threat "Off the Record" Memories]. Translated by Soon-Ok Noh. Seoul, 
Korea: JoongAng M&B, 2000. 
Reiss, Mitchell. Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities. 
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995. 
Shin, Gi-Wook, and Hilary Jan Izatt. "Anti-American and Anti-Alliance Sentiments in South 
Korea." Asian Survey 51, no. 6 (2011): 1113-33. 
Shin, Soon-ok "South Korea's Elusive Middlepowermanship: Regional or Global Player?". 
Pacific Review 29, no. 2 (2016): 187-209. 
Sigal, Leon V. Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1999. 
———. "The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding the Failure of the 'Crime-and-
Punishment' Strategy." Arms Control Today 27, no. 3 (1997): 3-13. 
Snyder, Scott. Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior. Washington, DC: 
US Institute of Peace Press, 1999. 
Sterngold, James. "South Korea President Lashes out at U.S." The New York Times, October 8 
1994. 
Trachtenberg, Marc. The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International 
Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012. 
———. "Preventive War and U.S. Foreign Policy." Security Studies 16, no. 1 (2007): 1-31. 
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. "The Origins and Evolution of the Korean-American Alliance: An 
American Perspective." Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Paper Series  (1998): 
3-35. 
Watkins, Michael, and Susan Rosegrant. Breakthrough International Negotiation: How Great 
Negotiators Transformed the World's Toughest Post-Cold War Conflicts. San Francisco, 
CA: Jossey-Bass, 2001. 
Wit, Joel S, Daniel Poneman, and Robert L Gallucci. Going Critical: The First North Korean 
Nuclear Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. 
139 
 
CHAPTER 3 
US-ROK Alliance and the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2002-06 
The Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (2002-2006) officially precipitated in October 2002 
when the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) allegedly admitted to possessing 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, in a blatant violation of the Geneva Agreed 
Framework of 1994 and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).1 Tension between the 
United States and the DPRK ensued and rapidly intensified, only to be checked by China’s 
timely diplomatic intervention that helped launch the Six Party Talks in August 2003.2 Despite 
initial optimism that the nuclear issue could be resolved effectively through dialogue, however, 
the multilateral process turned out to be quite unproductive, for significant differences persisted 
among the various capitals over how to reach the agreed-upon end goal of denuclearizing the 
Korean peninsula.3 As such, while the negotiations did go on for several years, they were mostly 
“protracted, frustrating, and unpredictable,” and in the end, unable to prevent the North Koreans 
from conducting their first nuclear test in October 2006.4 
From the outset of the Six Party Talks, the United States was of the view that maximum 
multilateral pressure had to be applied to the DPRK in order to successfully induce its 
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denuclearization; as President George W. Bush emphasized, “the five nations [US, South Korea, 
Japan, China, Russia] [had to] unite and send a single message to North Korea.”5 Therefore, 
throughout the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, the Bush administration strived to achieve a 
maximum coalition of five against one, while presupposing a minimum coalition of three with its 
allies Japan and South Korea.6  
Contrary to the Americans’ wishes, however, their “hoped for phalanx of five” never 
materialized,7 not the least because the Republic of Korea (ROK) conspicuously failed to 
display unity with the US over the management of the nuclear problem. For example, when the 
DPRK test-launched missiles in July 2006, the ROK Unification Minister curiously denounced 
the United States’ North Korea policy for having “fail[ed] the most.”8 Similarly, when North 
Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006, President Roh Moo-Hyun made a point of 
blaming the United States, claiming, “You Americans keep on saying you want this [the nuclear 
issue] resolved diplomatically…but you are always putting up more hurdles.”9 Naturally, such 
antagonistic attitude on the part of the South Koreans, along with their overall disinclination to 
cooperate over the nuclear issue, left a sour taste in the Americans’ mouths. For instance, 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, using words such as “hard to read”, “erratic”, 
                                         
5 Jong-Seok Lee, Peace on a Knife’s Edge: The inside Story of Roh Moo-Hyun's North Korea Policy, 
trans. Se-Woong Koo (Stanford, CA: Shorenstein APARC, 2018), p. 204. 
6 Cha, The Impossible State, p. 259. 
7 Oberdorfer and Carlin, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, p. 398. 
8 Jong-Seok Lee, K'alnalwiŭi P'yŏnghwa: Nomuhyŏn Sitae T'ongiloekyoanpo Pimanglok [Peace on a 
Knife’s Edge: The inside Story of Roh Moo-Hyun's North Korea Policy] (Goyang, Korea: Kaema, 2014), 
pp. 507-09. 
9 Mike Chinoy, Meltdown: The inside Story of the North Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York, NY: St. 
Martin's Press, 2009), p. 301. 
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“unpredictable”, and “unorthodox” to describe President Roh, confided in her memoir that “I 
frankly did not know what to expect in South Korea”;10 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates even 
went a step further, labeling Roh as “anti-American and probably a little crazy.”11 
In theoretical terms, the fact that the South Koreans could not effectively coordinate 
their policies with the Americans during the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis is highly puzzling. 
For one, considering that the purpose of a security alliance is to counter a shared threat, the US 
and the ROK should have been able to readily join their forces over the course of deterring their 
common enemy from going nuclear.12 For another, given that within an asymmetric alliance, the 
client (the weaker partner) is more vulnerable than the patron (the stronger partner) in the 
absence of the partnership, the ROK should have made an effort to avoid causing frictions with 
the United States, lest it be abandoned.13 In essence, contrary to the empirical record, the 
alliance literature predicts close cooperation between the allies, and such gap in prediction and 
reality is quite troubling both theoretically and empirically. First, it is theoretically troubling 
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because per the tenets of alliance politics, the US-ROK alliance during the period presents the 
“most likely case” of high alliance cohesion.14 Second, it is empirically troubling because 
discord in the US-ROK relations with respect to the nuclear conundrum is too consequential to 
be left inadequately accounted for; as The Washington Post points out, “how the two allies 
handle the nuclear problem matters [greatly],” since “mixed messages from Washington and 
Seoul” allows North Korea to exploit the gap and “drive[ ] right through it.”15 
In this chapter, therefore, I seek to provide an explanation for the low levels of the US-
ROK alliance cohesion observed over the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis of 2002-06, with a 
focus on the ROK’s alliance-eroding behavior. Based on a careful examination of both Korean 
and English language sources, I argue that the ROK’s status concerns played a significant role in 
shaping not only its views of the US-ROK alliance but also its consequent diplomatic 
interactions with its patron state during the period under examination. In particular, I demonstrate 
that similar to the Kim Young-Sam government during the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-
94 (chapter 2 of this dissertation), the ROK administration’s diplomatic maneuvers under Roh 
Moo-Hyun during the Second Nuclear Crisis were also heavily influenced by its experience of 
status inconsistency. 
As elaborated in great detail in the theoretical chapter, for the South Koreans of the post-
Cold War period, having an opportunity to exercise a significant degree of policy autonomy over 
the management of foreign policy issues critical to their national interest has been a prerogative 
that they believed they were entitled to per their claimed middle power status. This privilege in 
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turn had to be respected by the United States in order for their aspired middle power status to be 
recognized and thereby legitimized. What this meant was that if the South Koreans believed that 
the United States was not showing respect for their prerogative, they would experience status 
inconsistency and as a result, become motivated to take assertive and defiant alliance-eroding 
actions in order to signal to the United States their ability and resolve to exercise such privilege.  
In line with these ideas, the basic point that emerges from the empirical analysis of the 
Second Korean Nuclear Crisis is as follows. By the time President Roh was elected in December 
2002, the South Koreans came to strongly believe in their country’s status as solid middle power 
in the international community. As a middle power aspirant, the ROK believed that it was 
entitled to exercise the privilege of exerting a substantial degree of influence in dealing with the 
North Korean nuclear issue, which it expected the United States to show respect for. In particular, 
the Roh administration expected its ally to honor the spirit of a more horizontal and egalitarian 
US-ROK alliance—a bilateral relationship in which both sides fully “respected each other’s 
positions and accommodated each other’s interests”16—as the two nations closely cooperated 
over the management of the nuclear conundrum.17 However, to the disappointment of the South 
Koreans, the United States failed to reciprocate; as one senior ROK official recalls, “the Bush 
administration only wanted the South Korean government to be a passenger in its North Korea 
policy vehicle, owned and operated by the United States.”18 It was against the backdrop of such 
experience of disrespect that the South Koreans became highly motivated to overcome their 
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status inconsistency by signaling to the US both their ability and resolve to play a substantial role 
in crisis management. Accordingly, the ROK, in defiance of the US, began to take a more 
proactive and assertive approach to the nuclear issue, and in doing so, ended up causing a rapid 
deterioration in the US-ROK alliance cohesion.   
The remainder of the chapter is organized into five sections. In the opening empirical 
section, I analyze the ways in which President Roh’s sense of entitlement to the ROK’s middle 
power status informed his grand strategy, North Korea policies, and alliance management 
strategies. In the second empirical section, I delve deeper into the nature of the US-ROK alliance 
relationship that Roh—per his middle power aspiration—sought to craft vis-à-vis the nuclear 
problem, and examine why it failed to materialize. And in the third empirical section, I trace the 
resulting deterioration of the US-ROK alliance cohesion and the impact it had on the 
development of the nuclear crisis, until the first nuclear test of October 2006. Following the case 
study, I address three alternative explanations for the ROK’s alliance-eroding behavior: 1) 
divergence in threat perception; 2) domestic politics and anti-Americanism; and 3) desire to 
bandwagon with the rising China. Finally, I summarize my findings in a brief conclusion.  
Roh’s Pursuit of Status: Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Issue, and the US-ROK Alliance 
 President Roh Moo-Hyun and his principal advisors took office with a great sense of 
national pride and confidence in the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) status as a solid middle power in 
the international community. Per President Roh’s inauguration speech of February 25, 2003, 
South Koreans had a lot to be proud of both economically and politically. Not only did their 
country make an astounding achievement of becoming the 12th largest economic power in the 
world “within the half century since liberation from colonial rule,” but also it “successfully 
entered the age of information and knowledge, evolving from an agricultural community through 
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the age of industrialization,” all the while seeing “participatory democracy fully blossom” 
throughout the process of presidential elections. 19  Roh once again highlighted these 
achievements in his National Liberation Day speech of August 15, 2003, claiming that “Our 
economic success caught the world by surprise. We are now attracting world attention as a 
forerunner in the age of information. The development of our democracy also earned worldwide 
acclaim.”20 In essence, as officially pointed out in Roh’s Presidential Commission on Policy 
Planning, the administration proudly perceived the ROK as a “strong middle power.”21  
 Against such backdrop, President Roh laid out an ambitious long-term project for South 
Korea to provide regional leadership for establishing a Northeast Asian community, a new “order 
of cooperation and integration that transcends old antagonism and conflicts among countries in 
the region”—similar to the European Union.22 According to Roh, “the Age of Northeast Asia” 
was fast emerging “as a new source of energy in the global economy,” and in order for all 
members of the community—not just South Korea—to reap the full benefits from such 
development, a regional order “anchored by institutionalized cooperation and integration” was 
urgently needed as a mechanism for preventing the various sources of conflict—such as 
nationalistic stirrings, territorial disputes, and arms races—from threatening peace and prosperity 
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in East Asia.23 And Roh believed that a rising South Korea, a “strong nation” that was no longer 
a mere shrimp among whales, had to “cast off [its] historic fate of being overshadowed [by great 
powers]” and to “leap forward as a main actor” that would proactively transform the region 
alongside its own national development in pursuit of the European model.24 Ultimately, Roh 
envisioned that when such an order comes to full fruition, the Korean peninsula—which would 
by then be reunified—would play a “pivotal role” in the region as the “international logistics and 
financial hub” bringing Asia and Europe together.25 When that day comes, Korea would be able 
to boldly and proudly “walk shoulder to shoulder with neighboring powers at the forefront of the 
new global order.”26 
 However, in order to achieve such an ambitious goal of bringing about a genuine Age of 
Northeast Asia, the new administration clearly understood that “a structure of peace” first had be 
institutionalized on the Korean peninsula.27 That is, so long as the two Koreas remained divided 
and unable to shed the last vestiges of the Cold War, any plan to promote cooperation and 
overcome tension at the regional level—let alone transforming the peninsula into East Asia’s 
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“gateway of peace” connecting the “Eurasian landmass with the Pacific Ocean”—was a 
nonstarter.28 Therefore, as a near-term goal, Roh set out to transform the existing armistice 
agreement into a new peace treaty involving the two Koreas and the United States, thereby 
officially putting an end to the Korean War and laying the foundation for eventual 
reunification—which was in turn a precondition for ensuring peace in all of Northeast Asia.29  
To carry out this plan, Roh believed that there was no other choice but to follow the 
spirit of the Sunshine Policy pioneered by his predecessor Kim Dae-Jung, for only when the two 
Koreas were fully engaged in a sincere dialogue process for promoting arms reduction and 
balanced economic development on both sides of the peninsula would they be able to establish 
mutual trust necessary for full reconciliation.30 And such an approach was to be followed for 
managing the nuclear issue as well, which regained worldwide attention at the time with the 
outbreak of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis in October 2002.31 In particular, Roh stressed that 
as long as the North Koreans were treated as “partners in negotiation” and given “what they 
desperately want—regime security, normal treatment, and economic assistance,” they would be 
willing to “give up their nuclear ambitions.” 32  Accordingly, at the first meeting of the 
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presidential transition team held on Christmas Eve of 2002, Roh declared, “We will settle the 
North Korean nuclear issue peacefully through negotiation…this will be the very foundation of 
all the unification, foreign, and security policies of my government.”33  
 Ideally, Roh wanted South Korea—a strong middle power aspiring to play a larger and 
more influential role in Northeast Asia—to resolve the nuclear issue primarily through its own 
initiatives, based on the principle that South Korea and North Korea are the two main parties in 
the peninsular peace process.34 After all, having an opportunity to significantly influence the 
management of foreign policy issues critical to their national interest—such as the DPRK 
nuclear problem—was an important privilege that the South Koreans believed they were entitled 
to per their claimed middle power status. In reality, however, there wasn’t much room for the 
ROK to exert its influence via inter-Korean dialogue, given that the DPRK was adamant in its 
insistence that the nuclear problem was first and foremost a US-DPRK issue and that it would 
only forgo its nuclear ambitions if the United States were willing to credibly demonstrate its 
intent to drop hostile policies toward the DPRK and to provide it with a security guarantee.35 
While such position was antithetical to the ROK’s exercise of leadership role as initially 
envisioned, however, it was nonetheless compatible with the views of the new administration. 
This was because for the incoming ROK president, any approach that might disrupt peace and 
stability on the peninsula—such as economic sanctions and military actions—was an anathema 
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and thus, if the US-DPRK reconciliation could provide a legitimate and peaceful way out of 
nuclear dilemma, Roh was all the more willing to be its advocate.36 The president made his 
stance clear in a March 5, 2003 interview with The Times, when he stated that “the dispute over 
North Korea’s suspected nuclear weapons programme will be resolved only if America and 
North Korea engage in direct talks.”37  
That President Roh ceded the center stage to the US and the DPRK, however, by no 
means indicated that the ROK was to be marginalized from the denuclearization efforts; Roh’s 
ambition to play an influential regional role befitting the ROK’s middle power status was simply 
too great for him to remain passive.38 The fact of the matter was that the president continued to 
be highly committed to proactively and constructively shaping both peninsular and regional 
environments in ways most conducive to the establishment of the Northeast Asian community. 
And inasmuch as Roh recognized that the US-DPRK reconciliation was indispensible for a 
peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, he determined that the ROK could and should exercise 
its claimed privilege of playing an integral role in the crisis by taking the initiative to bring about 
such an outcome—specifically, by serving as a mediator between the US and North Korea, 
persuading the two parties to overcome mutual hostilities and to come to the negotiating table.39 
With tension between the US and the DPRK escalating uncontrollably following the outbreak of 
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the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, it became all the more incumbent upon the ROK to 
immediately embark on the mediating role, in order to save the peninsula from another Korean 
War.  
The first and most urgent task facing the new administration as the mediator in the 
nuclear issue was to restrain the Bush administration from taking any military action against the 
Hermit Kingdom.40 By early 2003, there was a fairly widespread belief in Seoul that the United 
States was targeting North Korea next for a military solution after achieving a swift victory in the 
Middle East.41 After all, the United States was gradually increasing its pressure on North Korea 
following the latter’s alleged admittance to a Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) program in 
October 2002, first declaring an end to heavy fuel oil (HFO) deliveries in November,42 and 
announcing a month later that it would put maximum financial and political pressure on the 
DPRK via “tailored containment”.43 And moreover, on February 7, 2003 President George W. 
Bush told reporters that “all options are on the table” in regard to the North Korean nuclear 
issue—clearly insinuating the possibility of resorting to a military action—and around the same 
time, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put 24 long-range bombers on alert after 
denouncing the DPRK as a “terrorist regime”.44 In essence, these actions, together with the 
United States’ new national security policy in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks—by 
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which it declared to “take whatever action necessary” against “rogue states and their terrorist 
clients before they were able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United 
States and our allies and friends”45—bolstered the idea that the US was indeed seriously 
considering launching an armed attack against the DPRK.46  
And what was even more alarming from the South Korean point of view than a military 
option per se was the possibility that the United States might resort to such an action without first 
consulting the ROK. In fact, many South Koreans including President Roh had a conviction, 
albeit historically inaccurate, that in the spring of 1994 the United States was about to launch a 
preemptive strike on North Korea without informing South Korea at all—only to be prevented by 
a strong last-minute intervention by then-President Kim Young-Sam—and thus came to believe 
that similar developments could unfold this time around as well.47 As President Roh confided to 
Charles Pritchard, a senior director for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), his 
greatest fear was that he would “wake up one morning to find that the United States had taken 
some unilateral action affecting the Korean peninsula without his knowledge.”48 If that were to 
happen, at the very least, his ambitious project of establishing the Northeast Asian community 
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would collapse even before taking off, and at the very worst, the peninsula would face an utter 
destruction. Therefore, it was only natural that President Roh came to assign top priority to 
persuading the United States to forgo any policy—including military action—that might 
destabilize or even lead to a war on the peninsula.49 And signaling his resolve, the president 
declared—after watching a Korean television show on the US unilateral military planning of 
1994—“As long as I am president...this kind of thing will never be tolerated.”50  
How then, was such “persuasion” going to work in practice? To answer this question, it 
is important to first understand how President Roh fundamentally viewed the nature of the US-
ROK alliance relationship.  
When President Roh entered office, one of the most important agendas he had in mind 
was to redefine the US-ROK alliance on a more equal footing. As he boldly declared in his 
inaugural speech, the president wanted to see the alliance “mature[ ] into a more reciprocal an 
equitable relationship.”51 According to Scott Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 
Roh set out to challenge “the traditional structures of the long-standing US-ROK patron-client 
relationship” and to define the alliance “on a more egalitarian basis,”52 in order that South Korea 
could “reduce [its] dependency on the United States” and thereby “gain greater respect from 
Washington and greater autonomy over Korean affairs.”53 As officially pointed out in Roh’s 
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national security strategy—“Our people, with the rapid growth of national power, successful 
democratization…now want more…horizontal foreign relations”—both the president and the 
general public alike called for a more equitable, mutually respecting US-ROK alliance that was 
commensurate with the ROK’s enhanced status.54  
What this meant for the actual conduct of the US-ROK alliance diplomacy was that the 
ROK would no longer automatically cater to the preferences of the United States.55 Both Roh 
and his principal advisors were of the view that South Korea’s traditional policies toward the US 
were extremely outdated and reflected an over-eagerness to align policies with the patron state, 
and they believed that unless such an unbalanced relationship comes to an end, the ROK would 
continue to remain a victim of great power politics.56 This was because from Roh’s perspective, 
“Washington did not fully comprehend Korea’s interests and [thus] could not be expected always 
to take them into full consideration,”57 as had already been “proven” in 1994 when the United 
States allegedly planned a unilateral military strike on North Korea. Therefore, Roh believed that 
in order for the ROK to truly optimize its national interests, it had to make sure that its voice is 
clearly heard and taken more seriously, and hence the reason why he felt compelled to revamp 
the US-ROK alliance dynamics in ways that are more conducive to equitable discussions and 
negotiations. It was against such backdrop that the Roh administration took off with a 
determination to say “no” or “let’s think more about that issue” to its American counterpart, 
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rather than having to always accommodate the United States’ priorities and readily respond with 
a “yes” to many of its requests and demands, as the ROK was prone to doing so in the past.58 
In the context of the North Korean nuclear issue, then, such revisionist orientation 
essentially indicated that when coordinating policies with the United States, the Roh 
administration was fully prepared to boldly stand up to the patron state whenever the latter 
seemed to be leaning towards any action such as military strike, economic sanctions, or other 
forms of pressure that was bound to disrupt peace and prosperity on the peninsula. After all, for 
the South Koreans, having an opportunity to significantly influence the management of the 
nuclear issue was an important privilege that they believed they were entitled to per their claimed 
middle power status. And because Roh and his advisors genuinely believed that the United States 
was about to resort to some sort of military option in early 2003, they were particularly resolved 
at the time to go an extra mile to dissuade the Americans, even willing to risk straining the 
alliance in the process.59  
Indeed, prior to his inauguration, President Roh made it clear that he was “willing to 
differ with the United States if that helps prevent war.”60 Accordingly, the president did not shy 
away from publicly criticizing and “counseling” the United States on the “appropriate” ways of 
dealing with the nuclear issue, as he did so in a January 2003 interview with CNN correspondent 
Mike Chinoy: “I think the best means of peaceful solution is dialogue, rather than unilaterally 
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demanding North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions…I don’t think it [a tactic of pressure] 
is a proper policy tool for the US.”61 Moreover, Roh at times was willing to go even further to 
signal his determined opposition to any use of force. For instance, Roh declared in December 
2002 that if the US and the DPRK were to go to war, the ROK would rather mediate than 
automatically join the US side, essentially conveying his aversion to an armed conflict to the 
point of challenging the very principle of reciprocal obligations specified in the US-ROK mutual 
defense treaty.62 Furthermore, at the height of the nuclear crisis—on March 2, 2003—when four 
North Korean Air Force MiG fighters intercepted an unarmed US reconnaissance plane RG-135S 
over the East Sea (Sea of Japan),63 Roh curiously blamed—albeit indirectly—the victim [the US 
side] for the high-altitude encounter, pointing out that the incident was “predictable because the 
United States had increased its aerial surveillance of North Korea’s reopened nuclear facilitates,” 
and pleaded that it “not to go too far [in retaliating against the DPRK].”64 That Roh called on the 
United States for restraint even though North Korea was the clear perpetrator in this case 
indicated just how desperate the South Korean president was to prevent Washington from either 
providing the DPRK with “any excuse to engage in military provocation,” or worse yet, 
considering resorting to an armed attack itself.65 In essence, all this goes to show that South 
Korea was set on bringing the United States on board with engagement and reconciliation efforts 
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at whatever cost; avoiding frictions in the alliance was a secondary issue, and unsurprisingly, a 
CFR report published in early 2003 noted that the Bush administration viewed the Roh 
administration’s policies as “naïve and injurious to the alliance.”66  
While it is difficult to assess how much of an impact—if at all—the above attempts at 
persuasion had on the Bush administration, at the end of the day, the latter began to gradually 
move away from considering resorting to an armed attack against the DPRK. For starters, 
following the MiG incident in early March, the United States started making noticeably fewer 
references to military options.67 Then in April, it entered the Three Party Talks involving North 
Korea and China, which, despite its early collapse, was highly significant for the mere fact that 
the United States officially turned to dialogue as a means for tackling the nuclear problem.68 
And finally, in May, the Bush administration, at the behest of the Roh administration, agreed to 
drop the phrase “all options were on the table” (with regard to the nuclear issue) from the US-
ROK joint statement, given that the wording by implication included military options as well.69 
Overall, then, with the Bush administration finally on board with taking a nonviolent approach to 
the nuclear conundrum, the ROK government was now in a better position to more 
diplomatically coordinate its policies with its US counterpart—rather than having to cause 
frictions in the alliance by raising objections at every turn—in pursuit of both denuclearization 
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and the US-DPRK reconciliation.  
US and ROK as Business Partners? Coming Together Then Drifting Apart  
 Now that the US and the DPRK formally entered the dialogue phase, starting with the 
Three Party Talks in April 2003 and the first round of the Six Party Talks later in August, the 
terms of denuclearization and engagement between the two countries loomed large as the next 
set of major obstacles that had to be overcome in order for the Roh administration to achieve its 
lofty goal of institutionalizing peace on the Korean peninsula.  
In fact, the American and the North Korean conditions were so diametrically opposed 
that both the Three Party Talks (April 23-25) and the first round of the Six Party Talks (August 
27-29) quickly adjourned without accomplishing anything. The North Koreans were adamant in 
their demand for a simultaneous exchange of concessions: the DPRK would abolish its nuclear 
program and the United States at the same time would provide security assurances that consisted 
of “a legally binding mutual nonaggression treaty, normalization [of relations] between North 
Korea and the US, and termination of US obstruction of economic cooperation between North 
Korea, Japan, and South Korea.”70 The Americans were also equally unyielding in their demand: 
the DPRK first had to “completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle” (hence, CVID) its 
nuclear program for the US to even consider holding any discussions of diplomatic, political, or 
economic incentives.71 Unsurprisingly, with neither side willing to move an inch from their 
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respective positions, both of the sessions failed to produce any substantive results; if anything, 
they led to the worsening of the US-DPRK relations. For example, during the Three Party Talks, 
the DPRK blackmailed the US by claiming that, “Our republic has nuclear capability…we can 
produce more and demonstrate it physically…we can transfer our capability abroad. What we do 
with that depends solely on the conduct of the United States.”72 Similarly, during the first round 
of the Six Party Talks, the North Koreans yet again threatened the Americans by declaring that 
“Clearly you have not ended your hostile policy. Therefore, we have no choice but to declare our 
possession of nuclear weapons and demonstrate our nuclear deterrent.”73 And worse yet, in early 
October, the DPRK further upped the ante by stating that all 8,000 fuel rods were reprocessed 
and that it “will consistently maintain and increase its nuclear deterrent force” so long as the US 
held onto its “hostile policy”.74  
With neither denuclearization nor reconciliation efforts showing any signs of progress, 
the Roh administration believed that it was once again time for the ROK to step in as a mediator 
between the United States and the DPRK so as to push the nuclear dialogue forward, and as such, 
it came up with a “three-step” plan that was designed to induce the two parties to meet halfway.75 
Per this proposal, at stage one, North Korea would declare its willingness to abandon its nuclear 
program and the five other participants in the Six Party Talks would declare their intent to 
provide security assurance; at stage two, the DPRK would freeze its nuclear programs in a way 
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that can be verified as “a step to dismantlement” and other countries would present 
corresponding security and economic measures to be taken at the time of dismantlement; finally, 
at stage three, the DPRK would complete CVID of its nuclear programs and other countries 
would implement the corresponding measures discussed in step two.76 In short, the South 
Korean proposal served as a compromise between the two extremes of the DPRK and the US: on 
the one hand, a simultaneous exchange of verified dismantlement and corresponding measures, 
and on the other, verified dismantlement as a precondition to all else. And because it was the 
United States, by the nature of the standoff, that first had to soften its stance for the ROK’s three-
step plan to take off at all, the Roh administration, as the mediator, once again had to primarily 
focus on persuading the Bush administration—this time, to take a more conciliatory position on 
the nuclear issue.77 
One would think, given the intransigence the ROK had shown in the earlier stages of the 
nuclear crisis, that its decision to yet again play the mediating role would not have boded well for 
the cohesion of the US-ROK alliance. After all, as pointed out in the previous section, a refusal 
to so readily accommodate the preferences of the United States and a determination to have the 
ROK’s voice carry greater weight in intra-alliance negotiations constituted the core of what Roh 
expected in the alliance redefined on a more equitable footing.  
However, it would be a mistake to construe the ROK’s alliance-eroding behavior in early 
2003 as an accurate reflection of the nature of the egalitarian relationship that President Roh 
sought to establish; rather, it was more an indication of South Korea’s desperation at the time to 
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prevent any armed conflict from erupting on the peninsula.78 The fact of the matter was that for 
President Roh, a truly horizontal US-ROK alliance was analogous to the relationship between 
highly cooperative business partners, in the sense that both parties attached great importance to 
not only respecting and understanding each other’s perspectives, opinions, and circumstances, 
but also honoring the spirit of quid pro quo.79 In general, according to psychological research, a 
business-like relationship can be understood as one that is “primarily impersonal and concerned 
with maintaining equity independent of other considerations.”80 
A number of examples from the first half of 2003 attest to Roh’s conscientious 
adherence to such principle of alliance management. For starters, in April, the ROK president 
pledged to send 700 noncombat troops to the Middle East—even though neither Roh nor the vast 
majority of South Koreans (around 80%) believed that the Iraq War was justified—as a “token of 
repayment” to the United States for heeding his opposition and thereby effectively forgoing the 
use of military means for tackling the nuclear issue.81 Similarly, in the same month, the South 
Korean president made a big decision to pass on an opportunity to send a special envoy to North 
Korea—although it potentially could have facilitated inter-Korean reconciliation and also 
increased the ROK’s leverage over the nuclear issue—primarily because the US was uneasy 
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about the overture. President Roh’s rationale essentially was that because the US at the time was 
about to commit to a dialogue process by entering the Three Party Talks, he was obliged to return 
the favor by shelving the agenda that his ally opposed.82 Furthermore, Roh’s efforts to abide by 
his principle of mutual respect and understanding was also reflected in the manner in which he 
dealt with other important areas of US-ROK cooperation, the most prominent being the 
relocation of the US Army’s 2nd Infantry Division from the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to the 
south of the Han River. Indeed, the South Korean president was initially shocked when the 
Americans first informed him of the plan in March 2003, yet soon enough came to terms and 
decided to use it as an opportunity to strengthen South Korea’s self-reliant national defense 
capabilities.83 While in all likelihood it was President Bush’s promise during the May US-ROK 
summit to pursue the agenda “by taking careful account of the political, economic and security 
situation on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia” that played the most decisive role in persuading 
President Roh,84 Roh’s decision to cooperate was also to a large extent influenced by not only 
his efforts to understand and respect the importance of the realignment project to the United 
States’ national interests (specifically, in terms of upholding the Rumsfeld Doctrine),85    but 
also his personal conviction that it was not morally right for the ROK to indefinitely rely on the 
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US troop’s “tripwire effect” for its own national security.86 In short, all this goes to show that the 
ROK by no means was an intransigent ally bent on getting everything its way in the name of 
horizontal relations; rather, as much as it expected its voice to be better heard and taken more 
seriously by the United States, the ROK was willing to do the same for its ally.  
Given such principle of alliance management, then, one could reasonably expect that the 
ROK government would not have simply demanded the United States to go along with its three-
step proposal for the Six Party Talks without giving anything in return. And surely enough, the 
idea of reciprocation lay at the heart of South Korea’s strategy for inducing cooperation from the 
Americans. Specifically, the Roh administration sought a quid pro quo from the Bush 
administration in the form of a more moderate and flexible stance on the nuclear issue in 
exchange for promising its second dispatch of troops to Iraq, which the US incidentally 
requested in the fall of 2003 as it unexpectedly encountered a fierce and dogged insurgency in 
the Middle East.87 This position was clearly conveyed to Secretary of State Colin Powell in 
September by South Korea’s Foreign Minister Yoon Young-Kwan, who in addition made a point 
of highlighting the ROK’s domestic political difficulties—as the majority of South Koreans 
(around 60%) and most of Roh’s core supporters opposed the additional dispatch of troops—in 
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order to gain further leverage over the “bargain”.88 As Yoon put it, “[The president] has been 
facing strong opposition [to dispatching troops to Iraq] from his own constituents…It might be 
easier for him to pursue a policy of cooperation with the United States in terms of Iraq if the 
United States can take some measures that can be regarded by the Korean people as a kind of 
change to a more flexible attitude [on North Korea] than before.”89  
Perhaps the South Koreans might have gone too in far in emphasizing the conditionality 
of their cooperation. Understandably, from the United States’ point of view, the alliance that used 
to be based on trust and shared values such as freedom and democracy—and within which the 
allies could rather freely ask for help on a various set of issues90—all of sudden transformed into 
a rigid relationship in which each request had to be bargained for individually.91 The US was 
thus both surprised and angered at the ROK’s “Operation Linkage”, even denouncing it as 
“absurd”, and Powell did not mince his words in expressing his displeasure to Yoon: “That is not 
how allies deal with each other.”92  
Regardless, however, the South Koreans ended up getting what they wanted, as they 
effectively delivered on the United States’ request.93 On October 18, President Roh officially 
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announced his decision to dispatch additional troops to the Middle East, along with his promise 
to provide $200 million worth of assistance for the reconstruction of Iraq over 2004 and 2007.94 
And when the first contingent of 3,000 troops arrived in Irbil in August 2004, the ROK soldiers 
came to form the third-largest military presence among the coalition forces in Iraq, after only the 
US and the Great Britain.95 Against such backdrop, then, the United States, despite its initial 
displeasure, was compelled to return the favor.96 Accordingly, on October 20, 2003, during the 
US-ROK summit at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Bangkok, 
Thailand, President Bush not only praised President Roh for his decision but also for the first 
time mentioned that he would consider providing the DPRK with a written guarantee of security, 
provided that the latter began taking concrete steps to verifiably dismantling its nuclear weapons 
program—a noticeably weaker requirement than the prior insistence on CVID as a precondition 
to all else.97 While Bush continued to reject North Korea’s demand for a formal nonaggression 
treaty, his shift in attitude was nonetheless significant for marking the first time that the 
American president—who had previously been adamantly opposed to giving any concessions to 
the Hermit Kingdom—came to accept that he had to take the DPRK’s security concerns into 
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account if a diplomatic solution were to work out at all.98  
In sum, the ROK conscientiously abided by its principle of business partner-like alliance 
management strategy to persuade the US to soften its hard-line position, and while such a 
mechanical, calculated approach to alliance cooperation did frustrate the US to a certain extent, 
when all was said and done, both the United States and South Korea got what they each 
wanted.99 At least for the time being. 
Unfortunately for the South Koreans, however, the successful trade-off between the 
troop dispatch and the softened US position turned out to be short-lived. This was because the 
United States’ demand for CVID was suddenly revived following the declaration of the Libyan 
government on December 19, 2003 that it would completely dismantle its weapons of mass 
destruction, including nuclear materials and programs, without any preconditions.100 As many 
US officials—especially those hardliners such as John Bolton and Robert Joseph—came to 
perceive this “Libyan model” as a model of successful nuclear dismantlement, CVID soon 
regained traction, and as a result, Jim Kelley, the US representative at the Six Party Talks, was 
instructed to insist on the DPRK’s complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement during 
the next rounds of talks.101 From this point on, then, the United States set out to coerce 
Pyongyang into submission, and in order to maximize multilateral pressure in that process, it 
called on other nations, especially its allies Japan and South Korea, to maintain a united front 
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with the Americans.102  
For President Roh, however, such a hard-line position was greatly frustrating because as 
he saw it, putting too much pressure on the DPRK in order to induce unconditional surrender 
was bound to “backfire by bloating North Korea’s sense of insecurity and anxiety, while 
worsening the nuclear fiasco and delaying the negotiated settlement.”103 Therefore, the Roh 
administration once again set out to soften the US stance by playing the role of an honest broker 
between the US and the DPRK,104 but this time, its words fell on deaf ears.  
For example, during the second and third rounds of the Six Party Talks (February 25-28, 
2004 and June 23-25, 2004, respectively),105 the ROK pushed for its three-step plan so as to 
break the deadlock between the US and the DPRK, yet the US resolutely dismissed the proposal 
on the grounds that its call for a “freeze” of the nuclear program (via the second step) was 
reminiscent of the failed Geneva Agreed Framework of the Clinton era.106 However, when the 
ROK countered by raising the point, “How do you expect total dismantling to take place without 
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an interim step of freezing?” the US could not provide a clear-cut answer, but nonetheless 
refused to give in.107 Moreover, during the second and third rounds, a major point of contention 
was whether or not the DPRK had an active HEU program; the US argued that it did, insisting 
that CVID be applied to uranium-based weapons and program as well, while the DPRK 
adamantly denied.108 Curiously, however, when the South Koreans, in an attempt to help 
overcome the standoff, requested that the Americans share the actual hard evidence that they 
claimed they had, the latter—according to Lee Jong-Seok, the deputy secretary of the ROK’s 
National Security Council (KNSC)—simply asked the South Koreans to trust the US 
judgment,109 thereby forcing the ROK government to remain in the dark regarding the DRPK’s 
HEU program.110 Overall, in what could be construed (by the South Koreans at least) as an 
overbearing manner, the United States determinedly worked towards coercing the DPRK into 
submission by demanding CVID of all of its nuclear programs and weapons (both plutonium and 
uranium-based);111 and because the North Koreans managed to persistently defy the US pressure 
at every turn, the first three rounds of the Six Party Talks concluded without producing any 
substantive results.112 
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Such developments in the nuclear arena were quite exasperating for the South Koreans. 
For starters, from their point of view, the truly horizontal alliance relationship that President Roh 
envisioned—which initially seemed to materialize with the successful US-ROK “bargain” in 
October 2003—suddenly took a U-turn as the United States began slighting the ROK’s ideas, 
perspectives, and concerns during the Six Party Talks.113 That is, Washington started to demand 
that Seoul “enthusiastically support and follow American leadership on the nuclear problem,” 
rather than acting as an honest broker and raising objections against the US in the process.114 
But even worse was the fact after all their efforts to dissuade the United States from military 
options in early 2003 and also to soften its negotiating position later that year, almost no progress 
had been made on both the denuclearization and the US-DPRK reconciliation fronts—not the 
least because the United States unilaterally approached the nuclear issue with its CVID mantra. 
Against such backdrop, President Roh came to believe that so long as the ROK continued to 
helplessly follow the American lead, he might never be able to achieve his ambitious goal of 
institutionalizing peace on the Korean peninsula. As one State Department official put it, “They 
[the South Koreans] were convinced pressure tactics weren’t going to work. The big factor 
was—they didn’t think we had a workable policy.”115 Moreover, with the United States showing 
disrespect for their claimed privilege of exerting a significant influence over the development of 
the nuclear crisis, the South Koreas came to experience status inconsistency.  
Therefore, for the sake of security and prosperity of the Korean people and also for the 
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sake of the ROK’s status concerns, President Roh decided it was about time that the ROK 
government started playing a more assertive and proactive role as the mediator in the nuclear 
negotiations—actively making suggestions and harmonizing differences in perspectives so that 
its own ideas are more greatly reflected—even if that meant standing up to the United States and 
once again causing frictions in the alliance, as it had done so back in early 2003.116 After all, the 
ROK, as a strong middle power, was obliged to do more to “assert itself, and actively shap[e] the 
events in the region instead of being swept along by history, as it had always been.”117 As such, 
the president declared on December 6, 2004 during a state visit to France, “The government will 
do its best in moving forward to reflect the thoughts and circumstances of the Korean people...If 
I have to get red in the face [angry] at someone, then I must do so, because it is an issue of our 
survival.”118 And as if to insinuate that the United States could be the object of such anger, 
Unification Minister Chung Dong-Yong stated on December 23 during a visit to China, “In the 
future, South Korea would deal with the North Korean nuclear issue in accordance with its own 
needs rather than American ideals.”119 In essence, triggered by their perception that the United 
States was not showing respect for their claimed privilege of exerting a substantial influence over 
the management of the nuclear problem, the South Koreans—compelled to overcome their status 
inconsistency and thereby get to play a more integral role in bringing about peace on the Korean 
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peninsula—were now ready to signal to the US their ability and resolve to exercise the 
prerogative.  
From the ROK government’s point of view, such a proactive turn in its approach to the 
nuclear conundrum would have been further vindicated by what it perceived as the United States’ 
continued display of disrespect towards its views and ideas. One example stands out. 
During the US-ROK summit at the APEC conference in Santiago, Chile on November 
20, 2004, President Roh advised President Bush that because problems don’t get solved when 
one makes value judgments about the North Korean regime—as doing so causes Pyongyang to 
feel a greater sense of insecurity and crisis—in order to create a more productive atmosphere for 
diplomacy, it was important that the US and other countries tone down their rhetoric when 
dealing with the Hermit Kingdom. To this, President Bush responded positively, stating, “That’s 
a good point. I will not be calling [the North Korean leader] Kim Jong-Il a liar anymore. This is a 
promise between friends…You’ve got a deal!”120 Similarly, in early January 2005, the ROK 
National Security Advisor Kwon Jin-Ho sent a letter to Secretary of State nominee Condoleezza 
Rice respectfully requesting her not to make any provocative comments about the DRPK during 
her upcoming confirmation hearings, since the North Koreans would most likely overreact by 
construing them as the Americans’ hostile intent. While it is unclear as to whether Rice actually 
responded to the message, the South Koreans in any case were quite confident that she would 
heed the request because after all, Rice too was well familiar with the promise Bush had made to 
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Roh back in Santiago.121  
However, contrary to the Roh administration’s wishes, not only did Rice at the hearing 
on January 19 introduce the United States’ Korea policy for Bush’s second term by naming North 
Korea an “outpost of tyranny”,122 but also on April 29, President Bush during a press conference 
called Kim Jong-Il a “tyrant” and a “dangerous person” with “huge concentration camps” who 
“starves his people” and “threatens and brags.”123 And expectedly, the DPRK, “in response to 
the Bush administration’s increasingly hostile policy toward North Korea,” countered with 
threats of its own, beginning with its first-ever official declaration of itself as a nuclear power on 
February 10, followed by a statement in March that its 1999 unilateral missile moratorium was 
no longer valid, and finally an announcement in mid-May that it had unloaded its 5-megawatt 
reactor, “taking necessary measures to bolster its nuclear arsenal.” 124  While the ROK 
government was first and foremost outraged at the DPRK for its reckless behavior, at the same 
time, it was also greatly frustrated that the United States went back on its words and 
unnecessarily provoked the North Koreans, which only ended up presenting the international 
community with the doubly serious and difficult problem of dealing with a declared nuclear-
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armed state.125  
Overall, then, for the Roh administration, this case of America’s disrespect (as it 
perceived) would have further reinforced not only the difficulty of achieving a truly horizontal, 
reciprocal alliance relations with the United States, but also the importance of more proactively 
and assertively serving as the mediator in the nuclear issue if it were to overcome its status 
inconsistency and thereby get to play a more significant role in establishing the long-desired 
peace on the Korean peninsula. After all, as Deputy Secretary of KNSC Lee Jong-Seok 
acknowledged, the shift in the ROK’s approach to the nuclear problem was an inevitable 
response to the “hegemonic unilateralism” that the Bush administration had displayed throughout 
the first three rounds of the Six Party Talks, which he incidentally said had stifled the ROK’s 
initial hopes of leveraging primarily on solid US-ROK cooperation to tackle the nuclear 
negotiations.126 
Allies Drift Further Apart:  
Towards the September 19 Agreement and the First Nuclear Test  
 Now that the ROK government made a more assertive turn vis-à-vis the nuclear issue, it 
set out to actively take the lead in nudging the DPRK back to the Six Party Talks.127 In particular, 
the Roh administration decided to provide incentives to the DPRK by way of promoting inter-
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Korean reconciliation, believing that policies of engagement could greatly facilitate an 
atmosphere conducive to resolving the nuclear issue.128 Signaling such a shift in South Korea’s 
mediating role, President Roh declared the following in Los Angeles in November 2004: “North 
Korea professes that nuclear capabilities are a deterrent for defending itself from external 
aggression. In many cases, it is true that North Korea’s claims…are quite hard to believe and 
give credit to. However, in this particular case it is true and undeniable that there is a 
considerable element of rationality in North Korea’s claims.”129 Essentially, by making this 
controversial statement, which understandably got a chilly reception in Washington, Roh 
intended, on the one hand, to persuade Kim Jong-Il to return to the Six Party Talks by letting the 
DPRK leader know that he was sympathetic to North Korea’s situation, and on the other, to 
signal to the US his resolve and ability to exert influence over the management of the nuclear 
issue.130 
 Curiously enough, the Roh administration remained committed to such accommodating 
posture even against the face of the DPRK’s bombshell announcement of February 10, 2005 (that 
it had acquired atomic weapons). While it is true that President Roh was initially livid at the 
revelation, he and his principal advisors soon enough came to play down the threat—maintaining 
that “the true intention of North Korea’s statement was not so much to boast [its nuclear 
capability] as to force the United States to change its hostile policies toward North Korea”—and 
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thus decided to stay the course.131 Accordingly, the ROK government opted to deliver on 
Pyongyang’s request for an unprecedented 500,000 tons of fertilizer aid, despite US Vice 
President Dick Cheney’s exhortations to the contrary, stating that “we place importance on the 
fertilizer request as a humanitarian issue”;132 in fact, when US Deputy National Security Advisor 
J.D. Crouch II asked his ROK counterpart Lee Jong-Seok in March to not reward the DPRK at a 
time when it was boycotting the Six Party Talks, Lee curtly retorted, “The ROK government will 
exercise its independent judgment on this issue.”133 Moreover, the Roh administration continued 
to pursue inter-Korean economic cooperation at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, even though 
Washington expressed concerns that the funds generated would indubitably be funneled into the 
nuclear program.134 Furthermore, in April, the ROK government abstained from voting on a UN 
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) resolution condemning violation of human rights in North 
Korea, explaining that, “Given the ongoing nuclear negotiations and the special character of 
[inter]-Korean relations, which are moving in the direction of reconciliation and cooperation, we 
feel there is no need to provoke the North by voting on the resolution.”135 In sum, in order to 
demonstrate its resolve and ability to make substantial contributions to the resolution of the 
nuclear issue by successfully coaxing the DPRK back to the Six Party Talks, South Korea 
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continued to appease and engage the rogue regime even after its nuclear declaration, thereby 
coming to directly challenge the United States’ official position that it would “never reward” 
North Korea for its nuclear brinkmanship, and especially not for inducing its return to the 
negotiating table.136  
 Evidently, the US and the ROK were starting to approach the North Korean nuclear issue 
in diametrically opposed ways. As The Wall Street Journal cogently put it, “The US, focused on 
preventing nuclear proliferation and disarming North Korea, [was] looking for ways to ratchet 
up…economic pressure on Pyongyang. But the South Korean government [was] busy working to 
help keep its former enemy in the North afloat with aid and economic cooperation projects.”137 
Against such backdrop, the US-ROK alliance relations began to rapidly go downhill. For 
example, many US lawmakers and government officials from both sides of the aisle complained 
about Seoul’s policy of engagement with Pyongyang.138 In particular, Rep. Henry Hyde pointed 
out that the ROK must make up its mind about who its enemy was before it could expect US 
help in an emergency; he was referring to the fact that South Korea—on top of insisting on 
almost unconditionally helping out the North—had curiously removed the term “main enemy” 
(in reference to the DPRK) from its recent 2004 defense white paper.139 Moreover, Derek J. 
Mitchell of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) claimed that Seoul’s 
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continued support of and assistance to Pyongyang “confused” Washington, to the point of 
shaking the very raison d’être of the alliance.140 Perhaps most clearly driving home the point 
was Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi, who remarked that “since the United 
States does not have sufficient trust in South Korea, Japan finds it a problem to share information 
[intelligence on the North Korean nuclear issue] it has received from Washington with South 
Korea.”141 In essence, as a result of the ROK’s unilateral and precipitous turn to accommodation 
and appeasement, the United States was quickly losing trust in and patience with its formerly 
loyal ally. 
 Nevertheless, the Roh administration refused to acquiesce to the US position, as it might 
have done so earlier during the nuclear crisis. This was because many government officials and 
analysts in Seoul came to place much of the blame for the lack of progress in the nuclear talks on 
the Bush administration; as one South Korean official put it, “We have been frustrated by the US 
government’s attitude…They have shown no flexibility.”142 Moreover, the ROK—in order to 
overcome status inconsistency—was compelled to play a more assertive and proactive mediating 
role in the nuclear issue in order to signal to the US its resolve to exercise the claimed privilege 
of getting to play an integral role in the crisis. For these reasons, Seoul continued to maintain its 
engagement policy, and ultimately managed to arrange a meeting between Unification Minister 
Chung Dong-Young and the DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il in Pyongyang on June 17, 2005. There, 
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Chung offered Kim two million kilowatts of electricity for returning to the Six Party Talks, and 
soon enough, on July 10, the DPRK officially announced that it would do so.143 While it is 
debatable as to how much of an impact the South Korean offer actually had on Kim Jong-Il’s 
calculus, at the end of the day, Seoul came to be seen as spearheading a breakthrough in the talks 
that were arguably deadlocked because of American intransigence.144 
 As a result of the ROK’s efforts, then, the six parties were able to reconvene for the 
fourth round of talks on July 26 after a 13-month hiatus.145 The core issue of this round was 
whether or not the DPRK was entitled to civilian nuclear power.146 The DPRK insisted that it 
did, demanding that a reference to light-water reactors (LWRs) be included in the final joint 
statement, whereas the United States was adamant that no such reference could be included, 
arguing that the DPRK was not entitled to any kind of nuclear program, civil or military.147 This 
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issue once again put the South Koreans at odds with the Americans, as the former—similar to the 
Chinese and the Russians—were of the view that “North Korea has a general right to peaceful 
use of nuclear energy, for agricultural, medical and power-generation purposes.”148 For this 
reason, the South Koreans—rather than lining up with the Americans—decided instead to work 
closely alongside the Chinese in order to come up with an acceptable wording that acknowledged 
the DPRK’s right to LWRs, which Beijing eventually managed to formulate in the following way 
by September 16: “The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The 
other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of 
the provision of a light-water reactor to the DPRK.”149 And when the United States demurred, 
the ROK, desperate to save the talks from yet another collapse, boldly stood up to its patron state; 
in particular, the chief South Korean delegate, Song Min-Soon, “blew up…warning emotionally 
that if Washington scuttled the deal by refusing to accept the Chinese compromise wording about 
LWRs, it could negatively affect US-ROK ties.”150 While the United States understandably was 
greatly displeased with its ally’s defiance,151 it was nevertheless compelled by “persistent 
pressure from China and South Korea” to soften its stance and to give in to the Chinese 
formulation; as The New York Times put it, “The US administration [was] not in a position to 
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really challenge North Korea…without South Korea and China on board.”152 At last, with the 
United States’ eleventh hour agreement, the delegations of the Six Party Talks were finally able 
to issue a joint statement of principles on September 19, the “first tangible outcome of two years 
of stop-and-start negotiations.”153  
 The ROK was ecstatic about the September 19 Joint Statement, which it considered “one 
of its most remarkable diplomatic achievements,”154 believing that without its “creative ideas 
and persistent negotiating efforts, reaching the agreement [in addition to reopening the 
talks]…would have been very difficult.”155 Moreover, in substantive terms, the joint statement 
“addressed most of the issues on [South Korea’s] long-cherished wish list.”156 For starters, the 
DPRK, for the first time ever, acknowledged “in writing, to all members of the region, that it had 
nuclear weapons, that it would give them up, and that it would end all associated nuclear 
programs.”157 In addition, the United States “committed to exist peacefully together with the 
DPRK” and “agreed to the eventual establishment of a bilateral working group to normalize 
diplomatic relations.”158 And furthermore, the parties agreed to “negotiate a permanent peace 
regime on the Korean peninsula” and also to “make efforts for lasting peace and stability in 
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Northeast Asia by agreeing to explore ways and means to promote multilateral security 
cooperation.” 159  In essence, by addressing not only denuclearization and US-DPRK 
reconciliation but also peninsular and regional peace mechanisms as well, the September 19 Joint 
Statement effectively laid the groundwork for achieving President Roh’s ambitious goals of 
institutionalizing peace on the peninsula and more broadly, bringing about a genuine Age of 
Northeast Asia.160 Moreover, the September 19 Agreement provided an ideal opportunity for the 
South Koreans to overcome their status inconsistency, for by having demonstrated to the United 
States what the ROK was capable of bringing to the nuclear negotiating table, it presented a 
convincing reason for the Americans to start showing respect for the South Koreans’ claimed 
privilege of exerting substantial influence over the management of the nuclear issue. Given these 
achievements, then, it was no wonder that Unification Minister Chung Dong-Young celebrated 
the agreement as “a victory of South Korea’s diplomacy, launching the initial step toward 
resolving the Cold War structure on the Korean Peninsula and building a permanent peace 
structure in Northeast Asia.”161  
 Unfortunately for the South Koreans, however, the September 19 Agreement “began to 
fall apart almost literally before the ink was dry on the declaration.”162 This was because the 
United States followed up with two measures that essentially nullified the joint statement. For 
one, on the final day of the fourth round, the chief US delegate, Christopher Hill, read a closing 
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statement on instructions from Washington that not only resurrected the CVID mantra but also 
specified the United States’ rigid interpretation of what the “appropriate time” (for the discussion 
of the LWRs) actually meant; in fact, according to Korea expert Don Oberdorfer, the latter was 
so stringent that it “blew away the carefully ambiguous formulation the joint statement had 
employed to deal with the issue.”163 Unsurprisingly, in response to the United States’ about-face, 
the DPRK Foreign Ministry countered the following day by issuing a statement that warned, “If 
the United States was pulling back on the LWRs, then it should not expect the North to move 
forward on any of the items of interest to the United States.”164 But what ultimately put the final 
nail on the September 19 Agreement’s coffin was the US Department of Treasury’s designation 
of Banco Delta Asia (BDA), per Section 311 of the Patriot Act, as a “financial institution of 
primary money laundering concerns”; specifically, the Treasury Department accused BDA for 
being a “willing pawn for the North Korean government to engage in corrupt financial activities,” 
and thereby forced the Macau bank to freeze “all North Korean accounts, amounting to about 
$25 million.”165 From this point on, for the next 18 months, the “entire Six Party Talks became 
captive to the BDA issue,” with the DPRK on the one hand persistently demanding, “We want 
our $25 million back,” and the US on the other maintaining that “the BDA sanctions were a law 
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enforcement issue and could not be modified or ended for political reasons.”166 And in this 
context, the September 19 Joint Statement, which “continued to exist on paper, had been 
shattered,” and the nuclear negotiations essentially returned to square one.167  
Understandably, the South Koreans were greatly distressed. They just could not 
comprehend why the United States would raise the BDA issue at this point and jeopardize all the 
progress that had been made on the nuclear front.168 For starters, the South Koreans had long 
told the Americans that the Six Party Talks should be kept separate from those “non-nuclear” 
issues—such as currency counterfeiting, human rights, and drug trafficking, among others—that 
stood in the way of US-DPRK normalization, given that if the talks were to collapse every time 
one of those issues arose, it would be “impossible” to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.169 And 
had not Bush promised Roh back in November 2004 at the APEC conference that he would 
accordingly assign top priority to the nuclear problem during his second term?170 Or was the 
BDA issue so exigent that it was worth virtually nullifying the September 19 Agreement? The 
South Koreans didn’t think so, as they questioned the credibility of the United States’ 
counterfeiting charges to begin with; they believed that the US evidence was weak and rather 
circumstantial, and thus insufficient to irrefutably prove that Pyongyang was behind the 
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production of counterfeit US dollars—somewhat analogous to the controversy over the DPRK’s 
HEU program.171 Therefore, Seoul was of the view that in the absence of definitive proof, now 
was not the time for Washington to put the nuclear issue at risk by pushing through the financial 
sanctions; instead, the US had to focus primarily on the nuclear problem itself, demonstrating 
greater flexibility on the BDA action in order to induce the DPRK’s return to the negotiating 
table.172  
For this reason, Roh, unable to get on board with the United States, set out to persuade 
Bush during the November 2005 US-ROK summit in Gyeongju, Korea to “lift or relax the 
financial sanctions against BDA in consideration of the [September 19] joint statement”173—but 
to no avail. This was because the American president, rather than carefully considering Roh’s 
rationale for adopting accommodating policies, instead doubled down on the counterfeiting 
charges, claiming that “Kim Jong-Il is producing more fake US dollars than anyone else in the 
world. What do you expect me to do as the president? I cannot sit idly and let him counterfeit our 
currency.”174 In other words, President Bush, as far as the South Koreans were concerned, was 
“deaf to a small allied nation’s leader who worried about and sought understanding for his 
country’s fate,”175 an attitude that once again reinforced for them the difficulty of redefining the 
                                         
171 Digital.Chosun, "S.Korean Experts Agree Bogus Dollar Trail Leads North," Chosun Ilbo, December 
22 2005; Cha, The Impossible State, p. 266; Lee, K'alnalwiŭi P'yŏnghwa [Peace on a Knife’s Edge], pp. 
342-43; Lee, Peace on a Knife’s Edge, p. 281; Digital.Chosun, "Seoul Official Raps U.S. Envoy for 
N.Korea Forgery Claim," Chosun Ilbo, December 23 2005. 
172 Moon, "Diplomacy of Defiance and Facilitation," p. 95. 
173 Lee, Peace on a Knife’s Edge, pp. 280, 84. 
174 Ibid., p. 284. 
175 Ibid., p. 285. 
184 
 
US-ROK alliance on a truly equitable footing; Roh at one point even lamented, “If they [the 
Americans] wear out an ally like this, who would want to be [their] ally?”176 In short, in spite of 
their efforts to signal to the US their resolve and ability to exercise the privilege of playing an 
integral role in the crisis, the South Koreans failed to earn the United States’ respect for the 
prerogative, and as a result, continued to experience status inconsistency.  
Furthermore, Bush’s unyielding stance raised doubts in the South Koreans’ minds as to 
whether the US was actually serious about resolving the nuclear problem at all; it seemed as if 
Washington was more intent on cracking down on the North Koreans’ illicit activities (which 
they believed had not been definitively proven, either) than stopping them from building a 
nuclear arsenal.177 In fact, President Roh went so far as to suspect that certain factions in 
Washington were strategically exploiting tensions and conflicts on the Korean peninsula, rather 
than prioritizing the resolution of the nuclear issue first and foremost.178 It was against these 
backdrops that the South Korean president shot back at President Bush with “barely disguised 
accusations”, insinuating that the “coincidence” of the BDA issue and the September 19 
Agreement was “actually something darker,” possibly a calculated attempt by the United States 
to make sure that the historic joint statement never took off.179 It was the worst US-ROK summit 
ever.180  
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Regardless, no matter how disrespected or slighted they might have felt about 
Washington’s boss diplomacy and no matter how much it longed to overcome their status 
inconsistency, there unfortunately was nothing that the South Koreans could do this time around 
to change the situation for the better—whether it be their status concerns or the nuclear 
conundrum. This was because now that the entire Six Party Talks hinged solely on the BDA 
incident—with the DPRK demanding that the sanctions be lifted before it could return to the 
negotiating table, and the US demanding an unconditional return—only the Americans held the 
key to moving the nuclear dialogue forward, by modifying the measures taken by their own 
financial and judicial authorities. And with President Bush already having made it clear that he 
had no intention of doing so, there was absolutely no room left for the Roh administration at this 
point to help make a breakthrough in the impasse by playing its erstwhile proactive and assertive 
mediating role.181 As a result, the South Koreans could only helplessly watch as the DPRK 
retaliated against the United States’ financial sanctions with “extreme measures” of its own,182 
first test-launching “seven missiles comprising short-range Scud, intermediate range Nodong, 
and long-range Daepodong missiles” on July 4, 2006,183 and ultimately conducting its first-ever 
nuclear test on the morning of October 9184—and thereby crushing President Roh’s lofty goals of 
institutionalizing peace on the Korean peninsula and bringing about a genuine Age of Northeast 
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Asia. 
Alternative Explanations 
 In this penultimate section, I discuss the extent to which three alternative explanations—
1) divergence in threat perception; 2) domestic politics and anti-Americanism; and 3) desire to 
bandwagon with the rising China—could account for the ROK’s alliance-eroding behavior 
examined throughout the extensive case study above.  
Divergence in Threat Perceptions 
The hypothesis that the divergence in threat perceptions of the DPRK and the resulting 
abandonment and/or entrapment fears on the part of the South Koreans caused the latter’s 
alliance-eroding behavior finds some support from the case study. After all, the allies did have 
differing threat perceptions of the DPRK. As Gi-Wook Shin puts it, the US viewed North Korea 
“as a serious regional and even global security threat”—and hence its general preference for 
pressure tactics—whereas the ROK perceived the DPRK as not only a “partner in inter-Korean 
reconciliation” but also a “weak state with severely diminished capacity to threaten ROK 
national security”—and hence its general preference for engagement.185 And as a result of such 
divergent threat perceptions, the ROK did at times come to fear the possibility of getting 
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entrapped in a US-DPRK conflict. For example, the ROK’s intransigent behavior during the 
early months of 2003 stemmed from its perception that the US was really about to resort to a 
military option and its resolve to go an extra mile to dissuade the Americans. Moreover, the 
South Koreans decided to take the proactive turn in their approach to the nuclear conundrum 
following the third round of the Six Party Talks in June 2004, for they came to believe that unless 
they parted ways with the Americans, they would not be able to make any progress towards 
establishing peace on the Korean peninsula. Although the US was by no means contemplating a 
military action at this point, the state of continued tension on the peninsula—even in the absence 
of an outbreak of military clash—was a “conflict” nonetheless that the South Koreans did not 
want to get entrapped in. In essence, the ROK’s alliance-eroding behaviors throughout the crisis 
can certainly be attributed to an important extent to security reasons; as a study by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) puts it, “it is the apparent difference in perceptions of 
and policy toward North Korea that is challenging most seriously the foundations of the 
alliance.”186 
Even so, the argument that the divergence in threat perceptions and the ROK’s fear of 
abandonment/entrapment were the primary cause of the low levels of US-ROK alliance cohesion 
is not entirely convincing. For starters, it must be noted that even though the extent to which the 
US and the ROK perceived North Korea as a threat might have differed, the DRPK certainly was 
a threat nonetheless to the South Koreans, for however diminished its military capabilities were 
deemed to be, the North was on its way to develop nuclear weapons. And this fact in theory 
should have strongly motivated the South Koreans to take their alliance with the Americans 
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seriously.187 Thus, it follows that for the South Koreans, antagonizing the United States and 
instilling a negative, disloyal image of themselves to their ally by devaluing the alliance and 
deliberately pursuing an independent course was far from a rational course of action. After all, if 
the South Koreans were to push away the United States too far, that would only increase the 
probability of both abandonment and entrapment. That is, if the United States were to come to 
care less about the ROK’s security interests due to the latter’s uncooperative behavior and 
attitude, the US could be led to either more easily initiate a conflict with North Korea—thereby 
entrapping the South Koreans—or more readily refuse to support the ROK in the event of a 
DPRK attack—thereby abandoning its ally. And in fact, as pointed out in the case study, the 
United States was already starting to hide intelligence on the North Korean nuclear issue from 
the South Koreans that it was sharing with the Japanese. In essence, while the hypothesis of the 
divergence in threat perceptions may account for the ROK’s defiant behaviors individually in 
isolation, it cannot explain why the South Koreans were willing to resort to those behaviors on a 
regular basis, which, by fostering an image of themselves as a disloyal ally, was bound to pose 
the double threat of abandonment and entrapment to their national security. In short, in the 
absence of integrating the ROK’s status concerns into our analysis, it is difficult to understand 
from the security point alone as to why the South Koreans resorted to a series of assertive and 
defiant actions that entailed greater security risks than otherwise.  
Domestic Politics and Anti-Americanism 
The hypothesis that it was the rise of anti-American sentiment in the ROK and the South 
Korean leader’s desire to cater to such public opinion that caused the low levels of US-ROK 
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alliance cohesion observed finds little support from the case study. To be sure, anti-American 
sentiment was on the rise in Seoul in the early years of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis. In 
particular, in the aftermath of a “US military training accident that killed two Korean schoolgirls 
[in June 2002],” South Korea saw “catholic priests [going] on a hunger strike, and tens and 
thousands of Koreans—not just activists but middle-class adults—protest[ing] against the United 
States.”188 Indeed, it is no secret that President Roh Moo-Hyun was elected in December 2002 
by capitalizing on such public sentiment,189 having added fuel to the fire himself with comments 
like, “What’s wrong with being anti-US?”190  The extent to which anti-Americanism was 
rampant in South Korea at the time is reflected by a 2003 Pew survey, which showed that “aside 
from certain Arab states, France, and Russia, South Korea was…one of the most anti-American 
countries.”191  
Despite these developments, however, there is little evidence to show that the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration formulated policies towards the alliance and the nuclear issue on the basis 
of anti-Americanism. If anything, President Roh, well aware that he was often denounced by 
many media outlets in both the ROK and the US as being anti-American, made conscious efforts 
to demonstrate his commitment to sustain the solid state of the US-ROK alliance.192 For 
example, during the first US-ROK summit in May 2003, Roh—in order to show that he was 
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positively disposed towards the US—said, “If the United States had not helped South Korea 
fifty-three years ago, I think that I might have ended up at a camp for political prisoners,” and 
ended up facing domestic political backlash for having been excessively fawning.193 Moreover, 
President Roh twice responded to the United States’ request for troop dispatches against the face 
of South Koreans’ general opposition to the Iraq War and the ROK’s support for the war 
efforts—arguably a proxy for anti-Americanism. In general, the widespread anti-American 
sentiment did not preclude the Roh administration from effectively cooperating with the Bush 
administration on a wide variety of important bilateral issues, such as the relocations of the 
Yongsan Garrison and the US Army’s 2nd Infantry Division and the US-ROK Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA), among others.194  
Perhaps most importantly, anti-American sentiment as intense as the one sparked by the 
“schoolgirls” incident in June 2002 did not resurface until 2008 with the US beef-importation 
protests.195 What this means is that the period in which the Roh administration was taking a 
more independent and proactive approach to the nuclear crisis at the expense of alliance cohesion 
(2005-06) did not coincide with any particular outburst of anti-Americanism at all. In light of 
these considerations, then, it can be argued that anti-American sentiment was not the cause of the 
low levels of alliance cohesion observed during the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis. 
Bandwagoning with the Rising China 
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Finally, the hypothesis that the ROK’s desire to bandwagon with the rising China caused 
the low levels of US-ROK alliance cohesion observed does not find support from the case study. 
It is true that economic relations between South Korea and China were expanding rapidly at the 
time of the nuclear crisis, so much so that China became the ROK’s largest trade partner in 
2003.196 Given the liberal logic that heightened economic interdependence fosters cooperative 
political relations, one could certainly make the case that the ROK would have become 
motivated to depart from “the long-standing lockstep with the United States” and move towards 
China.197 Indeed, in the spring of 2005, the Roh administration proposed the concept of the 
ROK as a “balancer” in Northeast Asia, signaling its desire to “extract itself from a stand-off 
centered on the peninsula between a ‘Southern alliance’ of South Korea, the US, and Japan…and 
a ‘Northern alliance’ of North Korea, China, and Russia.”198 According to one ROK diplomat, 
the concept reflected new thinking on the part of South Korea about “graduating from 
dependence on the United States” and formulating its foreign and security policy “based on the 
premise of the rise of China.”199 
However, amidst criticisms from the United States and the conservative circles in the 
ROK that the core idea of the balancer doctrine—that the ROK could actually play a “stabilizing 
role in Northeast Asia between the US-Japan camp and the North Korea-China-Russia camp”—
was a “pipe dream far above the reality of international politics,” the Roh administration ended 
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up never actually abiding by it in practice.200 As Yoichi Funabashi puts it, the balancer concept, 
which was “announced, with a flourish, as a ‘new doctrine’ in March [of 2005]…did not last 
three months”; in fact, by June, “even Roh ceased to refer to it.”201  
Accordingly, in the context of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, one does not really 
encounter much evidence that the South Koreans were making an effort to cater to the Chinese 
preferences at the expense of the American ones. To be sure, there were a number of times during 
the Six Party Talks in which the ROK and China teamed up against the United States. For 
example, during the fourth round of the talks (which began in July 2005), South Korea worked 
closely alongside the Chinese to pressure the US to accept a compromise wording that 
acknowledged the DPRK’s right to LWRs. Moreover, in the aftermath of the DPRK’s official 
declaration of itself as a nuclear power in February 2005, South Korea joined hands with the 
Chinese to deter Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice from “seeking a UN Security Council 
resolution authorizing stepped-up political and economic sanctions against Pyongyang.”202 
However, in these instances, the Chinese and the South Korean positions toward the nuclear 
issue were already aligned to begin with, meaning that the South Koreans did not deliberately 
modify their policies beforehand in order to accommodate the Chinese preferences. In sum, then, 
while the instances of ROK-Chinese cooperation against the US during the nuclear crisis, along 
with President Roh’s balancer doctrine, might initially make it seem as if the ROK was trying to 
bandwagon with the rising China at the expense of the United States, in reality, the South 
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Koreans were simply trying to leverage on cooperation with the Chinese to promote their 
common interests and goals.  
Conclusion 
A close reading of the historical record shows that South Korea’s status concerns 
influenced the trajectory of the US-ROK alliance relations during the Second Korean Nuclear 
Crisis (2002-2006) in nontrivial ways. Specifically, South Korea, as a middle power aspirant, had 
a sense of entitlement to the privilege of exercising a significant influence over the management 
of the nuclear issue, and thus expected the United States to show respect for it. In particular, the 
ROK expected the US to uphold the principle of horizontal and equitable relationship—in which 
the two would fully respect and understand one another’s views and suggestions and honor the 
spirit of quid pro quo—as the allies jointly tackled the nuclear issue. However, as it turned out, 
the United States, despite some initial positive signs, did not show respect for its ally’s claimed 
prerogative, and it was against such backdrop that the ROK—compelled to overcome status 
inconsistency—started to adopt a more proactive and assertive approach to the nuclear issue in 
defiance of the US, in order to signal to the latter its resolve and ability to exercise the privilege. 
As a result, the US-ROK alliance cohesion experienced a precipitous decline during the later part 
of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, up to the DPRK’s first nuclear test in October 2006. 
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CHAPTER 4 
US-France Alliance and de Gaulle’s Exit from NATO in 1966 
The United States-France alliance relations were fraught with tension during the 
presidency of General Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969). The allies had a difficult time coming to 
an agreement over their goals and strategies, and intra-alliance conflicts were a part and parcel of 
the Franco-American alliance. And interestingly enough, such tension within the alliance had 
largely to do with the French defiance against the United States, so much so that General de 
Gaulle “came to be regarded as the scourge of Atlantic unity and the biggest threat to American 
leadership of the Western Alliance in an era still dominated by the Cold War.”1 For example, in 
January 1963, France, contrary to American wishes, vetoed Britain’s entry into the Common 
Market.2 Moreover, a year later, France established diplomatic relations with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) without having consulted the US beforehand.3 And furthermore, in 
March 1966, the French completely withdrew themselves from the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) system,4 even though the US viewed the organization as “the proper venue for 
                                         
1 Garret Martin, General De Gaulle's Cold War: Challenging American Hegemony, 1963-68 (New York, 
NY: Berghahn Books, 2013), pp. 1-2. 
2  Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 369-70. 
3 Martin, General De Gaulle's Cold War, p. 56. 
4 To be precise, France only withdrew from NATO’s integrated military structure while remaining in the 
alliance otherwise. For convenience of terminology, however, in this chapter, I will refer to this incident 
simply as France’s withdrawal, or exit, from the organization. Marc Trachtenberg, "France and N.A.T.O., 
1949–1991," Journal of Transatlantic Studies 9, no. 3 (2011): 189; Martin, General De Gaulle's Cold War, 
p. 1. 
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political and strategic cooperation among Western nations.”5 In essence, the level of the US-
France alliance cohesion was conspicuously low during the de Gaulle period—due, to a 
significant extent, to France’s unwillingness to cooperate—and an examination of this 
phenomenon lies at the heart of this chapter. 
In theoretical terms, the fact that the French were unable to cooperate closely with the 
Americans is highly puzzling. For one, considering that the purpose of a security alliance is to 
counter a shared threat, the two allies should have been able to maintain strategic unity against 
the ongoing Soviet menace with ease.6 For another, given that within an asymmetric alliance, the 
client (the weaker partner) is more vulnerable than the patron (the stronger partner) in the 
absence of the partnership, the French should have made an effort to avoid causing frictions with 
the United States, lest it be abandoned.7 Nonetheless, despite these constraints, the French 
willfully resorted to alliance-eroding behaviors on a regular basis, such as entirely withdrawing 
their Mediterranean fleet from NATO in 1959 and refusing to participate in the American-
                                         
5 Frédéric Bozo, Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the United States, and the Atlantic Alliance, trans. 
Susan Emanuel (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), p. 20. 
6 Patricia A Weitsman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliances," Security Studies 7, no. 1 
(1997): 160; Stephen M Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); 
James Jungbok Lee, "The Importance of Status: The U.S.–R.O.K. Alliance Cohesion and the First Korean 
Nuclear Crisis, 1993–94," The International History Review 40, no. 2 (2018): 316, 17-18. As one 
prominent scholars notes, “alliances are against, and only derivatively for, some one or some thing.” 
George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 
1962), p. 12   
7 “Abandonment is the fear that the ally may leave the alliance, may not live up to explicit commitments, 
or may fail to provide support in contingencies where support is expected.” Glenn H Snyder, Alliance 
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 182, 84; James D Morrow, "Alliances and 
Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances," American Journal of 
Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991): 904-33; Lee, "The Importance of Status," pp. 316, 17-18, 39 n. 21.  
202 
 
sponsored multilateral force (MLF) in 1963.8 In short, France’s defiance against the US presents 
a theoretical conundrum, given that per the tenets of alliance politics, the level of US-France 
alliance cohesion should have been high instead.  
In this chapter, therefore, I seek to provide an explanation for the low levels of the US-
France alliance cohesion observed during the de Gaulle period, up to France’s decision to 
withdraw from NATO in March 1966. And this I do so by focusing on the French side of the 
story. Based on a careful examination of the historical record, I argue that France’s status 
concerns played a significant role in triggering its alliance-eroding behaviors. In particular, I 
demonstrate that similar to the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) Kim Young-Sam government during 
the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94 (chapter 2 of this dissertation) and the Roh Moo-
Hyun government during the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis of 2002-06 (chapter 3 of this 
dissertation), the French government’s diplomatic maneuvers under General de Gaulle were also 
significantly influenced by its experience of status inconsistency.. 
In line with this idea, the basic point that emerges from the empirical analysis of the US-
France relations during the de Gaulle period is as follows. General Charles de Gaulle entered 
office in 1958 as the first president of the Fifth Republic of France with a determination to 
restore and solidify France’s great power status. De Gaulle believed that France, as a great power 
aspirant, was entitled to exercise the privilege of playing a principal role on the world stage—as 
a leader of Western Europe and an equal of the Anglo-Saxons—by exercising full independence 
and policy autonomy in ways that were consequential to world strategic plans and armament. In 
order to actually get France recognized as a great power, the general sought to earn the United 
                                         
8 Francis J Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power: The Politics of International Monetary Relations, 1958-
1971 (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press Books, 2004), p. 92. 
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States’ respect for the claimed prerogative, yet to his disappointment, he continued to fail to do 
so across the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. Against such backdrop, de 
Gaulle’s France—compelled to overcome status inconsistency—resorted to a series of assertive 
and defiant alliance-eroding behaviors in order to drive home the point that France had both the 
resolve and ability to exercise policy autonomy in an influential manner. As a result, the US-
France alliance cohesion continued to go downhill, culminating in France’s eventual withdrawal 
from NATO in 1966. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized into six sections. In the opening empirical 
section, I analyze the ways in which General de Gaulle’s sense of entitlement to France’s great 
power status informed his desire to acquire independent nuclear weaponry, secure leadership 
over Western Europe, and to attain a position of equality with Washington and London over the 
management of world affairs. In the next three empirical sections, I discuss in detail the extent to 
which the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations were willing to show respect for 
France’s claimed great power privilege and examine the impact the American attitude and 
behavior had on the development of the US-France alliance relations, up to France’s exit from 
NATO in 1966. Following the case study, I address three alternative explanations for France’s 
defiance against the US: 1) divergence in threat perception of the USSR; 2) domestic politics and 
anti-Americanism; and 3) desire to bandwagon with the Soviets. Finally, I summarize my 
findings in a brief conclusion.  
De Gaulle, France and Great Power Status  
In May 1958, General Charles de Gaulle took office as the first president of the Fifth 
Republic of France with a determination to restore France’s great power status. As de Gaulle 
makes it clear his memoir, the new French president had long held the conviction that France 
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was destined for greatness: “All my life I have had a certain idea of France…The emotional side 
of me naturally imagines France…as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny…the 
positive side of my mind also assures me that France is not really herself unless in the front 
rank…In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness.”9 And in line with such 
conception, France—after having been thoroughly humiliated by its defeat in May-June 
194010—was well on its way to regain its traditional great power status through acquisition of 
associated markers. In particular, France won its seat as “a fifth permanent member of the [then] 
future UN [Security] Council (UNSC)” in August 1944, became a “full permanent member of 
the European Advisory Commission (EAC)” in November 1944, and moreover, was included as 
a member of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in July 1945.11 In addition, France was 
also “accorded an occupation zone in Germany, and was allowed to regain control of French 
China.” In essence, through these impressive array of achievements—“membership in elite 
forums,” “equal position in these forums relative to other members,” and “allocation of occupied 
zones”— France had obtained some of the more significant markers of “great power in the new 
world order”12 by the time de Gaulle returned to power, and it was against such backdrop that 
the new president set out in 1958 to solidify France’s great power status.  
For de Gaulle, it was of utmost importance that France, on the basis of the above 
                                         
9 Daniel Mahoney, De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur and Modern Democracy (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 2000), p. 16. 
10 Douglas Porch, "Military “Culture” and the Fall of France in 1940: A Review Essay," International 
Security 24, no. 4 (2000): 157. 
11 Gadi Heimann, "What Does It Take to Be a Great Power? The Story of France Joining the Big Five," 
Review of International Studies 41, no. 1 (2015): 194, 96-97, 99. 
12 Ibid., p. 199. 
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accomplishments, go on to secure “independence in world affairs”—which would allow her to 
“pursue her own general interest rather than…the interests of others”13—before it could truly 
achieve great power status. As the general saw things, it was lamentable that France, in the recent 
decades, failed to have much control over its own destiny. For example, during the 1930’s, when 
“French foreign policy was so closely aligned with that of Britain,” France’s “sense of utter 
dependence” on the latter prevented itself from resorting to an independent, unilateral measure in 
response to Germany’s “revolt against the Treaty of Versailles.”14 Moreover, in February 1945, 
France helplessly stood by as the “division of Europe between Russia and the Anglo-Saxons” 
was being carried out at the Yalta Summit Conference.15 And furthermore, during the 1956 Suez 
Crisis, Paris experienced the double humiliation of having had to “withdraw its military 
intervention forces after a nuclear threat from Russia and under US economic pressure.”16 In 
essence, such historic memory had acutely sensitized the general to the paramount importance of 
“prevent[ing] France from being a mere pawn on the international chessboard,”17 and thereby 
instigated him throughout the presidency to aggressively pursue his goal for “France to be and 
                                         
13 P.G. Cerny, "De Gaulle, the Nation-State and Foreign Policy," The Review of Politics 33, no. 2 (1971): 
277. 
14 Robert G Kaufman, "'To Balance or to Bandwagon?' Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security 
Studies 1, no. 3 (1992): 423; Julian Jackson, De Gaulle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2018), p. 566. 
15 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 391; Heimann, "What Does It Take to Be a Great Power?," pp. 
197-98. 
16 Scott D Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," 
International Security 21, no. 3 (1997): 77. 
17 Stanley Hoffmann, "De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance," International Organization 18, no. 
1 (1964): 1-2. 
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remain an independent nation.”18  
Central to de Gaulle’s notion of independence was an ability of a nation to defend itself, 
and such capability in turn ultimately hinged on that state’s possession of its own nuclear force.19 
As the general confided to US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1959, only by “provid[ing] 
herself [France] with an atomic armament” could “our defense and foreign policy be independent, 
which we prize above everything else.”20 In short, for de Gaulle, nuclear weapons were an 
indispensible marker of France’s great power status. Yet, as Marc Trachtenberg points out, 
simply possessing nuclear weaponry was not enough for the general. Rather, France needed to 
place the weapons under “pure national control,” which in turn had to be made “overt and 
explicit.” What this meant was that for the French, the United States was not to retain even 
formal control of their weapons. 21 It was for this reason that the general—while in principle 
“perfectly willing” to accept US assistance in building France’s national nuclear capability22—
rebuffed an offer made by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1958 to not only install 
tactical nuclear weapons on French soil but also to train the French military on their use, since 
the offer was contingent on the French agreement to contribute those weapons to a “common 
NATO or American-sponsored and controlled European capability.”23 Therefore, rather than 
                                         
18 Carolyn Davidson, "Dealing with De Gaulle: The United States and France," in Globalizing De Gaulle: 
International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, ed. Christian Nuenlist, Anna Locher, 
and Garret Martin (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010), p. 112. 
19 Marc Trachtenberg, "The De Gaulle Problem," Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 1 (2012): 82. 
20 Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?," p. 79. 
21 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 223. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Davidson, "Dealing with De Gaulle," p. 117. 
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complying with that condition, the French instead went ahead and conducted their first nuclear 
test in February 1960, and in that process, not only incurred economic costs they would not have 
had to face (had they accepted the American nuclear assistance) but also risked triggering 
German nuclear development24 In short, all this goes to show that de Gaulle placed such a great 
value on the goal of securing independence for France—on which the aspired great power status 
depended—that he was willing to tolerate strategic and economic costs if that meant getting 
closer to acquiring nuclear weapons under pure national control. 
At the same time, however, de Gaulle was well aware that simply possessing the markers 
of great power status—most importantly, independence (in general) and nuclear weapons (in 
particular)—was not sufficient (albeit necessary) for France to achieve that status. As discussed 
in the theoretical chapter, a state’s aspired status can be concretized only when it is recognized by 
others, where recognition involves a show of respect for the state’s privileges that it believes it is 
entitled to per its claimed status position. In the case of de Gaulle, he felt that as a great power 
aspirant, France was entitled to the privilege of “augment[ing] France’s role as a ‘principal 
player’ on the world stage” that can exercise a full “measure of independence and autonomy” in 
ways that were consequential to “world strategic plans and armament.”25  
In particular, de Gaulle envisioned playing a principal role in constructing a “continental 
West European bloc that could stand on its own both military and politically”—that is, “a Europe 
that could be truly independent of the United States and of the Soviet Union…a Europe that 
                                         
24 Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, p. 225. 
25 Andrew Moravcsik, "De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur: The Economic Origins of French E.C. 
Policy, 1958–1970 (Part I)," Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 2 (2000): 9. Dulles-de Gaulle meeting, 
July 5, 1958, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. 7(2), document 34 (hereinafter 
referred to as FRUS, with appropriate year and volume numbers). 
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could chart its own course in world affairs.”26 De Gaulle believed that Western Europe needed to 
overcome its state of relative powerlessness vis-à-vis the two superpowers and start taking 
“control of its political destiny” by “exercising control over its own defense.”27 And as the 
general saw things, such mission had to be carried out by France, for he was convinced that 
France was one of those “elected” nations in the world that were “destined to play a special role 
in the political life of [other] nations.” What this meant in the context of European affairs was 
that it was incumbent upon France to take the initiative to bring about both “liberty and greatness” 
to the continent,28 which the general thought could be achieved by rescuing Western Europe 
from “domination by the Americans or the Russians.”29 In essence, in de Gaulle’s view, France 
was obliged to take the leadership role in transforming Western Europe into a “third great power 
complex in the world” that can “balance[e] Soviet power without direct US support,”30 and 
having an opportunity to do so was a privilege that he believed France was entitled to as a great 
power aspirant.  
It was on the basis of such sense of entitlement that the general strongly pushed for the 
Fouchet Plan, whereby the Six (France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries) would 
be organized into a political union that would become “the equal of the two superpowers,” 
“serv[ing] as a counterweight to the USSR” and “act[ing] independently of the United States.31 
                                         
26 Trachtenberg, "The De Gaulle Problem," p. 84. 
27 Mahoney, De Gaulle, pp. 136-37. 
28 Ibid., p. 140. 
29 Moravcsik, "De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur," p. 11. 
30 Trachtenberg, "The De Gaulle Problem," pp. 83-84. 
31 Jeffrey G Giauque, "The United States and the Political Union of Western Europe, 1958–1963," 
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To the extent that de Gaulle envisioned creating an “independent European third force,”32 this 
agenda of “promot[ing] European cooperation and organiz[ing] a sort of a European concert”33 
was certainly of enormous significance in itself. However, what was as important—if not more—
for the general was the goal of leveraging on the project to solidify France’s position as the 
“leader of the European club of the ‘Six’”34; as he remarked in private, “Europe is the means by 
which France can become again what she has ceased to be since Waterloo. First in the world.”35 
Indeed, from the fact that de Gaulle tried to exclude Britain from the proposed continental 
arrangement—as he viewed his neighbor as “the ‘Trojan Horse’ of American leadership 
aspiration in Europe” that was bound to weaken France’s dominant position36—and attempted to 
“create a formal secretariat in Paris and to replace Brussels as the European capital,”37 one gets 
the sense that for the general, the Fouchet Plan was as much about uniting Western Europe as it 
was about signaling his conviction that the project must be conducted, both operationally and 
symbolically, under French leadership.38  
                                                                                                                                   
Contemporary European History 9, no. 1 (2000): 93; Jeffrey G Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of 
Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955-1963 (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp. 126-27. 
32 Moravcsik, "De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur," p. 12; Trachtenberg, "The De Gaulle Problem," 
p. 83. 
33 Jackson, De Gaulle, p. 567. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 568. 
36 Jeffrey Vanke, "An Impossible Union: Dutch Objections to the Fouchet Plan, 1959-62," Cold War 
History 2, no. 1 (2001): 96. 
37 Giauque, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity, p. 131. 
38 Vanke, "An Impossible Union," pp. 96, 101; Jeffrey Vanke, "Reconstructing De Gaulle," Journal of 
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In addition to being at the helm of the confederation project, de Gaulle believed that 
there was yet another role that France was entitled to play. In particular, the general thought that 
it was incumbent upon France—as a representative of Western Europe—to discuss and negotiate 
European and world affairs with the United States from a position of equality, so as to prevent 
the United States from making (what he viewed as) efforts to turn Europe into “a gigantic 
Atlantic Community…dependent on [and] run by America.”39 And de Gaulle believed that 
France, as the “first of the Six”,40 had the privilege of exercising leadership role on this front as 
well. It was against such backdrop that the general, in September 1958, made a proposal to 
President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to establish a Franco-
British-American tripartite directorate. According to this plan, the triumvirate—in which Britain 
would speak “for the Commonwealth and France for Western Europe”41—would make “joint 
decisions on political question affecting world security” and “establish and…put into effect 
strategic plans of action, notably with regard to the employment of nuclear weapons.” 42 
Basically, per this scheme, Paris would attain “equality with Washington [and London] in the 
decision making” of European and global issues,43 even to the point of exercising veto over the 
                                                                                                                                   
Cold War Studies 2, no. 3 (2000): 93. 
39 Moravcsik, "De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur," p. 12. 
40 Jackson, De Gaulle, p. 568. 
41 Jeffrey G Giauque, "Offers of Partnership or Bids for Hegemony? The Atlantic Community, 1961–
1963," The International History Review 22, no. 1 (2000): 91. 
42 De Gaulle to Eisenhower, September 17, 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 7(2), document 45.  
43 Frank Costigliola, "Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult," Political Science 
Quarterly 110, no. 1 (1995): 109. 
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United States’ use of nuclear weapons.44 In short, in line with his approach to the Fouchet Plan, 
de Gaulle, via the tripartite proposal, tried to achieve not only the “European” goal of increasing 
continental Europe’s leverage vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxons but also the “French” goal of signaling 
France’s entitlement to “break into the Anglo-American club of the ‘Two’” as the “leader of the 
European club of the ‘Six’.”45  
Overall, the discussion thus far has revealed a number of important points regarding de 
Gaulle and his great power ambition. For starters, de Gaulle embarked on his presidency with a 
determination to restore France’s great power status. And this he tried to accomplish through a 
two-pronged approach. On the one hand, the general strove to acquire an important marker of 
great power status—independence and autonomy—via possession of nuclear weapons under 
pure national control. And on the other, he sought to signal to others that France—as a leader of 
Western Europe and a member of the privileged tripartite directorate—was entitled to the 
privilege of playing a principal role on the world stage by exercising full independence and 
policy autonomy in ways that were consequential to both European and global affairs.  
In this context, if the Americans wanted to achieve a high level of alliance cohesion with 
the French, they would have had to show respect for their ally’s claimed great power privilege of 
exercising a significant independent influence over world affairs as a leader of the Six and a 
member of the triumvirate. Otherwise, per the theory developed in the first chapter, France 
would experience status inconsistency and thereby come to take assertive and defiant alliance-
eroding actions in order to signal its ability and resolve to exercise such prerogative In the 
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remaining empirical sections, I discuss in detail the extent to which the United States across the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations were willing to show respect for France’s 
claimed great power privilege and examine the impact the American attitude and behavior had on 
the development of the US-France alliance relations, up to France’s exit from NATO in 1966.    
Alliance under Stress: De Gaulle and Eisenhower  
One of the major diplomatic initiatives that General de Gaulle undertook upon entering 
office was sending his ambitious memorandum on the establishment of a tripartite directorate to 
the United States and Britain in September 1958. This move essentially amounted to de Gaulle’s 
challenge to the NATO system, which he had criticized for having failed to give “full 
consideration” for “France’s role and position” therein. 46  In particular, he lamented that 
“Americans [had] at their disposal commands of an overwhelming preponderance,” which had 
kept “essential conceptions of common defense” out of France’s reach.47 Such situation of 
exclusion was unacceptable to de Gaulle, who believed that France, “in view of its great history,” 
had a “greater role” to play in “defense of the free world.”48 Against such backdrop, the general 
was compelled to signal his conviction that France, as a great power aspirant, was entitled to the 
privilege of exerting significant influence over “world strategic plans and armament”49 by 
exercising full independence and policy autonomy, and it was for this reason that he called for a 
tripartite directorate, making his case that “the political functioning of NATO would be 
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facilitated by France, the United States and the United Kingdom cooperating closely at the 
summit [emphasis added].”50 
Despite his conviction and confidence, however, de Gaulle’s ambitious memorandum 
was not received well in Washington. For one, the United States did not want to see “France 
having control over US decision-making.”51 As Secretary of State Dulles told Italian Prime 
Minister Fanfani in December 1958, “We were not averse to explaining our policies anywhere in 
the world to our friends but we would not agree to an organism which had authority and perhaps 
a veto power.”52 Moreover, Washington was determined not to give the impression to other 
members of the Atlantic alliance that they were being treated as “inferior” or as “second-rate”.53 
As President Eisenhower himself noted in October 1958 in his response to de Gaulle’s 
memorandum, “We cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to our other allies, or 
other free world countries, the impression that basic decisions affecting their own vital interests 
are being made without their participation.”54 Although the Eisenhower administration did try to 
make an effort to avoid taking on de Gaulle directly—such as by telling him how the issues 
raised by the memorandum “would have to be carefully studied within the United States 
government”—it was quite apparent that, at the end of the day, the idea of a tripartite directorate 
was “wholly unacceptable to the United States.”55 In essence, as Frédéric Bozo writes, for 
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Washington, “NATO, and only NATO, was the proper venue for political and strategic 
cooperation among Western nations.”56  
Such response on the part of the Americans signaled to de Gaulle that the United States 
had no intention of showing respect for the prerogative that he felt that France, as a great power 
aspirant, was entitled to—that of getting to play an independent, influential role on the world 
stage as a member of the privileged triumvirate. That is, by insisting on the primacy of NATO—
which the general had long viewed as “an instrument of American domination,” where the 
“whole show was being run by the US”57—the United States was conveying its unwillingness to 
acknowledge de Gaulle’s aspiration to “undertak[e] actions that are our own actions” in the 
Western world, to which “we belong without having to confine ourselves to it.”58 And further 
reinforcing such impression was what appeared (from the French point of view at least) to be the 
Americans’ “desire to hold on to something close to a nuclear monopoly in the West.”59 A prime 
example of this was the US offer in July 1958 to deploy nuclear weapons on the French soil, 
which, by stipulating that “the order for their use had to be given by the United States or by 
SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe),” effectively ruled out French control and 
custody over the weapons—an indispensible marker of independence and autonomy for France.60 
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What all this implied for the French was that the Americans, in light of their rejection of the 
tripartite proposal—along with their refusal to support France’s acquirement of completely 
independent nuclear weaponry—were ultimately reluctant to show respect for France’s claimed 
prerogative of playing an independent and consequential role on the world stage as an equal of 
the Anglo-Saxons (without being constrained by NATO).61 
Clearly, there was a mismatch between the level of status that de Gaulle believed France 
deserved and the actual status attributed to it. In other words, by this point, the general had come 
to experience status inconsistency, which in turn instigated him to resort to assertive and defiant 
alliance-eroding actions in order to signal France’s ability and resolve to exercise policy 
autonomy in ways that were significant to “world strategic plans and armament.”62 Accordingly, 
in the spring of 1959, de Gaulle took a number of unilateral steps that “reduced French 
cooperation in NATO on certain defense issues, thereby creating serious problems” for the 
institution.”63 For one, in March, he presented the United States with a “fait accompli” by his 
decision to “withdraw [France’s] Mediterranean fleet from NATO entirely, both in peacetime and 
in wartime,” in the name of securing “national control of her fleet.”64 Moreover, in May, the 
general informed Eisenhower that he could not consent to atomic stockpiling on her soil “unless 
she herself has complete and permanent control over them,”65 and thus refused to “provid[e] the 
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nuclear warheads for seven squadrons of US fighters…based in France.”66 And furthermore, all 
this while, de Gaulle adamantly withheld French air forces from NATO command, expressing his 
opposition to an integrated aerial defense system.67 As Eisenhower told de Gaulle later in the 
summer of 1960, these actions were profoundly regrettable, for they had made it “more difficult 
the coordination of their efforts [of the NATO forces] in the case of war,” “create[d]…a major 
breach in the NATO wall of solidarity,” and “blocked efforts to strengthen the NATO 
structure,”68 just at a time when “unity was needed, especially because of the Berlin Crisis.”69 
However, from de Gaulle’s perspective, such uncooperative behavior was necessary for driving 
home his conviction that because France had both the capability and determination to exercise 
policy autonomy in a manner that could significantly influence “world political and military 
strategy and decisions,” it did not deserve to be “completely boxed in by NATO and classified 
with the other continental powers.”70 In essence, the general’s message was clear. As he had 
warned Dulles back in July 1958, France was not going to “throw itself enthusiastically into the 
effort of defending the free world” unless it felt that “it was playing a significant role in world 
strategy,”71 and what this meant was that if the US wanted to induce France’s cooperation, it 
needed to show respect for the latter’s claimed great power privilege.  
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To be sure, President Eisenhower, who “always felt a certain sympathy for de Gaulle,”72 
understood where the French leader was coming from. As he told General Lauris Norstad, “He 
[de Gaulle] is trying to build up his country, and we persist in treating them [the French] as 
second-rate”73; Eisenhower even added that “we would react very much as de Gaulle does if the 
shoe were on the other foot.”74 Accordingly, the US president, to the extent possible, made an 
effort to accommodate General de Gaulle’s preferences during his remaining time in office. For 
one, Eisenhower tried to find ways to work around the Atomic Energy Act—which he felt was a 
“very defected and ‘terrible’ law” that “has done great harm to the conduct of our relations with 
our allies”75—to allow for France to have effective control over nuclear weapons provided by the 
United States.76 In fact, when Eisenhower met de Gaulle in December 1959, he told the general, 
“I would like to be able to give it [the bomb] to you,” noting that it was unreasonable for France 
to be “spend[ing] huge sums of money developing a weapon her allies already had.”77 Moreover, 
in the same month, Eisenhower expressed his willingness to better accommodate de Gaulle’s 
tripartite proposal of September 1958 by loosening the rigid stance his administration had taken: 
namely, that “any formal association designed to direct the free world” was unacceptable.78 In 
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particular, Eisenhower called for “the establishment of a tripartite machinery,” in which people 
of “reasonably high rank” would be discussing, albeit on a clandestine basis, “questions of 
common interest to the three Governments.”79 Although de Gaulle would probably have wanted 
Eisenhower to have gone further and called for an overt, rather than a covert, machinery, he was, 
as Marc Trachtenberg notes, nonetheless “pleased with the proposal, which seemed to have come 
out of the blue.”80 
Unfortunately for de Gaulle, however, Eisenhower at this point (in early 1960) was no 
longer in a position to give the general what he wanted, since the administration was “at loose 
ends, soft and flaccid and incapable of steering a clear course”81; that is, Eisenhower was not 
fully in control of the policymaking process.82 For example, on the nuclear front, the American 
government as a whole—in response to de Gaulle’s “generally uncooperative attitude on NATO 
issues”—was turning against the idea of providing nuclear assistance to the French. And with 
prominent figures like General Norstad making their case that helping the French with their 
nuclear development would not necessarily induce better cooperation in NATO, the sentiment 
against nuclear assistance to France was only strengthening.83 Against such backdrop, the US 
president was “no longer willing to put his foot down” and effect policies that “really expressed 
his own thinking,” and as a result, the issue of bilateral nuclear cooperation with France ended up 
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being “put on ice for the rest of the Eisenhower period.”84 Moreover, on the tripartite front, 
Secretary of State Christian Herter managed to sabotage Eisenhower’s December 1959 proposal 
for “tripartite machinery” by calling instead for “informal talks over dinner,” where “the main 
US representative would be a diplomat…not even the ambassador.”85 Clearly, the French were 
very disappointed by this policy reversal, yet there was not much the US president could do at 
this point to amend the situation, considering that he was “not even aware” of Herter’s 
intervention.86 In short, then, all this goes to show that Eisenhower was not fully in control 
during the final year of his presidency,87 and for this reason, despite his good intentions, he was 
ultimately unable to accommodate de Gaulle’s preferences as they related to nuclear weaponry 
and tripartite directorate.  
Overall, during the Eisenhower administration, de Gaulle failed to earn the United States’ 
respect for the privilege he felt France was entitled to as a great power aspirant—that of getting 
to play an influential global role by exercising full independence and policy autonomy as an 
equal of the Anglo-Saxons. In particular, the United States rebuffed his tripartite proposal and 
conveyed its unwillingness to provide nuclear assistance to France in a way that would allow for 
completely independent nuclear weaponry. And in response to such experience of disrespect, the 
French president resorted to alliance-eroding behaviors—refusing to cooperate with the NATO 
system—in order to signal his resolve and ability to exercise policy autonomy in defiance of the 
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United States and in ways that were consequential to world strategic plans and armament. To 
Eisenhower’s credit, the US president did try to make an effort to accommodate de Gaulle’s 
preferences the best he could, but not being in complete control of the government during the 
final year of his presidency, he was ultimately unable to do so. Fortunately for the US-France 
alliance, however, Eisenhower’s failure on these fronts did not instigate de Gaulle to engage in 
additional alliance-eroding behaviors. Perhaps the general was well aware of the political 
constraints that were holding Eisenhower back and therefore decided to pin his hopes instead on 
incoming President John F. Kennedy.  
Allies Part Ways: Kennedy and the French Rejection of the MLF 
If General de Gaulle had hoped that the Kennedy administration would come to show 
respect for France’s claimed great power privilege of exercising a significant independent 
influence over global affairs, the general was in for a disappointment. This was because President 
Kennedy, who believed that the United States under Eisenhower had been “too kind, too 
indulgent” towards its allies, was resolved to “become far more assertive in [his] dealings with 
the NATO allies.”88 After all, as Kennedy himself noted, “a Europe beyond our influence—yet 
counting on us—in which we should have to bear the burden of defense without the power to 
affect events—would not be desirable.”89 What this meant in practice was that the United States, 
as an “executive agent” for NATO, needed to take the initiative to “set policy for the West as a 
whole.”90 And in so doing, it “had to make up [its] mind[ ] and begin to act regardless of the 
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opinions of [its] allies.”91 That is, rather than coordinating with the latter, the United States 
simply had to “tell them.”92  
In this context, there was little hope for de Gaulle that the Kennedy administration 
would come to show respect for France’s claimed great power privilege of playing a principal 
role on the world stage as a speaker for Western Europe and as an equal of the Anglo-Saxons.93 
Indeed, as it soon turned out, the US government was quite unwilling to accept France’s renewed 
bid for the establishment of a tripartite directorate. For instance, when President of the French 
National Assembly Jacques Chaban-Delmas told President Kennedy in March 1961 that France 
wanted to have “Western policy coordinated by decisions [among United States, United 
Kingdom, and France] taken beforehand at the level of the conception of policies and not 
belatedly at the level of their implementation,” Kennedy remained cool to the French proposal.94 
Moreover, when General de Gaulle himself brought up the idea of a triumvirate during his 
meeting with former Secretary of State Dean Acheson in April 1961, claiming, “It was most 
important for France, Britain and the US to discuss matters together and then together attempt to 
influence the course of events,” Acheson effectively rejected the request by maintaining that any 
such discussion “should [strictly] be held within NATO” with all of “our NATO allies.”95 In 
                                         
91 Berlin Contingency Planning, June 16, 1961, in FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. 14, document 42. 
92 Meeting between Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, et al., October 20, 1961, in FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. 14, 
document 184. 
93 Giauque, "Offers of Partnership or Bids for Hegemony?," p. 91. 
94 Kennedy-Chaban-Delmas meeting, March 10, 1961, in FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. 13, document 225. 
Costigliola, "The Failed Design," p. 235; Costigliola, "Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to 
Consult," p. 109. 
95 Gavin to Rusk, April 20, 1961, in FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. 13, document 101. 
222 
 
essence, it was clear from the outset that the Kennedy administration, which was determined to 
exercise dominant leadership over Europe with NATO at the forefront, was not eager to show 
respect for France’s claimed great power privilege of playing an influential global role as a 
member of the privileged triumvirate. 
In response to such experience of disrespect, de Gaulle began to toughen his call for the 
“political union of the Europe of Six” via the Fouchet Plan (proposed in late 1961 and revised in 
early 1962).96 In particular, in February 1962, de Gaulle himself made major revisions to the 
agenda in order to drive home his point that France had a “well-developed plan to give the 
Europe of Six a common defense policy” that would enable the group—functioning as a sort of a 
“bloc within NATO”—to “contest US leadership” therein.97 What the general here was getting at 
was to highlight his conviction that France was ready to construct a political union of great 
significance and influence—especially now that it was “almost freed of the Algerian burden” and 
“ensured of its atomic force” after having conducted multiple nuclear tests98—so that he could 
more forcefully justify and solidify France’s leadership over the “European club of the Six.” And 
by doing so, de Gaulle sought to break into the “Anglo-American club of the Two,” since he 
believed that “being the first of Six reinforced France’s case to join the Two.”99 In short, the 
general was trying to “use the confederation [of the Six] to gain the political weight necessary to 
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force the United States to accept their tripartite demands.”100 
Unfortunately for de Gaulle, however, his move backfired. This was because the 
Kennedy administration—to the extent that it was keen on maintaining US dominance in 
Europe—was bound to be alarmed by any policy that could potentially “exclude the 
Americans…from any role in Western Europe, break up NATO, and establish French 
hegemony…with a French-dominated confederation.”101 For this reason, far from inducing the 
Americans to support France’s entry into the ranks of the Anglo-American Two, de Gaulle’s 
actions only ended up strengthening their determination to “buttress the United States’ role as the 
leader [of Europe] in strategic-military affairs”102 and to “oppose any ‘special’ role for France in 
the Alliance.”103 As Walt Rostow104 told Hervé Alphand105 in May 1962 in no uncertain terms, 
“Whether its allies wished it or not,” Washington had to “play its role as leader and impose its 
will when the superior interest of the West required it.”106 The most salient indication of this 
attitude came from the nuclear arena. Of great significance here was Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara’s speech of May 1962, which—by criticizing the French (and by extension, British) 
nuclear weapons as being “dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking credibility 
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as a deterrent”107—effectively reaffirmed his administration’s strong opposition to “grant[ing] 
any kind of assistance to France for their independent nuclear capability.”108 Overall, by mid-
1962, it was quite clear to the French that the US was unwilling to show respect for their claimed 
great power prerogative of playing a principal role on the world stage by exercising full 
independence and policy autonomy—as a leader of the Six and a member of the triumvirate—
hence the reason why Paris came to view Washington as “at best a ‘natural’ opponent of French 
goals and at worst as an active enemy of them.”109 
To be sure, certain sections of the US government were both aware and critical of the 
negative impact the Kennedy administration’s assertive approach to Europe was having on 
alliance management. General Norstad, for example, pointed out in December 1962 that 
“Washington’s arrogance was turning all Europe against us.”110 Similarly, Colonel Lawrence 
Legere noted in mid-1962 that the US policies had alienated the Europeans because they were 
based on the idea that Europe’s only real option “for the defense of [its] existence” was a “total 
dependence” on the Americans.111 And towards the end of the year, President Kennedy himself 
came to share these views. He became particularly concerned about the souring of American 
relations with France, and thus began to seek ways to “work out some kind of arrangement” that 
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would help “bring[ ] France back into the community of Western nations.”112 Accordingly, 
during an October 1962 National Security Council (NSC) meeting, the president asserted that the 
United States had to “reconsider present policy of refusing to give nuclear weapons assistance to 
France” if it wanted to achieve a high level of alliance cohesion with the latter.113 It was against 
such backdrop that Kennedy decided to extend the Anglo-American Nassau agreement of 
December 1962 to de Gaulle, a move that indicated that the US president was willing to 
implement a “far-reaching liberalization of American policy on nuclear assistance to France” in 
order to “rebuild bridges with de Gaulle.”114 Indeed, as the president later recalled, “a sizable 
part of the Nassau arrangements was designed to please the French.”115   
The significance of the Nassau agreement was that it signified a major shift in the 
Kennedy administration’s stance on nuclear assistance. Whereas previously the United States had 
been adamant that the “use of nuclear weapons” by its European allies had to “be subject to US 
veto and control,”116 the Nassau accords indicated that the US government was now ready to 
tolerate its allies’ (albeit only the French and British) possession of independent nuclear deterrent. 
In particular, per the agreement, the United States was to provide France and Britain with 
missiles that were expected, on the one hand, to be assigned to a NATO force, but, on the other, 
to ultimately fall under “national control” and be made “available for independent use.”117 And 
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as intended, such an arrangement turned out to pique de Gaulle’s interest, for it not only gave a 
green light to France’s operation of national nuclear weaponry, but also—by implying that “the 
three western powers, Britain, France and the United States, would be acting as a bloc,” as “joint 
defenders of Europe”—signaled for the first time that the Kennedy administration was willing to 
seriously consider the general’s proposal for a tripartite directorate.118  
However, if mending relations with the French was one of its main objectives, the 
Nassau agreement ended up failing to deliver. This was primarily because the multilateral force 
(MLF) lobby in Washington, headed by Under Secretary of State George Ball, managed to 
“sabotage[ ] the president’s policy.”119 Unlike Kennedy, who had advocated for establishing a 
NATO multilateral force that would bring together the US, British, and French national forces, 
the officials of the MLF group insisted that the European defense system had to take the form of 
a “mixed manned force” that rendered “independent use [of nuclear weapons] on a national basis 
impossible.”120 Accordingly, when Ball flew to Paris on January 10, 1963 for a session with 
North Atlantic Council, he was quick to disabuse French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville of 
the notion that the US government had given consent at Nassau to a multilateral arrangement that 
allowed for French national nuclear force. The Under Secretary stressed instead that the Nassau 
agreement “had changed nothing of substance” and that the United States remained as committed 
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as ever to the primacy of the “very tight, essentially non-national” multilateral weapons 
system.121 In essence, not long after the December Nassau meeting, Ball came to slam shut the 
door that Kennedy had opened,122 and in doing so, he unambiguously signaled that the United 
States, as it had before, did not intend to show respect for France’s claimed prerogative of 
playing a principal role on the world stage as a member of the privileged triumvirate and a leader 
of the Six.  
Against such backdrop, de Gaulle, who “had now had it with the United States,” came to 
officially reject the Nassau offer on January 14, 1963,123 reasoning that “to turn over our 
weapons to a multilateral force, under a foreign command, would be to act contrary to that 
principle of our defense and our policy.”124 The general then asserted that rather than joining the 
MLF, he would be focusing instead on “construct[ing]…and employ[ing] our atomic force 
ourselves,”125 essentially conveying his conviction that France had both the ability and resolve 
to exercise full independence and policy autonomy without being constrained by NATO. As he 
had warned Dulles back in July 1958, de Gaulle here was yet again making his point that France 
was not going to “throw itself enthusiastically into the effort of defending the free world” unless 
it felt that “it was playing a significant role in world strategy.”126 Unsurprisingly, such blunt 
refusal on the part of the French to cooperate with the NATO system left a sour taste in the 
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Americans’ mouths. In fact, during a February 1963 NSC meeting, the Kennedy administration 
even raised the possibility of making a “threat of withdrawing [US] troops” from Europe127—
certainly not a welcoming prospect for de Gaulle, who had always wanted the US troops to 
remain in Europe so that they could “bring[ ] [their] weight to bear in case of necessity.”128  
Nevertheless, de Gaulle, as determined as he was to overcome status inconsistency, did not 
backtrack.  
In sum, up to this point in the Kennedy administration, de Gaulle once again failed to 
earn the Americans’ respect for the claimed prerogative of playing a principal role on the world 
stage by exercising full independence and policy autonomy—as a leader of the Six and a 
member of the triumvirate. The general’s renewed bid for a tripartite directorate was rebuffed, 
and his effort to make a stronger case to break into the Anglo-American Two via the Fouchet 
Plan backfired, as it only strengthened the United States’ determination to buttress its dominance 
in Europe. To Kennedy’s credit, the president did attempt in late 1962 to mend fences with the 
French by offering the latter a significantly liberalized nuclear sharing arrangement, yet that 
policy was quickly sabotaged by his officials, and once again, the US government came to 
harden its opposition to its allies’ attainment of national nuclear weapons. All this ultimately led 
to de Gaulle’s rejection of the MLF in early 1963, the implication of which was rather clear: 
unless the United States showed respect for France’s claimed great power prerogative, the 
general “would not hesitate” to take assertive and defiant alliance-eroding actions in order to 
signal France’s ability and resolve to exercise such privilege in ways that were consequential to 
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world strategic plans and armament.129 
Towards France’s Exit from NATO in 1966 
The Kennedy administration was certainly aware of what de Gaulle was trying to get at. 
During a January 1963 NSC meeting, for example, President Kennedy correctly pointed out that 
de Gaulle, in rejecting the MLF, was implicitly calling yet again for a “US-UK-France 
directorate giving France, in effect, a veto on our use of nuclear weapons.” The US president also 
understood that the French action had been instigated by the general’s ambition to “restore 
France to a predominant position in Europe,” which in turn stemmed from his conviction that 
“France must be a dominant power speaking to the USSR and the West as an equal, dependent on 
no one.”130  
However, far from inducing President Kennedy to accommodate the general’s 
preferences, such an understanding only ended up strengthening the US president’s 
determination to “play hardball with the Europeans,” especially the French.131 This was because 
Kennedy, clearly aware of de Gaulle’s motives, became infuriated with the fact that the general 
had the gall to “launch[ ] his policies based solely on the self-interest of France,” even though he 
was “banking on us to defend him by maintaining our present military position in Europe.”132 
As the US leader angrily remarked, “These bastards [the French]” were “just liv[ing] off the fat 
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of the land and spit[ting] on us every chance they get.”133 And in Kennedy’s view, the French 
behavior, while certainly extreme, was indicative of the more general tendency of the European 
allies to balk at “do[ing] anything for us simply because we have in the past helped them.”134 
What this implied for Kennedy was that the Americans, even as they were looking after the 
“military interests of the Free World,” had to more actively “look out for ourselves” and 
“consider very hard the narrower interests of the United States.” Hence was the US government’s 
renewed determination to “take the lead” in Europe, assertively imposing US policies without 
being “held back by the allies.”135   
In this context, the United States came to pay little attention to France’s status concerns. 
For starters, on the tripartite front, Kennedy indicated that he intended to maintain his opposition 
to de Gaulle’s proposal for a directorate, since he believed that otherwise, NATO would break 
down. Moreover, on the MLF front, the president asserted that he would further strengthen the 
weapons system (“even though de Gaulle is opposed”), given that the “multilateral force will 
increase our influence in Europe and provide a way to guide NATO and keep it strong.”136 
Furthermore, in a similar vein, Kennedy concluded the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) 
in July 1963,137 even though the treaty, by “bann[ing] all above-ground nuclear tests,”138 
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threatened to compromise atomic independence of the French, who “had not yet mastered the 
technique of underground tests.”139 To be sure, France was not impacted much, if at all, by the 
LTBT, for it had refused to sign the treaty to begin with. At the same time, however, from the 
French point of view, the spirit of the LTBT itself was enough to raise the suspicion that the 
Americans were intent on creating “a new division of Europe between Russia and the Anglo-
Saxons,” in which the French would be marginalized to the sidelines.140 Overall, such an 
impression, in conjunction with the United States’ continued rebuff of the tripartite proposal and 
its strengthened push for the MLF, signaled to the French that the Americans were not willing to 
support their force de frappe, let alone accept them as an equal. 
Further reinforcing the French perception that the US was lukewarm at best about 
showing respect for their great power aspiration was the latter’s response to de Gaulle’s attempt 
at reviving the Fouchet Plan via the Franco-German partnership of 1963. When the Fouchet Plan 
as proposed by the general back in February 1962 collapsed in April that year due to opposition 
of other members of the Six, especially the Dutch and the Belgians (with implicit US 
encouragement),141 de Gaulle quickly came to terms that a political union as he himself had 
envisioned—a West European confederation with France at the helm—“would not be realized for 
quite some time.”142 Nevertheless, the general was still of the view that at least a strong 
foundation for such an entity could be established in the short run by pursuing a Franco-German 
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entente, and for this reason, went on to conclude a bilateral treaty of cooperation with West 
Germany on January 22, 1963.143 Per this agreement, Paris and Bonn would closely cooperate 
“in the fields of foreign policy, defense, and education,” and the French leader hoped that the two 
states would come to function as a “powerful magnet around which the other [West European] 
partners would gravitate,” and thereby “foster[ ] the development of a more independent Western 
Europe.”144 Incidentally, it was against such backdrop that de Gaulle rejected Britain’s entry into 
the Common Market on January 14, 1963, for he believed that otherwise, continental Europe 
would be completely absorbed into a “colossal Atlantic community dependent on America and 
under American control.”145  
Washington obviously was not happy with the French move. From the US point of view, 
de Gaulle, by having taken a major step towards “organiz[ing] the six continental countries…into 
a grouping with its own nuclear force,”146 was effectively embarking on “a systematic campaign 
to reduce American influence and presence on the continent.”147 Kennedy even feared that the 
general was trying to lay the groundwork for eventually “run[ing] us out of Europe by means of 
a deal with the Russians.”148 None of this was acceptable to the Americans, who found the 
“ingratitude of the Europeans…galling.”149 As James Reston of the New York Times pointed out 
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on January 21, “if they [France and Germany] were asking us…to defend…a protectionist, 
inward-looking Europe which puts the continent before the Atlantic—then they are asking and 
expecting things that have never been and never will be.”150  
Accordingly, the Kennedy administration set out to “neutralize the threat posed by the 
Franco-German Treaty,”151 and it decided to do so by “putting Bonn’s back against the wall,” 
forcing it to “choose between Paris and Washington.”152 Under such pressure, the Germans 
chose the United States—indicating that it would “follow[ ] the American line in return for 
American protection”—and in order to credibly signal its intention to uphold the new alignment, 
the Bundestag ratified the Franco-German Treaty on May 16, 1963 only after having unilaterally 
added a new preamble that “affirm[ed] the Federal Republic’s continuing loyalty to NATO.”153 
In short, the US government, angered by the anti-American bent of Western Europe about to be 
built on the Paris-Bonn axis, came to play a significant role in “emptying the Franco-German 
Treaty of its content,” and in doing so, frustrated France’s ambition to establish and solidify its 
leadership over the European club of the Six. All this reinforced for the French their impression 
that the Kennedy administration at the end of the day was far from willing to show respect for 
France’s claimed great power privilege of playing a principal role on the world stage by 
exercising full independence and policy autonomy—as a leader of the Six and a member of the 
triumvirate.  
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From this point on, the US-France alliance cohesion inexorably went downhill, 
“culminating in France’s withdrawal from the NATO” in 1966.154 In the absence of the United 
States’ respect for France’s claimed great power privilege, the French once again came to 
experience status inconsistency and were thus compelled to overcome the dissonance by even 
more forcefully signaling their desire to be recognized as a great power. And the fact that 
Kennedy’s successor Lyndon B. Johnson held the view that “distance [rather than engagement] 
was the best sedative for Franco-American relations”155—so much so that President Johnson and 
de Gaulle “were only ever in each other’s presence for thirty minutes”156—did not help convince 
the French otherwise. Accordingly, starting from the late Kennedy/early Johnson period, General 
de Gaulle began to take a series of assertive actions in defiance of the Americans in order to 
demonstrate France’s resolve and capability to exercise policy autonomy in ways that were 
consequential to world affairs.  
For instance, on the diplomatic front, the general on January 27, 1964 recognized the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), so that he could “reinforce France’s independence vis-à-vis 
the superpowers and promote France’s prestige as a global power.”157 Although his ministers 
had cautioned the French leader that such a move would most certainly come to “annoy the 
United States,” this, according to Julian Jackson, was “never a reason to hold back in de Gaulle’s 
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eyes.”158 What this implied was that even at the risk of antagonizing the US, the general here 
was resolved to leverage on the “diplomatic recognition of the PRC” to not only “help shift the 
global equilibrium” but also to remind other states that “France was still capable of having an 
impact on world affairs.”159 Moreover, on the international economic front, de Gaulle on 
February 4, 1965 publicly denounced the Bretton Woods system as a form of American 
economic imperialism that enabled “US companies to take over European companies cheaply” 
via deficit dollars.160 He called instead “for a return to a pure gold standard,” inviting other 
countries to “follow France’s example and turn in their surplus dollars for gold.”161 Although 
such an attack predictably “touched a nerve in the United States,” even coming to “infuriate[ ] 
key administration officials,” none of this “perturbed de Gaulle in the slightest.”162 For the 
general,  all this was well worth it so long as he could—through his “public and political 
denunciation”—get to place France “at the forefront of the debate about the international 
monetary system” and thereby demonstrate its ability to play an influential role in world 
affairs.163  
Perhaps the most dramatic and impactful of this series of assertive and defiant status-
driven actions came in 1966, when de Gaulle declared France’s withdrawal from NATO. On 
March 7, the general notified President Johnson that France intended to “recover the entire 
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exercise of its sovereignty on its territory…terminate its participation in the ‘integrated’ [NATO] 
commands, and no longer place its forces at NATO’s disposal,”164 and shortly after asserted that 
“all foreign troops—which principally meant US troops—would have to leave French territory or 
fall under French command by April 1967.165 The thrust of de Gaulle’s message was clear: 
“everything French out of NATO and everything NATO—especially everything American—out 
of France.”166 And understandably, such hostility came to antagonize the Americans, even 
making officials like George Ball and Robert McNamara argue that France “should no longer 
have the Article V protection provided by NATO.”167 Nevertheless, the French—in line with 
their defiance on the diplomatic and economic fronts—persevered. This was because in their 
view, by disengaging from NATO and thereby reclaiming complete national control over its 
defense—and not to mention, showcasing to the world its ability to dramatically challenge the 
US leadership—they would able to convincingly drive home their conviction that France 
deserved to be recognized as a great power that could play an influential global role by 
exercising full independence and policy autonomy.168  
In sum, de Gaulle, even after having forcefully made his case through his rejection of the 
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MLF, failed to earn the Americans’ respect for his claimed great power privilege. If anything, his 
defiant action only strengthened the Kennedy administration’s determination to maintain its 
dominance in Europe, leading it to continue opposing the tripartite proposal, insist on the MLF, 
sign the LTBT, and neutralize the Franco-German Treaty. And the Johnson administration, which, 
after all, believed that inaction was the best remedy for the de Gaulle problem, did little to 
accommodate the general’s preferences. Against such backdrop, de Gaulle’s status inconsistency 
was further heightened, and the general, in order to overcome the dissonance, came to take a 
series of assertive and defiant alliance-eroding actions on the diplomatic, economic, and defense 
fronts that were intended to convey his conviction that France was entitled to the privilege of 
exercising significant and independent influence over world strategic plans and armament. All 
this resulted in France’s exit from NATO in March 1966, which essentially put the final nail in 
the coffin of the US-France alliance cohesion during the de Gaulle period (1958-69). 
Alternative Explanations 
 In this penultimate section, I discuss the extent to which three alternative explanations—
1) divergence in threat perception of the USSR; 2) domestic politics and anti-Americanism; and 
3) desire to bandwagon with the Soviet Union—could account for France’s alliance-eroding 
behavior examined throughout the extensive case study above.  
Divergence in Threat Perceptions 
 The hypothesis that the divergence in threat perceptions of the Soviet Union and the 
resulting abandonment and/or entrapment fears on the part of the French caused the latter’s 
alliance-eroding behaviors finds some support from the case study. While it is true that both the 
French and the Americans consistently perceived the USSR as a major security threat, at times 
the relative difference in the levels of their respective threat perception came to instill the fear of 
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abandonment and/or entrapment in the French, thereby causing them to defy cooperation with 
the Americans. For example, during earlier part of the Berlin Crisis, de Gaulle refused to 
“proceed actively with joint planning [with the US] for the use of force when the Soviets 
threatened in November 1958 to liquidate western rights in Berlin,” since the general, being less 
determined than his American counterpart to resort to military action, wanted to avoid the 
prospect of becoming entrapped in an unwanted conflict (the general here had a relatively lower 
threat perception of the USSR).169 Moreover, during the later part of the Berlin Crisis, the 
French leader “went to great lengths in the first half of 1962 to block any negotiated settlement 
[between the US and the USSR] over Berlin,” for he feared that the Kennedy administration, by 
having authorized “direct negotiations with the Soviets,” was about to give “dangerous 
concessions…that would undermine Western European security” (de Gaulle here had a relatively 
higher threat perception of the USSR).170  
 Nonetheless, at the end of the day, the explanatory power of the 
abandonment/entrapment argument is limited. This is because while it might account for certain 
instances of French defiance individually in isolation, the argument fails to provide an 
overarching explanation for the broader pattern of French noncooperation across the de Gaulle 
period. In particular, one is left wondering why the French, despite their dependence on the 
Americans for security guarantee against the Russians, 171 would have resorted to alliance 
eroding actions on a regular basis, given that such behavior, by fostering an image of France as a 
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disloyal ally, was bound to increase the probability of getting both abandoned—by expediting the 
US troop withdrawal from Europe—and entrapped—by making the US more readily use force 
against the USSR without much regard for France’s security interests. In short, all this goes to 
show that in the absence of integrating France’s status concerns into our analysis, it is difficult to 
understand from the security point alone as to why the French would have resorted to a series of 
defiant actions that only increased the odds of both abandonment and entrapment, the very 
outcomes that the French—as the argument goes—had sought to avoid in the first place through 
their non-cooperative behavior. 
Domestic Politics and Anti-Americanism 
The hypothesis that it was anti-American sentiment in France and the French leader’s 
desire to cater to such public opinion that caused the low levels of US-France alliance cohesion 
observed does not find support from the case study. To be sure, due to France’s continued display 
of defiance against the United States throughout the de Gaulle period, the Americans naturally 
came to believe that the general’s policies were “the results of his anti-Americanism”172 and 
largely “animated by anti-American prejudice.”173 In fact, US Ambassador to France Charles 
Bohlen went so far as to claim in 1967 that the French leader’s “anti-Americanism [has become] 
a compulsive obsession.”174  
However, as Max Paul Friedman points out, the Americans came to perceive the French 
as anti-American not because they were inherently so, but simply because France’s policies often 
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came into conflict with their own. That is, from the French point of view, they were merely 
“pursu[ing] French interests based on French analyses”—as Friedman observes, “de Gaulle and 
his principal subordinates” displayed almost no signs of anti-Americanism “in their internal 
memorandums, classified correspondence, diaries, and memoirs”—but for the Americans, who 
believed that the French should “accept American leadership” because “American and French 
interests were congruent” to begin with, France’s refusal to readily follow their lead was bound 
to come across as being anti-American. Indeed, when Kennedy asked Couve de Murville in 1963 
why the French were always giving their policies “an anti-American aspect,” the latter responded 
that “what Kennedy saw as anti-Americanism was either a divergence of interests or different 
views.”175 In essence, all this goes to show that rather than anti-Americanism being the cause of 
France’s defiance, it was France’s uncooperative behavior—which was after all based on its own 
national interests—that made it seem as if anti-American sentiment was at the heart of France’s 
alliance policies. 
Moreover, there is little evidence that de Gaulle’s alliance policies were formulated with 
an eye on domestic public opinion more generally. According to Thomas Risse-Kappen, “the 
Fifth Republic’s centralized political system and a fragmented societal structure” not only made 
it “difficult to build a public consensus on policy issues” but also “limit[ed] the public impact on 
foreign and security policy.”176 Indeed, as Risse-Kappen points out, “with the possible exception 
of the ending of the Algerian war,” there is “not much evidence that any of the major foreign 
policy decisions”—be it “building of an independent nuclear force” or “the withdrawal from 
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NATO’s military command,” among others—“were taken in response to public opinion.” This 
was because “in most cases, public opinion was deeply split on the issues,” which made it easier 
for the French leaders, including and especially de Gaulle, to “create a public consensus 
supporting their foreign policies after the event.”177 Overall, then, based on these considerations, 
it can be said that neither public opinion in general nor anti-American sentiment in particular was 
responsible for causing France’s alliance-eroding behaviors during the de Gaulle period.  
Bandwagoning with the USSR 
Finally, the hypothesis that France’s desire to bandwagon with the Soviet Union caused 
the low levels of US-France alliance cohesion observed does not hold true. For starters, it should 
be recalled that the very purpose of de Gaulle’s grand strategy was to construct “a Europe that 
could be truly independent of the United States and of the Soviet Union…a Europe that could 
chart its own course in world affairs [emphasis added],”178 which implied that it scarcely made 
any sense for France to have moved away from the US only to align itself anew with the USSR. 
Indeed, as it turns out, for most of the period under examination (1958-66), the French did not 
make much of an effort to improve relations with the Soviet Union, let alone do so at the cost of 
sacrificing relations with the US. For example, during 1958-1962, de Gaulle, holding a 
particularly pessimistic view of the Soviet threat—“even more so than…Washington and London, 
because of the evident Soviet nuclear–strategic progress after 1956-57…the Berlin crisis in 
1958-62, and the Cuba crisis”179—naturally balked at establishing ties with the USSR.180 
                                         
177 Ibid., p. 503. 
178 Trachtenberg, "The De Gaulle Problem," p. 84. 
179 Georges‐Henri Soutou, "France and the Cold War, 1944–63," Diplomacy and Statecraft 12, no. 4 
(2001): 41. 
242 
 
Moreover, even during 1963-64, when superpower relations were “at their closest since the start 
of the Cold War,” de Gaulle decided to stay the course, for he suspected that Moscow, yet to 
“abandon[ ] its aggressive ideology” or “loosen[ ] its grip on the satellite states,” continued to 
harbor hostile intentions. 181  
To be sure, the French leader did begin to reach out to the USSR in late 1964 and 1965, 
when he came to believe that the Soviets—by having removed Khrushchev from power and 
relaxed their grip on the eastern satellites—were about to bring more tranquility to their foreign 
policy.182 Even so, the fact remained that the general was still wary and mistrustful of Moscow’s 
intentions and thus “wanted to continue probing the Soviet government before intensifying 
cooperation”; as he told one of his aides in 1965, “They [the Russians] will have to make their 
thinking clear…[and] must give new and evident proof of their desire for détente and entente.”183 
Accordingly, when de Gaulle made his trip to the Soviet Union in July 1966, he did so primarily 
to test the water—“to see where the Soviets are going, and what they are ready to agree to; or at 
least where they are going and what they are not ready to agree to”184—rather than to make any 
concrete diplomatic breakthrough. In essence, all this goes to show that while the French were 
seeking to improve relations with the Soviets during 1964-66, they were only doing so very 
cautiously and incrementally. In this context, anything close to an alignment with the USSR at 
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the expense of the US was out of the question for the French; as the general himself made it clear 
during his Moscow visit, France was an independent nation that “accepted Soviet power [only] 
as a balance against American hegemony, [just] like he accepted American power as a guarantee 
against Soviet hegemony.”185  
Conclusion 
A close reading of the historical record shows that France’s status concerns influenced 
the trajectory of the US-France alliance relations during the de Gaulle period (1958-1969) in 
nontrivial ways. Specifically, France, as a great power aspirant, felt entitled to the privilege of 
playing a principal role on the world stage—as a leader of Western Europe and an equal of the 
Anglo-Saxons—by exercising full independence and policy autonomy in ways that were 
consequential to global strategic plans and armament. To this end, the French strove to acquire 
independent nuclear weaponry under pure national control, to secure leadership over Western 
Europe, and to attain a position of equality with Washington (and London) over the management 
of world affairs. And in order to actually get France recognized as a great power, the general 
sought to earn the United States’ respect for the claimed prerogative.  
Unfortunately for de Gaulle, however, he failed to do so, for the United States across the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations continued to rebuff his proposal for a 
tripartite directorate, to frustrate France’s attempt at securing leadership over the Six via the 
Fouchet Plan (1961-62) and the Franco-German Treaty (1963), and to oppose providing nuclear 
assistance in a way that would allow for national nuclear weaponry. To be sure, Presidents 
Eisenhower and Kennedy did try at times to accommodate de Gaulle’s preferences on the 
                                         
185 Martin, General De Gaulle's Cold War, p. 109. 
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tripartite and nuclear fronts, yet both of their initiatives ended up getting quickly sabotaged by 
their officials.  
Against such backdrop, de Gaulle’s France—compelled to overcome status 
inconsistency—resorted to a series of alliance eroding behaviors in defiance of the US—such as 
withdrawing their Mediterranean fleet from NATO in 1959, rejecting the MLF in 1963, publicly 
denouncing the Bretton Woods systems as an instrument of American imperialism in 1965, 
among others—in order to drive home its conviction that France had both the resolve and ability 
to exercise policy autonomy in ways that were consequential to global affairs. As a result, the 
US-France alliance cohesion continued to go downhill, culminating in France’s eventual 
withdrawal from NATO in 1966.186  
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
186 Could the Americans have done anything differently to satisfy de Gaulle? Probably not, considering 
that any action aimed at accommodating de Gaulle’s status concerns was bound to hurt the United States’ 
relationship with both Germany and Britain. For example, consenting to France’s national nuclear 
capability would have provoked the Germans, in defiance of the Americans, to go nuclear themselves. 
And accepting de Gaulle’s tripartite proposal would have angered both the Germans and the British; the 
Germans because the triumvirate by definition would have relegated them to second-class status (below 
France, US, and Britain), and the British because the tripartite directorate would have weakened their 
“special relationship” with the Americans by adding a third member of equal status to the Anglo-
American Two. Moreover, recognizing France as a leader of the European Six would have antagonized 
the Germans because it would have forced them to live under the French “hegemony”, and also the 
British because the French would have leveraged on their power to limit Britain’s economic and political 
interaction with the continental Europe. In short, insofar as the Americans did not value their alliance with 
the French more than their relationship with the Germans and the British, there doesn’t seem to be 
anything they could have done differently to satisfy de Gaulle’s status ambitions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
The main goals of this dissertation were twofold. The first goal was to explain why the 
United States and South Korea have frequently clashed over the North Korean nuclear problem 
throughout the post-Cold War period, even though—per the alliance literature—the presence of a 
shared threat and the alliance’s asymmetric structure should have provided a strong cohesive 
force to the partnership. To this end, I focused on the South Korean side of the story, trying to 
understand why the country has often defied powerful strategic logic to unilaterally pursue its 
own set of policies towards the DPRK in defiance of the United States. The second goal of the 
project was to demonstrate that the findings from the US-ROK alliance can be generalized to 
explain cases of conflict that occur within asymmetric alliances more broadly. For this, I 
conducted an in-depth case study of the US-France alliance relations during the presidency of 
Charles de Gaulle (1958-1969), up to France’s withdrawal from NATO in 1966. Overall, I 
embarked on this dissertation project to advance our understanding of the nature of conflicts that 
can develop within asymmetrical alliances more generally, in both empirical and theoretical 
terms. 
Summary of the Findings 
In my study, I found that the low levels of US-ROK alliance cohesion over the North 
Korean nuclear problem should be understood within the context of South Korea’s pursuit of 
status as a solid middle power in the post-Cold War period. In particular, the South Koreans have 
had a conviction that their country, as a middle power aspirant, was entitled to the privilege of 
exercising a significant degree of influence over the management of foreign policy issues critical 
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to their national interest, such as the North Korean nuclear problem. This privilege in turn had to 
be respected by the United States in order for their aspired middle power status to be recognized 
and thereby legitimized. What this meant was that if the South Koreans believed that the United 
States was not showing respect for their claimed prerogative, they would experience status 
inconsistency—a mismatch between the level of attributed status and the level of status a state 
believes she deserves—and as a result, become motivated to resort to assertive and defiant 
alliance-eroding behaviors in order to signal to the US their ability and resolve to exercise the 
privilege. Such was the logic underpinning the ROK’s alliance eroding behaviors during both the 
First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94 (Chapter 2) and the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis of 
2002-06 (Chapter 3).  
During the First Korean Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94, the ROK frequently engaged in 
policy reversals—aligning its policies with the US at one point and not doing so at another—and 
this, I found, was due in large part to its experience of status inconsistency. In particular, when 
the South Koreans believed that the United States was showing respect for their claimed 
prerogative of playing an integral role in crisis management, they were able to focus squarely on 
the central goal of ensuring a nuclear-free North Korea and to closely cooperate with the United 
States towards that end. However, when the South Koreans believed otherwise, they came to 
experience status inconsistency, which in turn instigated them to take assertive and defiant 
alliance-eroding actions that were primarily aimed at signaling their ability and resolve to play an 
influential role in crisis management—such as reining in the US-DPRK talks—rather than at 
tackling the main nuclear issue in hand. Overall, these behavioral fluctuations ended up 
weakening alliance cohesion and, by extension, inhibiting a successful resolution of the nuclear 
crisis. 
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Among the three alternative explanations—1) divergence in threat perception; 2) 
domestic politics and anti-Americanism; and 3) desire to bandwagon with the rising China—I 
found no support for the first or the third. I did, however, find partial support for the second, in 
the sense that while anti-Americanism was absent during the First Korean Nuclear Crisis, public 
opinion in general did matter a great deal for the ROK President Kim Young-Sam. Nonetheless, 
rather than contradicting my central argument, the domestic political explanation actually 
complemented the latter. That is, although the ROK’s experience of status inconsistency was in 
itself a significant motivator of its alliance eroding behavior, what added further fuel to the fire 
was President Kim’s sense of obligation—as the first civilian leader of a newly democratized 
nation—to pay an extra careful attention to public opinion when he formulated policies towards 
the US-ROK alliance and the North Korean nuclear issue.  
Similarly, during the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis of 2002-06, I found that the ROK’s 
diplomatic maneuvers were also motivated to a significant extent by its experience of status 
inconsistency. In particular, South Korea, as a middle power aspirant, had a sense of entit lement 
to the privilege of exercising a significant influence over the management of the nuclear issue. 
And the South Koreans expected the United States to show respect for the prerogative by 
upholding the principle of horizontal and equitable relationship as the allies jointly tackled the 
nuclear issue. However, as the South Koreans saw it, the United States failed overall to 
reciprocate, and it was against such backdrop that the ROK—compelled to overcome status 
inconsistency—started to adopt a more proactive and assertive approach to the nuclear issue in 
defiance of the US in order to signal its resolve and ability to exercise the claimed privilege. As a 
result, the US-ROK alliance cohesion experienced a precipitous decline during the later part of 
the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, up to the DPRK’s first nuclear test in October 2006. 
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In terms of alternative explanations, I found only a limited support for the claim that the 
divergence in threat perceptions of the DPRK contributed to the ROK’s alliance-eroding 
behavior.1 To be sure, the South Koreans did not perceive the DPRK to be as great of a threat as 
did the Americans, and such difference in threat perceptions did lead the former—out of a fear of 
getting entrapped in an unwanted US-DPRK conflict—to act in defiance of the latter at times. 
Ultimately, however, I did not find this line of argument convincing, for it failed explain why the 
South Koreans—who were after all continuing to depend heavily on the US security guarantee 
against the DPRK—resorted to alliance eroding behaviors on a regular basis, which, by fostering 
an image of themselves as a disloyal ally and thereby antagonizing the Americans, were bound to 
heighten the risk of entrapment (and also abandonment)—the very outcome that the ROK, as the 
argument went, had sought to avoid in the first place through its non-cooperative behavior. 
On the basis of my findings from the US-ROK alliance, I was able to come up with a 
generalized argument that attempts to explain why asymmetric allies are sometimes unable to 
display a high level of alliance cohesion despite mutual interests and shared threats, as follows: if 
the smaller partner in an asymmetric alliance—assuming that it aspires for a higher status vis-à-
vis the status quo—believes that its stronger partner is not showing respect for its claimed 
privilege associated with that status, the former—in order to overcome status inconsistency—is 
likely to take assertive and defiant alliance-eroding actions to signal to the latter its resolve and 
ability to exercise the prerogative. In order to test the validity of this argument, I conducted an 
in-depth case study of the US-France alliance relations during the de Gaulle period (1958-69), up 
to France’s decision to withdraw from NATO in 1966. 
                                         
1 I found no evidence at all that the ROK’s actions were driven by anti-American sentiment or a desire to 
bandwagon with China. 
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As it turned out, the findings from the French case study very closely paralleled those 
from the two Korean nuclear crises. That is, in the context of the US-France alliance, France’s 
diplomatic maneuvers were significantly driven by its experience of status inconsistency. 
General Charles de Gaulle entered office in 1958 as the first president of the Fifth Republic of 
France with a determination to restore and solidify France’s great power status. De Gaulle 
believed that France, as a great power aspirant, was entitled to exercise the privilege of playing a 
principal role on the world stage—as a leader of Western Europe and an equal of the Anglo-
Saxons—by exercising full independence and policy autonomy in ways that were consequential 
to world strategic plans and armament. In order to actually get France recognized as a great 
power, the general sought to earn the United States’ respect for the claimed prerogative, yet to his 
disappointment, he continued to fail to do so across the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson 
administrations. Against such backdrop, de Gaulle’s France—compelled to overcome status 
inconsistency—resorted to a series of assertive and defiant alliance-eroding behaviors— such as 
entirely withdrawing their Mediterranean fleet from NATO in 1959, refusing to participate in the 
American-sponsored multilateral force (MLF) in 1963, and establishing diplomatic relations with 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1964 without having notified Washington—in order to 
drive home the point that France had both the resolve and ability to exercise policy autonomy in 
an influential manner. As a result, the US-France alliance cohesion continued to go downhill, 
culminating in France’s eventual exit from NATO in 1966. 
Certainly, the relative difference in the levels of the United States’ and France’s 
respective threat perception of the USSR did come to instill the fear of abandonment and/or 
entrapment in the French, thereby having caused them at times to defy cooperation with the 
Americans. Nonetheless, at the end of the day, I found this to be, at best, an incomplete 
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explanation for the broader pattern of France’s alliance-eroding behaviors. This is because the 
argument failed to explain why the French—despite their dependence on the Americans for 
security guarantee against the Russians—consistently resorted to assertive and defiant actions, 
which, by fostering an image of themselves as a disloyal ally and thereby alienating the 
Americans, were bound to heighten the risk of both abandonment and entrapment—the very 
outcomes that the French, as the argument went, had sought to avoid in the first place through 
their non-cooperative behavior.2  
In sum, I have accomplished two major tasks in this dissertation. First, I have 
demonstrated that the low levels of the US-ROK alliance cohesion over the North Korean 
nuclear problem should be understood in terms of South Korea’s pursuit of status as a solid 
middle power in the post-Cold War period. In particular, I have shown that the ROK’s diplomatic 
maneuvers in the context of the US-South Korea alliance has been significantly driven by its 
experience of status inconsistency, which turned out to trump the influence of other more 
“conventional” factors like the divergence in threat perceptions, domestic politics (anti-
Americanism), and a desire to bandwagon with the rising China. Second, I have leveraged on the 
findings from the US-ROK alliance to posit a generalized argument that attempts explain causes 
of conflicts that can occur within asymmetric alliances more broadly, the plausibility of which 
has been confirmed via the in-depth case study of the US-France alliance relations during the de 
Gaulle period. 
Theoretical Contributions 
This dissertation has made a number of theoretical contributions. First, it has proposed a 
                                         
2 Incidentally, I found no evidence that the French behavior was driven by either anti-Americanism or by 
their desire to bandwagon with the USSR. 
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concrete and testable mechanism via which an experience of status inconsistency could lead to a 
particular state behavior. That is, in contrast to the large body of scholarship on status 
inconsistency,3 which generally tends to take for granted that a given state behavior (e.g., 
initiating a violent international conflict) is simply a spontaneous reaction to an experience of 
status inconsistency, my project has added greater substance to this mechanism by having 
proposed the concepts of (dis)respect and (mis)recognition as the crucial intermediary steps 
linking status dissatisfaction and the resulting state action.  
Second, while most of the scholarship on status inconsistency has focused primarily on 
the linkage between status concerns and initiation of violent international conflict, 4  this 
dissertation has made it clear that such a limitation in the scope of state behavior is not warranted. 
Recall that, per my argument, a status inconsistent state tries to signal to its significant others its 
ability and resolve to exercise some of the privileges associated with its aspired status by 
resorting to assertive and defiant actions. While engaging in a military conflict is certainly one 
way of going about it, I have shown that it is not necessarily the only way; for example, France 
managed to convey its signal through its refusal to cooperate with the US under the NATO 
framework. In essence, this dissertation has broadened our understanding of the range of 
behaviors and strategies that states could resort to over the course of overcoming status 
dissatisfaction.5 
The third contribution of the project relates to the question of whether status-seeking is 
                                         
3 Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 2 (1964): 95-119. 
4 Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, "Reputation and Status as Motives for War," Annual 
Review of Political Science 17 (2014): 383. 
5 Jonathan Renshon, "Status Deficits and War," International Organization 70, no. 3 (2016): 513-50. 
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rational or irrational. The majority of works in the status literature have—explicitly or by 
implication—taken the latter position, viewing status-seeking “largely as a manifestation of 
pathology or irrationality.”6 Yet, at the same time, an increasing number of works have come to 
challenge this position, making their case that status is “something that political actors care about 
and are willing to pay costs to gain,” for there is “an expectation that it is instrumentally 
valuable.” 7  Contrary to both of these lines of research, however, my dissertation has 
demonstrated that status-seeking can be simultaneously rational and irrational. That is, it has 
shown that while status, on the one hand, is a valuable enough resource that makes it rational for 
states to go after, on the other, it can often prompt a state to resort to behavior that do not make 
sense in rational terms—especially when one becomes overwhelmed with emotions like anger 
and frustration that follow an experience of disrespect and/or humiliation where status concerns 
are involved.  
Fourth, this project has contributed to the alliance literature by having proposed another 
significant avenue via which an alliance can endure or collapse. In particular, contrary to the 
conventional wisdom of alliance politics, I have shown that even when the influence of external 
threat and domestic politics is held relatively constant,8 a state could still engage in alliance 
eroding behaviors depending on its belief as to whether or not it is being “properly treated” by 
the alliance partner. That is to say, my project has demonstrated that the nature of diplomatic 
interaction can play as significant a role as changes in a state’s external or internal environments 
                                         
6 Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2017), p. 50. 
7 Ibid., p. 51. 
8 Stephen M Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," Survival 39, no. 1 (1997): 156-79. 
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in either bringing alliance partners together or splitting them apart.     
Fifth, this dissertation has explored some of the conditions under which a middle power 
might stand up to a great power despite their power differential. Scholars have pointed out that 
middle powers, often being “objects rather than subjects” of international politics, tend to “find it 
hard to accept” the reality in which their fate gets “conditioned by the policies and relations of 
stronger powers.” However, they have yet to explain why those countries, despite holding similar 
views, differ so greatly in the actual policies they take towards great powers. For example, states 
like Iran strive to negate great power influence by forming alliances with their regional neighbors, 
whereas countries like Taiwan welcome great power engagement in their region. 9 In this 
dissertation, I have addressed this gap in the middle power literature by having posited a pattern 
of state behavior that might account for such divergence: namely, that a middle power’s 
willingness to challenge (or cooperate with) a great power is significantly influenced by the 
extent to which the latter shows disrespect (or respect) for the former’s status aspirations. 
Finally, this project has weighed directly in on the fundamental question of whether 
international politics is to be understood in essentially realist terms. Realism is built upon the 
basic assumption that the anarchic structure of the international system generates strong 
pressures on leaders to make choices for power political reasons. What this implies is that a 
variety of state behaviors should be primarily driven by concerns for physical security and/or 
material prosperity, whereas an array of unit-level and personality factors such as leadership style, 
                                         
9 Randall L. Schweller, "The Concept of Middle Power," in The Korean Pivot: The Study of South Korea 
as a Global Power, ed. Victor D. Cha and Marie Dumond (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2017), pp. 6-7. 
257 
 
domestic politics, regime type, or ideology should be of secondary importance.10 Contrary to 
such expectations, however, I have demonstrated in this project that the desire for status can 
fundamentally influence state behavior even when security and/or material considerations should 
have been dominant. In short, my findings have not only drawn attention to the limitations in 
trying to understand international politics in purely power political terms but also underscored 
the analytical edge one could gain by incorporating non-rationalist insights and variables into the 
existing neorealist theoretical framework.  
Policy Implications 
This dissertation has important policy implications as well. Over the post-Cold War 
period, the United States—as often criticized—has tended to leverage on its sole superpower 
status to impose its will on its friends and allies and consequently has come to alienate many of 
them at one point or another.11 Yet despite its overwhelming power, the United States can no 
longer afford to pursue its foreign policies in such manner, given how difficult it has become 
(and will continue to be) for the Americans to unilaterally tackle problems such as “controlling 
terrorism, curbing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rebuilding failed states, and 
maintaining economic stability” without others’ help.12 For this reason, it is now incumbent 
                                         
10 Galen Jackson, "The Importance of Playing the Two-Level Game: U.S. Domestic Politics and the Road 
to a Separate Peace, 1977-1978," Forthcoming, Journal of Cold War Studies: 3; Kenneth N Waltz, Theory 
of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010); John J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics, Updated ed. (New York, NY: WW Norton & Company, 2014); Stephen M Walt, 
The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 
11 Stephen M Walt, "Taming American Power," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 105-20; John J 
Mearsheimer, Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2018). 
12 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to 
U.S. Primacy," International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 63. 
258 
 
upon Washington to actively look for ways to successfully persuade its allies and partners to get 
on board with the US global governance or, at a minimum, dissuade them from obstructing US 
efforts.13 
One such way, which this dissertation has proposed, is for the United States to make an 
effort to understand other states’ status concerns and to start showing respect for some of the 
privileges and prerogatives they associate with their claimed status positions. Hypothetically, for 
example, if Japan, as a great power aspirant, were to feel entitled to wield significant influence 
over the management of regional security affairs, then Washington could be showing respect for 
that claimed privilege by closely cooperating with Tokyo and actively seeking out its advice 
when dealing with Pyongyang’s provocations. The rationale here is essentially that a show of 
respect for “foreign nations and their leaders can often facilitate dialog and cooperation,” just as 
“disrespect can fuel conflicts.”14 That is to say, (dis)respect for status concerns in international 
politics could potentially go a long way towards facilitating (or impeding) interstate 
collaboration on important global issues.  
In short, the recommendation of this project is that if the United States wants to get its 
friends, allies, and partners to sincerely cooperate with its international agenda, it would be better 
off—as the Obama administration had set out to do back in 2009—trying to put an end to the 
“problematical habits…such as lecturing foreign governments or confronting them with fait 
accomplis,” and instead start treating others with “dignity and respect.”15 After all, many 
                                         
13 Ibid. 
14 Reinhard Wolf, "Treating Asian Nations with Respect: Promises and Pitfalls of Status Recognition," 
Global Discourse 4, no. 4 (2014): 464. 
15 Ibid., pp. 463-64. 
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countries around the world, whether they are allies like the ROK and Japan or potential partners 
like China and Russia, desire to interact with the United States on a level playing field, rather 
than as subordinates, and thus want their ideas and interests to be respected and taken seriously.16 
In the context of the three case studies conducted in this dissertation, could the United 
States have induced better cooperation from the South Korean and French allies by having made 
a greater effort to show respect for their status concerns? In theory, Washington probably could 
have, yet in practice, competing priorities would have constrained its initiatives towards that end.  
For instance, during the de Gaulle period (1958-69), any US action aimed at showing respect for 
the general’s status concerns—giving consent to France’s national nuclear weapons, accepting 
the tripartite proposal, or recognizing France as a leader of the continental Europe—was bound 
to hurt the United States’ relations with both Germany and Britain, which the Americans valued 
as much, if not more, than their alliance with the French. Moreover, during the First Korean 
Nuclear Crisis of 1993-94, the United States could have accommodated the ROK’s status 
concerns by having ceded the main negotiating platform to the two Koreas, yet at the expense of 
potentially eroding its influence over the Korean peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region at large. 
Furthermore, during the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis of 2002-06, Washington could have 
satisfied the ROK government’s status aspirations by having consistently upheld the principle of 
horizontal and equitable relationship that its ally so desired, though at the risk of facing domestic 
political backlash for being too accepting of the ROK’s dovish policies toward the DPRK.  
Overall, what these examples indicate is not that a show of respect for status concerns is an 
ineffective tool for fostering alliance cohesion by any means, but simply that it is something that 
                                         
16 James Jungbok Lee, "Will China’s Rise Be Peaceful? A Social Psychological Perspective," Asian 
Security 12, no. 1 (2016): 46. 
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policymakers must use wisely and carefully, never losing sight of its potential drawbacks.   
Directions for Future Research 
In concluding this project, three distinct avenues for future research can be suggested. 
First, more case studies need to be conducted in order to determine whether the findings of this 
dissertation are truly generalizable. While I did carry out an in-depth case study of the US-France 
relations as an important first step towards broadening the findings from the US-ROK alliance to 
other cases of conflicts that occur within asymmetric alliances more broadly, it was nonetheless 
only a first step, and there is no doubt that by testing my argument against a greater number of 
cases, its explanatory power would become better established. In particular, it would be ideal if 
asymmetric alliances between non-democratic nations—such as Sino-Soviet alliance during the 
Cold War or China-North Korea alliance today—and those between a democratic and a non-
democratic nation—such as the US-Saudi Arabia alliance—could be added to the mix, as it 
would allow us to determine if states react to an experience of status inconsistency differently 
depending on their regime type. Moreover, it would also be informative if one could study those 
alliances in which the smaller partner construes something other than independence and policy 
autonomy as a privilege associated with its aspired higher status, as it would allow us to find out 
whether an experience of status inconsistency triggers different state behaviors depending on the 
nature of the claimed prerogative at stake.  
Second, one could analyze how and why a state’s sensitivity to status inconsistency 
might come to fluctuate over time. In the case of the ROK, for example, the South Koreans of 
the post-Cold War period have consistently believed that their country, as a middle power 
aspirant, was entitled to exercise a significant degree of policy autonomy over the management 
of foreign policy issues critical to their national interest. This, however, did not mean that an 
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experience of status inconsistency has always instigated the South Koreans to resort to assertive 
and defiant alliance-eroding behaviors. For instance, the Lee Myung-Bak (2008-2013) and Park 
Geun-Hye (2013-2017) administrations—unlike their Kim Young-Sam and Roh Moo-Hyun 
counterparts—were able to display a high level of alliance cohesion with the US over the DPRK 
nuclear problem, even though they did not get to exert a substantial degree of influence over the 
issue as they might have wanted to. In short, it would be interesting to examine why a state might 
be particularly sensitive to status inconsistency at one point yet rather nonchalant about it at 
another, even as its aspiration to a higher status and its conception of a privilege associated with 
that position are held constant.17   
Finally, a line of research that sets out to explore the causal impact of respectful behavior 
could be pursued. For the majority of the dissertation, I have focused on the analysis of 
disrespectful behavior, examining how it could trigger status inconsistency, which in turn tends 
to instigate a state to take assertive and defiant actions.18 However, it would also be interesting 
to examine in depth what kind of impact a show of respect would have on state behavior. At a 
first glance, it might be easy to take for granted that a respectful behavior would induce greater 
cooperation from another state by helping it overcome status inconsistency. At the same time, 
                                         
17 To be sure, the differences in the South Korean behaviors could be a reflection of variations in the level 
of threat perception of the DPRK across the different administrations. Even if this were true, however, it 
would still be fruitful to examine the causes underlying fluctuations in a state’s sensitivity to status 
inconsistency over time. This is because changes in a state’s threat perception while its status aspirations 
are held relatively constant give us an excellent opportunity to analyze the specific conditions under 
which security issues come to trump status concerns, and vice versa. 
18 This had much to do with methodological reasons. As Reinhard Wolf points out, it is more difficult to 
empirically measure and detect the experience of respect compared to disrespect, for oftentimes, “actors 
tend not to comment on treatment they feel entitled to.” While one could rely on “the very absence 
of…complaints about disrespect” as a sign of respect, then one would be running into the “well-known 
problem[ ] of proving negatives.” Reinhard Wolf, "Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The 
Significance of Status Recognition," International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 113-14. 
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however, there is also a chance that a show of respect might backfire, for it could “encourage an 
inflated self-esteem well beyond the level intended by the respecting actor,”19 thereby increasing 
the odds that the “respected” state, with an artificially heightened status expectations, would yet 
again come to experience status inconsistency when its “updated” demands are not met. In 
essence, this line of research would help one determine the most optimal manner of showing 
respect for a status inconsistent state while minimizing any of its potential “side effects”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
19 Wolf, "Treating Asian Nations with Respect: Promises and Pitfalls of Status Recognition," p. 469. 
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